1 10 38 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/02952e9acee97c43eba65ac601b06287.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/4fff2418a0703b1062a84b628a80d7e1.mp4 d194aa5ccdcf00005ed884a27044184c Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Wormser, Eric Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 1:01:39 Location The location of the interview Stamford, Connecticut Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:05] David Christensen: Interview with Mr. Eric Wormser in Stamford, Connecticut, October 26, 1971. [00:00:20] DC: Mr. Wormser will now relay how he first became involved with the German rocket program at the end of World War II. [00:00:33] Eric Wormser: I was drafted in January 1945, after having been previously deferred because of having been employed in essential war work in the field of optics and fire control. After receiving six weeks basic training at Fort Belvoir in January 1945, I was assigned to a special army unit which operated out of the Pentagon and assigned drafted specialized technical manpower to various high-priority technical projects in the army. [00:02:02] DC: So, you had [inaudible] industrial experience primarily why they– [00:02:09] EW: Yes, I have a degree in mechanical engineering at MIT in 1942. I had three years of industrial experience in the field of optical fire control instruments. [00:02:31] DC: And you also spoke German at that time? [00:02:34] EW: I was born in Germany– [00:02:38] DC: Oh, I see. [00:02:41] EW: – and educated in Germany up to my twelfth year so that I speak German, you might say fluently, but do not have great technical depth in German. [00:03:08] DC: That was a key consideration in this assignment, I guess, that you’re German in your background. [00:03:14] EW: Right. I was assigned first by the army to Frankfurt Arsenal for a brief period of time to work on problems on army optical fire control instruments. [00:03:46] DC: When did you meet Toftoy? In the Pentagon, said you were assigned there to him? [00:03:58] EW: I believe in the spring of 1945; a request was made by the Office of the Chief of Ordinance for a field grade officer to be assigned to the – I think it was then called the Office of Rocket…something – in the Pentagon. The qualifications of that officer were to be that he had to have a fluent knowledge of German and good broad technical background. My superior at Frankfurt Arsenal called me in and said – I was at that point a private first class working, in a technical capacity, at Frankfurt Arsenal. He said you have the technical background and you know the Germans. German, but you're not a field grade officer, but I'll check and see if they want you in Washington. I think within a week or so word came back: send PFC Wormser to Washington. And I reported to Colonel Toftoy's office and worked for – actually Lieutenant Colonel James G. Bain, who was Colonel Toftoy's assistant. My function in Washington from spring of 1945 until the arrival of A: The German documents which have been found in the salt mine in Germany. And B – well really until the arrival of the big bulk of German documents which had been captured out of the salt mine – my function was to digest documents and intelligence reports which were beginning to come in from Europe in drips and drabs, indicating some technical details of the activities of Peenemünde. [00:08:14] DC: I think you mentioned there were some British intelligence reports trickling in about that time too, which you [reviewed?]. [00:08:20] EW: To the best of my recollection, we got some British reports which related to the fact that the British had identified Peenemünde as a rocket test station. Then we got word that a V2 had mis-fired and landed, I believe it was on the island of Bornholm. Which is a Swedish island. [00:09:59] DC: And you were getting these reports sometime after the fight but at least getting the data. [00:10:04] EW: Right. So, we were beginning to get, in the Pentagon, we were beginning to get, you might say, a partial picture of what was going on at Peenemünde and in the German rocket effort. [00:10:39] DC: Was there much excitement when you found out that the Von Braun team and the documents had been captured and were coming over? And also, the V2 hardware? I guess you were aware of this before they – [00:10:55] EW: Right. Well, I think I can relate it to you about this way. I think I was by then a sergeant. And I remember Colonel Bain coming to see me sometime in the summer of ‘45 and saying, ‘Sergeant Wormser we've got two big truckloads of German documents coming with a captain on the trucks’ and with instructions to not leave these documents out of his hands and ‘where the hell are we going to put them’ and ‘what are we going to do with them.’ I don't remember anymore but I think it was several tons of paper. It was I believe two trailer trucks. [00:12:33] DC: These had already been shipped then across the Atlantic and were arriving in – [00:12:40] EW: I got word… Colonel Bain got word and I got word that two trailer trucks were on their way with German documents pertaining to the Peenemünde effort and they were on their way to Washington presumably. The first thing we had to figure out is where the hell were we going to put them and what were we going to do with them. Well, the next thing I knew is, we commandeered an empty warehouse at Aberdeen. [00:13:35] DC: Why was Aberdeen figured? That was available? That warehouse was available? Is that why they ended up there? [00:13:42] EW: I assume, number one, because it belonged to the Army Ordnance and, number two, because it was close to Washington. I assume it was the place that somebody could find an empty warehouse. [chuckling] The next thing I knew is that I was sent to… I think I went to Aberdeen with Colonel Bain and then a major – I think his name was Bergman. Major Bergman was assigned just administratively to the program, and we found ourselves with a warehouse with 20 or more huge crates… [00:15:12] DC: Wooden? Crates? Were they wooden crates? [00:15:14] EW: Wooden crates. 20 or more huge crates containing all of the original drawings and all of the original reports in reproducible form from Peenemünde which had been captured in the Harz. The Harz salt mine. [00:15:52] DC: Were they marked on the outside to know what was inside of the boxes? In any form? Or did you have to open them to see what was in them? [00:16:02] EW: As far as I can remember, they were not marked on the outside. We had to start opening the crates and start figuring out what to do. Now at that point, I first, I believe to the best of my recollection, I went to Aberdeen several times while still stationed in Washington. Then I was transferred to Aberdeen and then a number of other German speaking GIs were selected. [00:17:17] DC: Do you recall any of them, off-hand? [00:17:25] EW: No, I will give you a name later on. I don't remember any of the guys at Aberdeen. I don't think they, might say played a very major role. They were just helping to uncrate the stuff and try and sort it. [00:18:08] DC: When did you first meet the group of Germans? [inaudible] [00:18:13] EW: I'm trying to remember now… which happened first. We realized very soon that the task of cataloging the German documents and figuring out what we had on hand was an unbelievably large task. I don't remember in which order this now occurred, but what we did next was… we had, the United States had a large number of German prisoners. At Fort Eustis, Virginia, … I can't remember anymore which sequences went, but we selected from amongst these German prisoners, we selected well-educated German officers and got them to volunteer to help sort the documents. I don’t remember anymore as to the – [00:20:34] DC: Who was in overall charge of the task? Was there any one individual that had the total responsibility to select people, to catalog and supervise and coordinate the thing [inaudible]? [00:20:51] EW: Well, I suppose it was this way. There was a major, an Aberdeen major, I believe his name was Bergman. Is that correct? Does that check out with your – [00:21:10] DC: No, I haven’t heard of him. That’s what you mentioned before… [00:21:13] EW: I think he was nominally in charge, but I think in fact, you might say I was in charge. I had been told by Colonel Toftoy's office, mostly Colonel Bain, ‘try and get these documents organized. Now by this time, the Army had also retained Richard Porter of General Electric. I am not entirely sure when I first met Porter. I think I met him first in Washington, but then he also came to Aberdeen. Essentially, I think much to our complete astonishment, we, as far as we could tell, found that we had the complete, what was called the archives, the complete library of documents of Peenemünde. [00:23:15] DC: You didn't really know what you had until you opened up everything in order? [00:23:19] EW: No. We didn't know what we had, but as far as we could establish, we had the complete library of documents of the Peenemünde project in our possession in this warehouse in Aberdeen. Now, I'm trying to remember the sequence of events. And maybe you can help me. I believe the first group of Germans, which I believe included von Braun, arrived together with Major Hamill from, they had come through, I believe, Boston, come through Boston, and they arrived at Aberdeen, I would guess in September, is that correct? [00:24:51] DC: Yeah. [00:24:52] EW: September 1945. Now, Hamill and von Braun, I believe, went on first to Washington and then to Fort Bliss and White Sands. But they left behind, I think it was approximately ten fellows, six to eight fellows they left behind, including, I remember, Schulze, Tessmann – [00:25:54] DC: Poppel? [00:25:56] EW: I think Poppel. [ 00:26:03] DC: Jungert? Well, I’ve got their names anyway, yeah, I know. I have them listed. [00:26:13] EW: We had six to eight Germans. Oh, Schwidetzky was one of them. [muffled] Excuse me, sorry. [inaudible] [tape scratch] [shuffling] And lived in barracks in the secluded section of Aberdeen. [00:26:47] DC: You had pretty tight security? [00:26:51] EW: We had tight security. And you might say, sort of, I was their personal liaison man as well as their supervisor, as far as organizing the documents went. [00:27:24] DC: What was their reaction to this country and this project and the work? [00:27:30] EW: Well, I can tell you several things that I think are sort of human-interest type things. First of all, when they first got here, they were terribly thin and undernourished, number one. Number two, they were in very bad need of dental work. So, I'm trying to remember, but I think we fed them in one of the regular mess halls at Aberdeen to the best of my recollection. And we started getting their teeth attended to and their health looked after. They were, when they realized that we had the entire collection of documents from Peenemünde, which they referred to as the archives of Peenemünde, they were astounded. [00:29:18] DC: Well, now I understand that Tessmann, who was there working on the archives, also was responsible for putting them in the mines. So, he should have been aware of this, shouldn't he? Didn't he know what was in there? Maybe not. Maybe he didn't package them. All he did was put them in the mines, not knowing really what they contained. [00:29:39] EW: Yeah, as a matter of fact, I think. [00:29:44] DC: So, the Germans were somewhat surprised at the contents of the crates as they opened them, is that correct? [00:29:53] EW: Well, of the warehouse, I think if I remember correctly by the – I can't remember the exact time sequence anymore – but I think we had been working on the documents already for probably something of the order of a month before the Peenemünde Germans arrived. So, we had essentially already uncrated the documents and began to store them and organize them. [00:31:03] DC: Saying that you had already cataloged for about a month? [00:31:06] EW: To the best of my recollection, we had already started to organize and catalog and try and put into some order the huge number of drawings and reports. [00:31:35] DC: Did you work on big tables basically and spread this stuff out? See what’s in there? How did you go about physically handling all these things and tagging them in the right holes more or less? [00:31:49] EW: I think we got drawing cabinets and files. [00:32:03] DC: What was your personal reaction when you saw these things? Being an engineer, I guess this was somewhat amazing to you? [00:32:13] EW: It was amazing and astounding to me. While I was fluent in ordinary German, there were contained in these documents obviously a large number of special technical expressions that were unfamiliar to me. So, one of the first projects that I personally undertook and which we published later on as an internal report was a glossary of German guided missile terms and trying to find the equivalent English word for the German word. [00:33:58] DC: Were translators established at this time that helped convert this to English? [00:34:04] EW: We had personnel and our effort was to abstract rather than translate. I know we got help from German prisoners at Fort Eustis, Virginia and I remember going back and forth. I think if I remember correctly, we left the German prisoners down at Fort Eustis and took the documents down there, and had certain selected documents abstracted and then they would get them back. That's the best of my recollection. I only remember that I went back and forth between Aberdeen and Fort Eustis. [00:35:05] DC: Was there pretty high priority on this work? Did you work long hours or was it just the writing? [00:35:09] EW: Yeah, yeah. The task of trying to organize the documents was a very large one. We worked very long hours and made only slow inroads into getting the documents organized. [00:35:37] DC: Were you instructed to look for any particular type of data or information that you might turn over to Toftoy or someone in particular? A high priority item? [inaudible] [00:36:02] EW: To the best of my recollection, General Electric then became involved through Project Hermes and General Electric engineering personnel, such as Dr. Porter [and trying to remember a guy, that was a short little guy… up in Boston?] [00:36:44] DC: So anyway, they became the first – [inaudible] [00:36:46] EW: Yes, General Electric started coming in and we gave them an idea of what was available. I think I had met Major Hamill, oh then Major Hamill, when he escorted the German group to Aberdeen in summer of ‘45 after they arrived in this country. And I had conversations with both Major Hamill and Colonel Bain, and Colonel Toftoy, to the extent that as soon as the task of organizing the documents at Aberdeen was reasonably underway and the documents were in some reasonable shape where they could be handled by others. I could be useful at Fort Bliss and White Sands if I was interested to go out there. And I expressed an interest in getting out there because I was interested in getting involved in the hardware as well as – [00:39:02] DC: Oh, you wanted to see some of the parts out there? [00:39:04] EW: – as well as some of the documents. [00:39:06] DC: Your appetite had been whetted, I guess, over these documents. [00:39:11] EW: Right. So, I…trying to remember exactly when, but I believe and I remember I drove – I had a small car – I drove from Aberdeen to Fort Bliss around Christmas ’45, I would guess. [00:39:58] DC: How were the documents? [inaudible] – [ a truck?] or what? [Your thoughts?] [00:40:04] EW: I think…I’m trying to recall this now…I think the documents stayed at Aberdeen for some time beyond that point. [00:40:26] DC: I see. Did they ever come to Bliss then, or? [00:40:31] EW: I know certain documents or copies of certain documents went to Bliss. I am not sure whether all the documents ever went to Bliss or not. I just plain don't remember. I think there are a couple other – you might say – human interest type things that you would like to know about the stay of the German group at Aberdeen. I distinctly remember it included Schwidetzky, Schulze, Tessmann, I think Poppel. I don't remember who else. First of all, I asked the Germans what they knew about the involvement of slave laborers in their project. I think at first, I got the answer that they didn't know anything about it. I remember that I arranged to get some captured German movies from the – I assume I got them from the post library — on slave labor activities. I remember I took the group of Germans at Aberdeen to the movie theater and had the movies shown to them. By sheer coincidence, I had not previously seen the movies. – included scenes of showing Polish and other slave laborers employed in the Nordhausen V2 factory. [00:44:07.680] DC: Do you recall where that film might be? It might be [something worth to check out.] [00:44:18] EW: I just requested a bunch of German documentary movies on concentration camp and slave labor camp activities because I felt that since these men told me they knew nothing about it, I felt they ought to know something about it. I arranged to show these movies to them. I still don't, to this day, know whether they really didn't know anything about it or I suspect they didn't want to tell me about it. I think for the next ten days there was hardly a word exchanged between the Germans and myself because they were so, I suppose, embarrassed about the involvement of the slave laborers in their project. [00:45:37] DC: Of course, they were in engineering and Nordhausen was production. So, it's possible they weren't personally involved. And maybe they – [didn’t know about it?] [00:45:45] EW: It is possible. I really don't know the details. The attitudes of the different Germans on this varied greatly. [00:46:07] DC: And you were in a uniform during that period? [00:46:09] EW: Yeah, I was in uniform. Now, we had the group at Aberdeen for, well, certainly several months. I don't remember how many months. They expressed the desire to see something of the United States. I remember taking the group, myself, to New York. [00:46:54] DC: The whole group, was it? [00:46:57] EW: I think it was? I remember taking the group and I know they stayed with some relatives of Schwidetzky’s, I believe in Jersey, and some of them stayed, I think, at a YMCA. I'm not sure whether I stayed with them or how it all went. Anyway, I took them to New York and I brought them back. And I think I took them to Washington and brought them back. If I can remember correctly. [00:47:41] DC: What was their reaction? [00:47:44] EW: They were certainly very pleased and interested to get to see some of the country. We operated, at that point, on instructions that we were not to divulge their identities to anybody. I think we were taking certain chances in doing these things, but we had to draw a fine line between keeping the guys happy and keeping them as prisoners. [00:48:34] DC: What did you then do at Bliss? Did you work with that same group anymore or was that the end of your relationship, more or less? [00:48:42] EW: No, I worked with the same group. Well, by the same group, certainly. [00:48:47] DC: I mean the same document group. [00:48:49] EW: I really worked with the entire group at Bliss. [00:48:54] DC: You met some of them for the first time when you went out there then. [00:48:58] EW: Yes, as a matter of fact, at Bliss I got to know von Braun well, I got to know Stuhlinger well, I got to know Riedel well, Steinhoff, Schilling. At Bliss I really worked, you might say, essentially with the department heads. [00:49:28] DC: The lab directors? [00:49:29] EW: The lab directors, department heads. [00:49:33] DC: What was your function then? [00:49:38] EW: Well, I suppose my function was interrogation and technical liaison. Major Hamill was in overall charge. And I suppose I was sort of his, what you might call, technical liaison assistant, you might call me. [00:50:06] DC: Were there any other German speaking military people there besides – [00:50:10] EW: We had other German military – we had other US military guys that spoke German but of limited technical background. We then got, I think I was by that time a top sergeant, whatever it is, technical sergeant. You know, I got progressive [vehicle?] knowledge. And then came on board Jim Fagan. [00:51:02] DC: Yeah, I've interviewed Jim. [00:51:07] EW: Jim Fagan came on board and he was a GI. And while he didn't know as much German as I did, he had a very good technical background. [00:51:28] DC: Even in rockets, I guess. [00:51:30] EW: In rockets and in propellants. So, Jim Fagan became kind of, at first, sort of my assistant and later on took over from me. And then in addition I think after a while we got, a fella of a name of Tom Moore. [00:51:59] DC: [Yes, that looks like it?]. [00:52:01] EW: Tom Moore. [00:52:06] DC: How was his German? [00:52:10] EW: Oh, somewhat limited. But, of course, as time progressed the Germans started to learn some English. [00:52:32] DC: What was your reaction when you saw the V2 hardware after seeing the documents for many months? Did you feel the need to study the turbo pumps and thrust chambers? [00:52:43] EW: Yeah, I went from Fort Bliss to White Sands fairly frequently with von Braun and others. And I was present for the first static firing. I was present for the first two launches. I was generally employed as a technical liaison type person helping to maintain liaison between von Braun and US personnel. [00:53:44] DC: What about industry now? Were they coming in for interrogation? [00:53:48] EW: Yes, yes. We got at that point in time, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of Caltech began to come in to Fort Bliss to interrogate some of the Germans. And generally, I would sit in with people who came in. I would be an intermediary. I would sit in with jet propulsion people or I would sit in with navy people or North American Rockwell people. And I would act as, in part, as interpreter and sort of liaison man between the visitors that came to Fort Bliss and the German group. [00:55:03] DC: Do you think these interrogations were transcribed and might still exist somewhere? Is there a formal – [00:55:13] EW: I issued, I myself issued a series of reports on various subjects of interrogation. [00:55:34] DC: They could be at Fort Bliss still? [00:55:38] EW: They could be at Fort Bliss and I will search and see if I can find. [00:55:50] DC: Oh great! Give me a reference number or date maybe I can locate it. [00:55:54] EW: I will search and see if I can find, I think I have copies of some of them. Some place. [00:56:07] DC: That would certainly help complete the story to show how this transfer of knowledge took place. [00:56:13] EW: I can give you an example which I vividly remember. [00:56:27] DC: Great. Please do. [00:56:30] EW: I remember a navy officer coming to Fort Bliss. He was a fairly high-ranking man, probably a commander or something of that sort. And I remember that the commander, I was assigned to help the commander interview von Braun or some of these people to interrogate them. Had they considered launching V2s from submarines? And I remember that we were told by, I think von Braun and Riedel and others, that they had considered towing a second submarine behind a first submarine and having a V2 rocket contained in that second submarine or some modification thereof. And then directing this second submarine and launching a V2 rocket out of it. [00:58:31] DC: Right, and how did the officer react? [00:58:35] EW: He was fairly amazed. So, you might say that some of the elementary concepts of what later became the Polaris Project, at least in proposal or idea form, had been considered by the Germans. [00:59:09] DC: In what year did you, when did you finally leave the [inaudible] until then? [00:59:16] EW: I left Fort Bliss I think it was September of ‘46 because my tour of duty in the army was up and I was due for discharge. There was some brief discussion as to whether I wanted to stay on as a civilian employee at Fort Bliss. But essentially, I preferred to go elsewhere. [01:00:13] DC: I guess by that time the Germans were learning American anyway or learning English. So, this role of interpreter wasn’t quite as critical – [01:00:23] EW: Yeah, I think the role of interpreter wasn’t as critical anymore. And Major Hamill had acquired Jim Fagan and Tom Moore and had some beginnings of a technical staff to assist him. [01:00:51] DC: Well, you certainly played a key role in the transfer of that knowledge. [And that was what I think your interest or specialty is?] [We’re about to run out of tape. Oh, there’s a little more, do you think you – ] [01:01:08] EW: I certainly recognized von Braun as a tremendously capable, you might say, technical administrator and technical promoter. And I also recognized – [END] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000029_A Title A name given to the resource Wormser, Eric Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-10-26 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Description An account of the resource This interview discusses discoveries and integration of German scientists into US Rocket sciences at the conclusion of World War 2. Mr. Eric Wormser discusses how he was drafted, what his technical specialties were, how the US received V2 rocket documents from Peenemünde, the German scientists he worked with, and his career with the Army. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/10869ceea2aa0955d375ac52a8570b92.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/9bb429d7dff8242d5c4955e5a75c44ff.mp4 180f4a798dc476055679cd05b5101440 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Voss, Werner Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 0:24:02 Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:02] David Christensen: This is an interview with Mr. Werner Voss. The date is August 3, 1971. [00:00:10] DC: If you could, state how you got involved in the rocket business. [inaudible] – ’39, you know. [00:00:18] Werner Voss: I had been drafted in ‘38. I’m at [Kröslin?]. His name was Günther Lehmann. [00:00:25] WV: He worked in the sheet metal shops there. He was a bachelor and I've been a bachelor. We talk about a good time. We had the cinemas. [chuckling] [00:00:35] DC: Sounds like a good place to go! [00:00:38] WV: At that time, I was employed with the Air Force. And then I decided I should change. I looked over this place. I managed to get an interview there. [00:00:53] DC: How did you do that? You had the connections to... [00:00:56] WV: I wrote a letter. [00:00:58] DC: You wrote a letter? [00:01:00] WV: To this place. It was Peenemünde Heeresversuchanstalt. Then I got an invitation to show up. I was interviewed by Riedel zwei, or Riedel II. [00:01:13] DC: Riedel II. Did you know this was a rocket installation? [00:01:17] WV: At that time, I didn't know what was going on. [00:01:18] DC: You had no idea what it was? [00:01:20] WV: It looked interesting; the buildings, the whole layout. [chuckles] Finally, it took several months before I got my transfer. I arrived about the last week in August ‘39. [00:01:35] DC: So, you went from the Air Force to the Army uniform? [00:01:38] WV: No, no. I was civilian, actually. After I got discharged. Then I arrived about the last week in August ’39, I finally arrived at Peenemünde. [00:01:51] DC: Then what happened? Did you go for interviews then to see what you would do? [00:01:56] WV: It was Riedel II. He hired me then for... at that time, I was hired for this... I don't know exactly who was... Reisig was in charge of that particular facility that I was supposed to be assigned to. For the measuring group. [00:02:20] DC: More of a telemetry type instrumentation? [00:02:23] WV: Electric. And then since my clearance wasn't there, they put me in the valve laboratory. And there we started to operate the oscillograph and [get it cleared?]. At that time, we worked on the [German] for airplanes. Small items. [00:02:46] DC: A little [JKO or J2?] unit on – … What were you doing? Analyzing individual valves to see their operation? [00:02:54] WV: Take the measurements, analyze them, components… which happened … designed, built, and then tested. [00:03:02] DC: And this was all done at Peenemünde because it was not available elsewhere to get the... [00:03:07] WV: The industry was not there and also, I think it was a matter, probably, of security. [00:03:12] DC: I see, a combination. [00:03:14] WV: Probably a combination of both. [00:03:15] DC: These things were designed, built, tested, everything right there on the spot? [00:03:22] WV: Then they put me in this valve laboratory where Helmut Zoike was in charge at that time. Later on, he was transferred to – I don’t exactly… where it was called at that time. Then Dobrick took over. Then it was decided that the V2 would go in production. Then he was replaced and Lindenmayer took over. [00:03:59] DC: He was the production coordinator? [00:04:03] WV: Lindenmayer took over and Dobrick took over. This responsibility was extended from valve testing also to design. It was combined design and testing under one supervision. Then later on production started for the V2 preparation for production. Then Lindenmayer came and he took over and Dobrick was transferred. I think then he went to Riedel II, somewhere on ground equipment, mobile [pronounced like the Alabama City of Mobile] – [00:04:40] DC: Mobile. [correcting Voss] [00:04:42] WV: – launch equipment, all these things. [00:04:43] DC: Did the valve laboratory get involved with not only flight hardware but ground support hardware? [00:04:50] WV: In the beginning very much, but later on not. It was separate because in the beginning we were very small, early in ‘39, ‘40. As we went on, we supported test and facility and things like that. But later on, they opened their own shop… at their own shop. But for my transfer never happening, I stuck to the valve labs. So, I never reached my final point. [00:05:22] [muffled audio] [00:05:26] DC: Oh, really? [slight chuckle] Anyway, you mentioned then you were transferred into the production. [00:05:36] WV: Well, in ‘43, early after Lindenmayer took over, the problem was to get parts for pre-production series and things like this. And then orders were made out to the industry to build according to our drawings – parts. The intent was to make assembly at Peenemünde. [00:06:06] DC: So, you'd get the parts and you'd reassemble them. [00:06:10] WV: In that time, I was assigned, what I did so far, the measuring and electrical design, things like this. I was then transferred for inspection. So, they put me on part inspection. After we found out that we had a 100% reject practically, it was decided then to put people out in the field and get the whole parts made as well as assembly. And of course, we had to put priority for the shipment to the Mittelwerk for production line of the V2. [00:06:50] DC: What was the problem? The tolerance of the parts? [00:06:53] WV: Well, it was a tolerance build-up problem. And then also not the precision of what we asked for – we needed. [00:07:06] DC: It's still not available now? [00:07:08] WV: It's not available. Maybe a lack of looking the right companies also. [00:07:13] DC: Your valves stick then? Your parts wouldn't move? [00:07:17] WV: No, we had to work with cryogenic. We had to have the right tolerances. And if it doesn’t work… [00:07:23] WV: But at that time the other reject we had the most was tolerances problem. Poor inspection. And you remember it was only 43 – lack of people. It was mostly done with skilled people and things like that. Then later on in around June, at that time Dr. Thiel was in charge of the whole test division or you may call it. At that time in design, he decided then to get the people in the field. At that time, I was sent down to Munich, Bavaria, Austria, and [Czechoslovakia?]. We had then final contacts led to companies. [00:08:22] DC: You were running all over the country side looking at – [00:08:25] WV: I had this southern area and I had then with me several other people supporting me. And then this part we had to take care of… supporting Peenemünde and as well as you heard before, to Debe – no, Deg – what was the name you mentioned? [00:08:52] Unidentified Female Speaker: Degenkolb. [00:08:53] WV: Degenkolb. He was in charge of production. [00:08:56] DC: He was the locomotive? [00:08:58] WV: Yeah. He had his own organization. We had to get people in their station there. We had to report on a number of components to the quality and security of the parts and inspections. [00:09:15] [recording stops] [00:09:18] WV: [recording starts again] At that time we had the army inspection, army personnel to clear off the inspections. We had to use them to report on all our problems. [00:09:28] DC: Did these companies know what they were working on? Were they secret or – [00:09:31] WV: No. No secrets. They just got the drawing and that sort of thing. [00:09:36] DC: So, what would you do when you go into a company? You try to explain to them the urgency? [00:09:41] WV: No, we got our priorities. It's normal. Then we had our support from the local army officers as well as from the party officers. [00:09:56] DC: How were these companies selected? Did they have capabilities to do this? Was it political selection? [00:10:02] WV: I think it was more or less like Degenkolb as the main officer, they had some kind of file ready where they know that this company can do something and research. Mainly they also wanted to put out all the different companies in different areas. [00:10:18] DC: Spread the work around? [00:10:19] WV: Spread out. We had in general for each component three companies spread over different locations. [00:10:24] DC: For each component, three companies? How many companies do you recall visiting? Dozens of them all over the place? [00:10:37] WV: We had 28 components. Some companies made two components or more. I cannot recall the number exactly of companies. [00:10:51] DC: 70 or 80 companies. [00:10:53] WV: 28 components. Several people made more than one component. For instance, like [Deckel?] in Munich. [Knott?]. In a [metalwork?] from Munich, they made about three or four types of components. [00:11:14] DC: These were all production parts? [00:11:17] WV: Production parts. [00:11:18] DC: And they were then being assembled at Mittelwerk? [00:11:20] WV: No. They were assembled as ready to deliver. Then we shipped to Mittelwerk for receiving inspection and for installation. And later on, in ‘40... and this organization was called, later on, Fertigungs aufsicht. That was the official name. Fertigungs aufsicht. And later on, this whole organization was organized under Mr. Lindenberg. [00:12:00] DC: [mumbling] Lindenberg, yeah, I’ve heard his name. [00:12:08] WV: My technical supervisor at that time was [Ehrlicher?], yes [Ehrlicher?]. And he was good on [conscripts?] and I was – we were stationed in the Mittlewerk. I think it was early ‘44. I was moved then and had to take over the whole component area for [oscillographs?] [loud popping noises] -people spread out over the country. So earlier, I only took careful look at only [a thousand?] parts and later on I had to take care of everything. We had space in [Kroslin?] – Nordhausen at our offices, then later on we were moved underground. Occupied the office on the outer [war?] It was upstairs not downstairs. [00:13:01] DC: When did the groups start coming in from Peenemünde then and setting up shop in the Nordhausen area? Did they come through? [00:13:09] WV: Well, they were already much earlier. And Mittlewerk, really, I think transferred to people like Magnus von Braun. I never belonged to Mittlewerk, always part. Only stationed there as a consistent... I always belonged to Peenemünde. And Erich [Ball?] was used to be there. Dr. Friedrich, he passed away a few years ago. I think I – [popping sounds] recall like other [workers?] of course, there was then like, Rudi Schlidt myself, and other people there from the Fertigungs aufsicht, only stationed there. Because we didn't belong to Mittelwerk. [00:14:02] DC: When did the system start breaking down? During the bombings I guess, eventually the communication and transportation problems came up? [00:14:10] WV: No, it was around Easter in ‘45. [00:14:14] DC: Still going strong. [00:14:16] WV: Up to that time, in ‘45, we had the full production. Only a few parts were missing. But at Easter I recall that, that was the end. [00:14:28] DC: That was towards the end? [00:14:30] WV: We had... the day before Easter we had to destroy all our documents. Or take them up for shipment. [00:14:39] DC: All production? [00:14:41] WV: Drawings, all drawings. [00:14:43] DC: Were any of those eventually brought here or was that only the R&D documents? [00:14:47] WV: I don't know. The documents. And I left then. I took off. [00:14:51] DC: You took off, I see. Did you ever go back in to help pick parts out for the...? [00:14:57] WV: No. I forgot this place, what they called down and... Yeah, Riedel III moved. He took, later, over the design group. He moved and... I think it was... I think it was Leutenberg. [muffled] Yeah. I think it was Leutenberg. And I... after I heard that the troops were close to Mittelwerk, I took off. [00:15:35] DC: Yeah. [00:15:36] WV: And then to Leutenberg and that's when the... Riedel III. That was in the last day. The rest of you moved already down to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. And then a day later, it was occupied. It was over for me. [00:15:53] DC: Yeah. And then did you hear about the Americans wanting to bring people over then. Or later? [00:16:01] WV: No. [00:16:02] WV: We... before we were separated, or let's say pulled all apart. then we have been instructed that we should contact people in Munich, Hamburg, wherever you are located. And then I went from... I ended up in Bavaria and then I went back to the north, wasn’t far to Lübeck. Traveling there by Hamburg, you see. And at that time, we were considered war criminals. [00:16:34] DC: War criminals? [00:16:37] WV: Everybody worked on the V2 were marked war criminals. [00:16:41] DC: By the allies, you mean? [00:16:43] WV: Yeah. So, I didn’t dare to identify myself that I worked at Peenemünde. I always refused because we had an identification card from OKH, that means Oberkommande der Wehrmacht, like the [inaudible]. And then finally in October 1945, the paper announced that the V2 would be accepted as a normal weapon. And I made contact with the contact men in Hamburg. [00:17:18] DC: You already knew who to contact in Hamburg? Was he one of your coworkers you contacted? [00:17:24] WV: No, I didn't know him before. It was one of those contact name and addresses we had been given – [00:17:29] DC: Just a contact man? [00:17:30] WV: Yeah. Then at the time I learned that Lindenberg was out there in Cuxhaven. There's English people there. And then I contacted there ... [Flein Krüger?], is that the name? [00:17:49] FS: Yeah. [00:17:50] WV: I know her. Is she still alive? [00:17:52] FS: Yeah, she's in Cuxhaven. [00:17:54] WV: Cuxhaven? She's stuck there. [00:17:56] DC: Still there. [chuckles] [00:17:58] WV: And then she informed me what was going on there, and I decided, because I had some differences with Mr. Lindenberg in Nordhausen, I decided not to go there. And then she informed me that there's a place in Bavaria, in Landshut. And I contacted them in Landshut with an address, and I contacted then also Lindenmayer. [00:18:27] DC: Lindenmayer? He was there then? [00:18:29] WV: It was about November. And then about January, I was contacted by an Army of the United States Army captain. [00:18:38] DC: By who? [00:18:39] WV: Captain of the United States Army. [00:18:41] DC: You know, who the man was? [00:18:43] WV: I mean, if you still find him, [a paper’s not out of the question?]. [00:18:46] DC: Did you sign a contract then? [00:18:48] WV: At that time, I signed a contract for the 1st of July ‘46. I was picked up by a truck with all the belongings, we all brought things with us. And two weeks later I went over to Fort Bliss. My first stop was in Alexandria, Virginia. I stayed about there for five or six weeks. [00:19:14] DC: What did you do during that period? [00:19:16] WV: During the six weeks? Oh, nothing. [00:19:19] DC: Stood around? Relaxed? [00:19:22] WV: No, it was too hot for me to do anything. [00:19:26] DC: You caught the train out west? [00:19:28] WV: Oh no, we went by plane. [00:19:30] DC: Oh, you did go by plane? Fort Bliss? [00:19:32] WV: Fort Bliss by Army plane. And this Dr. Thiel. [00:19:38] DC: Did he go with you then? [00:19:40] WV: Yeah, that's the other Thiel. This Thiel is now out there on the west coast. What’s his first name? I forgot. Shame. [00:19:52] DC: We might have it. [00:19:54] WV: He is now, I think, with TRW. I think he is with TRW. [00:20:00] FS: Adolf? [00:20:01] WV: Adolf. We stayed together there in Alexandria. [00:20:07] DC: Were there many others on the flight with you or just a couple of them? [00:20:10] WV: Rickhey was with me. [00:20:12] DC: How many? [00:20:13] WV: Mr. Rickhey was with me. And I don't like to talk about Rickhey. [00:20:21] DC: So, when you got to Bliss, what did you do then? [00:20:24] WV: Then we got assigned first, had to get used to the climate. No air conditioning, it was pretty hot. Then I was assigned in measuring field again, like picked it up where I stopped in ‘43. Mostly I worked in there together with Lindenmayer again, with Zoike, and with Hans Paul. [00:20:50] DC: Hans Paul? Suppose he was working in the measuring group too. [00:20:54] WV: He worked at that time on heat transfer problems. I worked with the guy mostly together in that particular area, making models and measuring equipment. [00:21:06] DC: Did you get involved in the ramjet program then later on? [00:21:09] WV: I have not been involved yet, or hardly involved in this, I mean directly. Not too much. [00:21:16] DC: So, mostly just developing instruments? [00:21:19] WV: Yeah, and just supporting laboratory tests. [00:21:27] DC: Are you still in that field even now? [00:21:29] WV: No, I'm now in astrionics. [00:21:31] DC: Oh really? I didn't know that. [00:21:33] WV: Two years ago. I have been transferred against my will. [00:21:40] DC: [recording distorts] – a little story here. [00:21:45] WV: My hometown is Stettin, and I'm known as a stubborn Pomeranian, called Pommern. And the most interesting thing is that Lindenmayer is from Bavaria, and he's also known as stubborn [Hofstetter?]. And then we got together first on one particular night, Saturday. Oh, on Friday night he asked me to work – to stay over on Saturday and Sunday and work. Get our first five. [00:22:21] DC: [chuckling] He wanted you to stay over and you wanted to go out for the weekend. [00:22:25] WV: Well, we both were stubborn, but I won. I went home and [Vaisas?] was in the hospital. And then the interesting part is that he insisted that I go to this stubborn Bavarian. And that was an interesting part because we are known as the [inaudible]. I never would make it down there. But later we found out that Pomeranians are really not that stubborn. Not like the Bavarians. I hope you're not from there, or your parents. [00:23:03] FS: No. [giggling] [00:23:08] DC: So, you had the same north-south problems. [00:23:10] WV: Same relationship. Same thing like you had here. [inaudible] [00:23:15] WV: In this case, you only know the [?], the Prussians, and the other guys, other people called []? [00:23:24] [inaudible speech with laughter] [00:23:30] WV: That's the only part that’s interesting — most interesting part. I had been sent down to a different area, which I hardly know how to deal with. I was scared about my experience. [00:23:44] WV: The first one was in Bavaria, and then I found out that [inaudible] [00:23:59] DC: Okay, end of interview with Mr. Voss. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000028_A Title A name given to the resource Voss, Werner Description An account of the resource Experiences at Peenemuende on development of the V-2. Work at Nordhausen. Operation Paperclip. Work at Fort Bliss. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-03 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/740d873e522a4c61969a487e0a927917.pdf 55b3416b2b3bfad41e0329904c592790 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000031_T Title A name given to the resource Von Braun, Wernher (Transcript) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-10-08 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/3191b4d3feaa2a7db232a17f1ebec312.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/da91786e6024413f8ece505d615626d0.mp4 822a01bf9a2891d6614dfffb7bc4b357 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000031_A Title A name given to the resource Von Braun, Wernher Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-10-08 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/c050cee4d0016e8b130923224d23aed1.pdf e4da0338d15d099bf318e01e46e5b911 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Trichel, Gervais Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 2 pages Text Any textual data included in the document Gervais Trichel 28 April [1971?] Birmingham, Michigan February-March 1944 I visited England in connection with small rockets being produced for the invasion. Dr. Allyn Crowe [Alwyn Crow] was the head of rocket work at the Ministry of Supply at that time. He showed me a photograph from a reconnaissance airplane of what appeared to be a large rocket on the island of Peenemunde. Crowe said that it was a Trojan Horse. “From our computation of it, its weight would be over 100 tons. By no means that we can visualize could it get off the ground.” One of the things that convinced the British that it was fake was that it was too convenient – being left in the open for photo reconnaissance. They considered it to be an instrument of psychological warfare. Another thing which convinced them was that their airfields on the French [coase?] were camouflaged – they even went to the trouble to build dummy aerodromes out of canvas and cardboard. (Trichel at that time was serving as military attache in Britain – in France). The British raided the camouflaged airfield (‘bombed the hell out of it’) and then – after the raid, dropped a wooden bomb on the dummy airfield. [Anyway?], the British figured the same thing was happening in Peenemunde. Dr. Sorenson was visiting in Sweden when the Swedish rocket fell. He was able to persuade the Swedes to turn it over to him certain pieces of the rocket were recovered. These pieces wound up in my office in Washington. We had pieces of the framework and pieces of the propulsion motor – enough to realize that it was not a solid structure but an aircraft type construction. We then decided that we needed someone studying this thing. We didn’t want to interrupt Cal Tech. Instead we went to the General Electric Company and got them to undertake a contract to investigate and correlate the information we had about this rocket. They set up a project under Dr. Porter. They built an artist’s conception of the rocket. We then very rapidly accumulated parts from [English?] recoveries so that long before the invasion, GE had a very good idea of what the V-2 was like. We were not aware of the English activities although we had liaison Trichel -2 people in England, who supplied constant streams of information from (wreckage). But we did have reciprocal activities with the British. With the Invasion coming about, the Ordnance Department asked to set up investigation teams to study tanks, weapons, etc., including the Buzz Bomb and the V-2. GE was given this assignment. The GE team did a very good job. They did something no one else did. GE had for many years had manufacturing facilities in Germany through its international operation. They had in their organization technical people who lived in Germany, who spoke German and generally, knew where things were. Henry Saylor – Chief Ordnance officer of the Expeditionary Force complimented me: “You're probably the only ones there who didn’t have to be spoon fed or hand carried around.” They knew what to ask about, who to ask, and how to ask it. Porter’s group was well organized. They had 5-6 months working on reconstituting the V-2 problem – year’s effort. After the capture of Nordhausen, we got a message from Sayler’s office, saying that they had a factory and could get samples of the material we wanted. He had a large group of the people involved, there. It was their opinion that this group ought to be brought to the US. We (Barnes and I) immediately agreed and reacted to their word. We went cables to Sayler’s office to get at least 100 complete missiles and enough to assemble another 100 in spare parts, and to ship them to the US. Toftoy got 1500 European railroad cars full of stuff out of there before the British or Air Force found out. Then the British found out through their work mission, they made a strong plea to send it to England to test fire it there. We felt it should come here to the US. Meanwhile the Air Force found out. We told them, yes that we had “it”, but not how many. We even agreed to give Wright Field one German ^and 5 to the British which was quite a generous offer until they found out how many we had. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Typed Transcript of Interview Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000027_T Title A name given to the resource Trichel, Gervais (Transcript) Description An account of the resource Role of US Army Ordinance in rocket research in WW Ii. Details of evacuation of V-2s and German engineers after the end of war. Post-war rocket developments USA with German team Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-04-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/ec6923c8fb38fd042cfa2f690ac4095b.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/5263cdac769c9f0da50ddebf6d36988c.mp4 42cb4d81291601c5686b7e8c7f722b67 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Trichel, Gervais Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 1:31:48 At 1:01:05 recording repeats first 30 minutes of recording Location The location of the interview Birmingham, Michigan Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:07] David Christensen: Testing. This is an interview with Dr. Trichel in his home in Birmingham, Michigan on April 28, 1972. Dr. Trichel has been telling me of his background in rocketry prior to the time that the V-2 rocket was fired and landed in Sweden. He has gone into an extensive detail of his activities, particularly in the early Army Ordnance Rocket Program. [00:00:40] Gervais Trichel: Well, to start the V-2 at the beginning, I would have to go back to about February or March of 1944. At that time, I visited England in connection with some of the rockets being produced for the invasion. [00:01:22] DC: So, the smaller rockets? [00:01:23] GT: Smaller rockets. At that time, Dr. Alwyn Crow was head of rocket work in the Ministry of Supply in England. And on one of my visits with Dr. Crow, he showed me a photograph taken by a reconnaissance airplane of what appeared to be a large rocket on the island of Peenemünde. [00:02:06] DC: I see, you were keenly interested, I guess. In seeing something like that. [00:02:13] GT: I asked Dr. Crowe what they made of this, and he laughed and said it's a ‘Trojan Horse’. He said that from our computation of the thing, the size – we can get very accurately off of the photograph — its weight would be over 100 tons, and by no means that we can visualize, would you be able to get it off of the ground. [00:03:02] DC: Yeah, I see. [chuckle] That was the official opinion at that point. [00:03:06] GT: Right. Now, I don't know whether you have heard this, but this was not hearsay, this was an actual conversation between myself and Dr. Crowe. One of the, of course, reasons, [as he would often say?] for his belief that it was a Trojan horse, was that it was left so conveniently out where it could be photographed. [00:03:39] DC: Too obvious. [00:03:40] GT: It was obvious. It had been left out there. [00:03:48] DC: He was really thinking it was being done to the psychological – ? [00:03:52] GT: Yes. Of course, the British were much more likely than the Americans… Long before we were in the war, I was in France as an assistant military attaché. The airfields were camouflaged, and they went to a great deal of trouble, the Germans did then, to actually build some dummy air drones out of canvas and cardboard near where the fields, which had belonged to the British before Dunkirk, were located. The British, however, knew full well where these airfields were. And at one time when I was there, they came over and raided one of these camouflaged fields, and bombed the hell out of it, and then dropped a wooden bomb on the cardboard target that the Germans had created for them. [00:05:27] DC: A wooden bomb. [00:05:28] GT: So… that actually the British sense of humor, you might say, of going to the trouble to drop a wooden bomb on a make-believe [peel?], thought that maybe the Germans were doing the same thing at Peenemünde. [00:05:52] DC: I see. Until the summer of ‘44, you mentioned, when the Swedish... [00:05:56] GT: That's right. [00:05:57] DC: That was a burning point. [00:06:02] GT: The next thing that came to my attention about the V-2 was that sometime in the summer of 1944, when this rocket escaped and accidentally went into Sweden. Dr. Sorensen was at that time visiting in Sweden, and he was able to persuade the Swedes to turn over to him certain pieces recovered from this rocket. These pieces wound up in my office. [00:07:01] DC: Really? [00:07:02] GT: In Washington. [00:07:05] DC: I guess the British somewhat resented this, didn't they? [00:07:07] Well, I don't know. But anyway, we had the propulsion motor for the pumps. We had enough pieces of the framework to realize that it was not a solid structure, as Dr. Crowe had suggested, but an aircraft type of construction. Anyway, we then decided that we should have someone studying this thing. And because of our knowledge of the thing, we didn't want to interrupt Caltech. Instead, we went to the General Electric Company and got them to undertake a contract to investigate and correlate the information we had about this rocket. This they did. They set up a project under Dr. Porter. And they built in the room there an artist's conception, if you will, of this rocket, where we put together all the things. [00:09:11] DC: Were the British doing something simultaneously similar to this? [00:09:15] GT: I don't know. [00:09:16] DC: I see. This is— [00:09:17] GT: What we did. I believe it was about September when the first V-2 came across in England. We then very rapidly accumulated the parts missing and what have you from these recoveries in England. [00:10:02] GT: So that long before the invasion, General Electric and Dr. Porter had, under his group there, had a very good idea of what the V-2 was like. [00:10:22] DC: Now were you aware that the British were also in Poland – about that same time – trying to piece together, from the Blizna firing area, pieces of rockets? About the same time the first rockets were hitting England. They were doing this similar activity. You weren't necessarily informed. [00:10:43] GT: I don't know how much information we had on that. We got very good information and very quick from our own military people in England, who supplied us with a constant stream of records. [00:11:04] DC: Were the British aware of what you were doing? Were they also trying to keep a close liaison, and see what you came out of from your investigation of piecing all these pieces together? [00:11:16] GT: Yes. I had a British officer attached to my... [00:11:23] DC: So, they were feeding US data back to England too. [00:11:26] GT: Yes. [00:11:27] DC: So, you were getting across as part of the [invasion?]. [00:11:29] GT: I had a British Lieutenant Captain, I’ve forgotten. Anyway, the officer attached to the rocket development division. [00:11:40] DC: I see. [00:11:43] GT: As liaison. But anyway, when the invasion the following year was coming about, the Ordnance Department were directed to set up teams, scientific teams, to investigate all sorts of things. [00:12:25] DC: All kinds of weapons and tanks... [00:12:26] GT: Weapons, tanks and other things. The problem of getting such a team for the V-2 rocket – also for the buzz bomb — and the V-2 rocket team was assigned to us. And since we had had General Electric do that, we had been doing all this other work on it, but they were also contracted for such a team. Which incidentally, did a very good job. [00:13:17] DC: The GE team. [00:13:19] GT: The GE team. [00:13:20] DC: Very professional. [00:13:21] GT: Not only professional, but they did something that no one else before, as I know, bothered to do. As you know, General Electric for a great many years at least, had had manufacturing facilities in Germany. [00:13:49] DC: Through their international operations. [00:13:51] GT: Through their international operations. And they had in their organization, technical people who had either lived or otherwise been assigned to these projects and who spoke German fluently. Henry Sayler complimented me – he was the Chief Army Ordnance officer of the expeditionary force— complimented me once and he said that, “Your people were the only ones that came over there that didn't have to be spoon fed and hand carried around.” Because they not only spoke German, but they knew where things were in Germany because most of them had lived in Germany at some time or other. [00:14:43] DC: That was a tremendous asset to the success of the whole mission. [00:14:49] GT: And that spoke volumes for GE's organization. [00:14:55] DC: Well, it explains a lot to me over the success of the whole mission, I think. [00:15:00] Of course. Because they knew. Not only knew how to ask and find them things, but they knew a lot of people to ask about. [00:15:13] DC: Right. [00:15:14] GT: To find out what was going on. [00:15:16] DC: They already had contacts. [00:15:18] GT: Had contacts. [00:15:19] Now, I see that's not particularly germane to your inquiry, but it is. [00:15:25] DC: It certainly is. I think it's one of the key factors that needs to be brought out in the story as to the success of the whole operation. [00:15:35] GT: Well, anyway. Porter's group were well organized and of course it had five or six months. Well, no, more than that. Nearly a year from the summer to one summer to the next. Working on the reconstituting the V-2 problem. [00:16:05] DC: When did you first get involved with the interest in the people behind the V-2? I think that's the story we really need to investigate. [inaudible] — that Paperclip Operation? [00:16:24] GT: Well, after the capture of Nordhausen, we got a message from Sayler's office saying that they had this factory where the V-2s were. And that they could get samples of the material for one. And that they had a large group of the people involved. And that it was their opinion that this group ought to be brought to the United States. We immediately, and myself and the General Barnes, sent cables to Sayler's office [inaudible] to get at least 100 complete missiles. And enough to assemble another 100 in the form of spare parts. And to ship them to the United States. [00:18:08] DC: Of course, we were still at war with Japan, so that was one of your motivations, I think. [00:18:12] GT: Well, our motivation was, I don't remember too well, except that we agreed with Sayler's office over there. And I guess that Toftoy and company had told him, because I don't know whether, but anyway, that it should be done. Well, anyway, pursuant to his offer and our request back from the Chief of Ordnance to the Chief of Ordnance [office?], Toftoy got 1500 French railroads, or European railroads, carloads of stuff out of there. And he got all this stuff going before either the British or the Air Force found out about it. [00:19:05] DC: What do you attribute this to? Just getting out of there fast? [00:19:08] GT: That's right, just fast is all. When they found out about it, and I think the British found out through their mission in Washington that we had this stuff coming. They made a very strong plea that this stuff be shipped to England and that it be test fired and whatnot over there. Well, we were equally of the opinion that it should come to the United States. And meanwhile, the Air Force found out about what we were getting, and we said yes, that we were getting some of these. We didn't tell them how many. And so, we immediately agreed that we would give Wright Field one of them, which they thought was very generous until they found out how many we had. [laughing] And we gave five to the British, which satisfied them, or at least seemed to. In the meantime, the Toftoy and company were busy getting these things down to the port and getting them sent back to the United States. And then correspondents, people, not concerning the civilians, personnel, and whatnot. And we were having difficulty there. The reason being that a lot of people were very much opposed to bringing these people in the United States. They were German. They were thought to be indoctrinated Nazis. They had been engaged in this project over there. And they thought it, at least one very high-placed scientist in the United States said that they will not be able to teach us anything that American science can't do. So, rather, the State Department were very unwilling to grant visas to bring these people in. And the employment people said, how are you going to pay them? How are you going to hire them? They're enemy aliens. Well, I knew this, that we were employing Germans, civilians in Germany, by the thousands. It's true that we were employing them as laborers and mechanics that we were employing. So, when this objection was raised, I went over to the Secretary of War's office and got a hold of personnel people and said, how are you able to hire these people in Germany? If we can't hire them over here? Oh, they said, [when they got the regulations out?], the Secretary of War has authority to hire enemy aliens in the combat zone. But we got the actual act or directive, whatever it was, and it said nothing about combat zones, but they'd give them authority. So, when the matter got up to Mr. Patterson, Judge Patterson said that I can hire them in the United States or any other place. [00:24:21] DC: So, it wasn't restricted then? [00:24:23] GT: No. There was no legal reason why we couldn't hire them over here. [00:24:33] DC: So, of a keen interest, I guess… [00:24:35] GT: The State Department were much more difficult. And we finally through... who was the Assistant Secretary of State there, or the Assistant Secretary of the Army… He was the Assistant Secretary of the Army and was on this so-called SWAN committee, State War and Navy committee. And he was on our side trying to get them, and actually, they had to get to the Secretary of State himself to get an order issued to these immigration group there to let these people in. And we had to agree in turn that we would bring them in under the condition that they were to stay together, be held together, and on a military reservation. And that they would not be allowed to travel from this island except with special permission and for special purposes. And that they were not to be immigrants, but they were under contract. And that if they violated that contract, that we would return them to Germany. And that when our need for them was over, that we agreed that we would, at our expense, return them, repatriate them to Germany. [00:26:40] DC: So initially it was all just a temporary... [00:26:42] GT: That's right. [00:26:43] DC: ...a temporary right. [00:26:51] GT: Then the decision was that we would take them to White Sands. Now, this is the first time I've mentioned White Sands. But White Sands Proving Ground came about again because of the Caltech Project. [00:27:19] DC: The same program you mentioned earlier? [00:27:21] GT: Yes. The initial so-called Private A was fired on the dry lake range. The succeeding models, though, did not... they didn't have any range that was sufficient. And General Barnes agreed that we ought to have such a range. That firing over the water was unsatisfactory for two reasons. In the first place, at that time, nobody knew how accurately you could track with radar. It wasn't even certain that you could transmit through the heavy side layers to a missile in flight. And there was strong need that you have some method of checking optically. And correlate the radio observation, radar observation, with optical observation. And this brings in, then, the Askania story, which you probably know. [00:28:53] DC: [Eh, you tell me?]. [00:28:56] GT: Before the war, Aberdeen had made a contract with Askania in Germany for some very large theodolites, recording theodolites. Photographs, bombs in flight, particularly. [00:29:26] DC: That was a German firm? [00:29:28] GT: German firm, Askania. The war came along. And by the time that Askania had these things ready for delivery, we were at war with Germany. Technically, they were not war material. Theodolite is a surveying instrument. And I don't know how. You can probably find out. We arranged through the Swiss to trade with the enemy. And legally brought those theodolites into the United States. The Germans got them into Switzerland, and we got them out of Switzerland. [00:30:25] DC: There was a lot of this interchange going on. [00:30:27] GT: Oh, yes. It was this trading– [00:30:29] [recording malfunction] [00:30:45] GT: Uh, anyway. These Askania theodolites were available. And they were far better than anything either the Army or Navy had for that purpose, because they had been specially designed and built for the war. And we wanted a land range where radar tracking could be correlated with theodolite data from these Askania theodolites. So... [00:31:24] DC: So, what year did you get those? [00:31:28] GT: Well, yes, it was in ‘44. They were available in 1944. General Barnes’s suggestion, we got, from the Department of the Interior, maps showing all the public domain in the United States. And we were looking for a range that would be 100 miles long and 50 miles wide. And then we got an aircraft and started looking at these areas. [00:32:18] DC: Aerial surveys. [00:32:32] GT: Well, we had the map, but we went and looked from the air. The three areas that immediately seemed to offer some chance, with the area in Nevada south of Winnemucca. The range was there, but the impact area was very mountainous, very rugged. And it might have been jeepable in the summertime, but certainly when the snow fell, it would be impossible to [get?] land transportation in there. The other large area that had only a small installation in the middle of it was the Ajo area in the southern part of Arizona. Ajo had two disabilities that we couldn't do much about. One was that the area lay along the Mexican border. And remembering what happened to the Swedes, although we didn't know about it at that time, our fear was that we would have an international accident, an incident because of an accidental missile going into Mexico. The other one was a main transcontinental railway in the southern Pacific runs across that thing, the northern boundary. We were also afraid that we would have a large public outcry about firing any place along those tracks. And the tracks ran parallel to the direction we wanted to fire. [00:34:48] DC: And that made it even worse. [00:34:53] GT: The area that we finally started on was the one that [lay in?] White Sands. It wasn't as long as one, but at that time we had 85 miles by using part of the Fort Bliss elevation. In fact, we started out that Fort Bliss was to be the base, the firing point. And I'm not sure, but the firing point isn't on the Fort Bliss reservation today. But there were about 4 million acres, only 47,000 were the only privately owned property there. Well, 47,000 acres is a lot, but— [00:35:48] DC: Not out there. [00:35:50] GT: Not in that area. The White Sands National Monument, which was already a public…lay in the middle of it. The north end, the Air Force had the Alamogordo bombing range, which at that time was being used by the bomb people. The principle of all this public land were under grazing permits. And we had a terrific outcry on the part of the ranchers there, we were taking their grazing permits away from them. And they were up on the governor's doorstep. And the solution to that thing, credit must go to John Howard, who was my executive officer. He had been down and talked to the people in the governor’s office. And the political situation was pretty hostile. So, Howard came up with the idea that [if] you can't lick them, join them. So, he says the thing is wrong, he told me, he says the thing is wrong, is that the Texas Project is going to take all of those things. He says that actually it isn't any further to Las Cruces, New Mexico, than it is to El Paso. So, let's change the… [00:38:21] DC: Make it a New Mexico Project. [00:38:22] GT: Make it into a New Mexico Project, which is what we did. And immediately we got the Chamber of Commerce in Las Cruces behind the thing. And they had apparently as much political muscle as the ranchers. [00:38:48] DC: So, you got the [inaudible] [00:38:49] GT: So, we got the political objection to the thing. And then we had authority to condemn these grazing permits and to condemn and buy the 47,000 acres of land there, which was that. The range we wound up with was neither as wide nor as long as we had set out to, but it was reasonable. Actually, some places 40 miles wide, and I'd say it was 85 miles in length, which looked like it would satisfy our immediate needs. [00:39:50] DC: Now when that was selected, that was prior to the awareness of the V-2 project? [00:39:55] GT: Oh yes, that project was all going on with the idea of providing a place where it was part of the more advanced vehicles from Caltech. And also, the mountain area around that thing is far up a valley. And these surrounding mountains gave an excellent place to locate both radar and optical control system. The whole area is jeepable, so we could recover. [00:40:34] DC: And it's not that much of a weather problem. [00:40:36] GT: No, the weather is excellent there. Anyway though, we had the land and the money to buy the equipment that we needed initially was nothing like what we have now. Like $4 million I guess was the only estimate for the communications equipment and camera installation. We had the cameras. [00:41:14] DC: You did get your deadlines from the government, under wartime…? [00:41:17] GT: Oh yes, we'd gotten them in the [name?]. In fact, they were on hand when we got them at the range. They belonged to Aberdeen, but that's Ordnance too. Well anyway though, the next step was to build a firing point, because this was just opened. And there goes the credit that ought to be given, more measure than you ever got to a rather unusual man, Colonel Turner. [00:41:55] DC: Turner? [00:41:56] GT: Turner, yeah. Colonel Turner came to me in the Rocket Development Division from the Ammunition Division. And General Barnes, at one of our luncheons, said that the Ammunition Division Chief, I forgot what his name was anyway, has got a lieutenant colonel that he would ask me if I would take off because he's difficult, he's causing trouble. And he said they don't want to fire him, but they've got to get rid of him. Of course, they could use a reserve officer so they could [award him?] back for life if they wanted to. But anyway, he was, as Barnes said, difficult. So, he said could you take him? And well, what could I say? I said, yeah. Well, Turner was one of these very aggressive people. And he was certainly an advocate of ‘do it now’. Anyway, this happened at about the time that we were going to build White Sands. So, we decided the thing to do to build White Sands there was to get some temporary barracks that had been built at Fort Bliss and move them up there. And so, we set out to get permission to do that. In the meantime, I decided that Turner might be just the man for this ‘do it now’ job to get out there. So, I sent him to White Sands to build a place, and he did. The next thing I knew, I was called up to General Clay's office, because my man Turner down there had charges prepared against him by the area engineer for stealing— [laughing] [00:45:14] DC: Just grabbed everything? [chuckling] [00:45:16] GT: – these buildings without authority. [00:45:20] DC: When he went up to Bliss and got buildings and moved them [inaudible]? [00:45:23] GT: He moved them out there apparently without waiting for the paperwork. Anyway, I was able to… General Barnes to persuade them not to actually court-martial him on the grounds that here was a man who was getting something done and for God's sake – [00:45:48] DC: Don't stop it! [00:45:50] GT: Don't stop it! It needed to be done and everything. Actually, the paperwork was in the mail. There was no reason he couldn't. Anyway, Turner built White Sands literally out of nothing. He was accused of stealing. If the truth was known he probably did. But he actually took stuff without having the paperwork completed. [00:46:23] DC: That seems to be the whole story of the rocket program. You always had to scrounge, make do. [00:46:32] GT: We had no money for construction. The Ordnance money was not at the will to construct barracks. With Ordnance, we couldn't build barracks out of an Ordnance appropriation. Anyway, White Sands was in operation and was an ideal place to move the Germans when they decided to bring them in. That was the place. The first place it was isolated. There was probably no better place we could have picked for him that would have that. We had a range there where they could fire the V-2 missiles. Not full range but far enough distance to do what we wanted to. [00:47:35] DC: When did you first meet some of these people? In Washington? Did you ever get out and visit with them out there? [00:47:43] GT: No, I never laid eyes on them. After these arrangements were all made, I went to the Philippines as Deputy Ordnance Officer of the Western Pacific. [00:48:00] DC: I see, what was the month and year was that, if you will? [00:48:06] GT: I left the United States in June or July of ’45, after the fall there and so on. This thing was all arranged with these things on. I left and we had agreed. Again, I had [inaudible] Toftoy, so Toftoy was brought over to succeed me. And I was ordered to the Philippines. [00:48:42] DC: Would you mind telling me a little bit about how you first met him and a little bit of his story from your viewpoint because he's not here to tell himself? It would help me to get a little background of this relationship and how he... [00:48:58] GT: Toftoy was a coast artillery officer, which I had done too. At the time that I was an instructor in the coast artillery school, Toftoy was in the mine command at Fort Monroe. That's when I first knew him. [00:49:19] DC: When did you get acquainted with the rocket program, again? Reacquainted. When did he…? [00:49:27] GT: Not at all until he — I never laid eyes on him. Oh, I guess I had seen him in Europe as far as having any dealings with him. But when we were looking for someone to take my place, because of his connection with this thing in Europe, he seemed like an ideal man to bring back for that purpose. And he was brought back because he had, as far as I know, been the moving spirit in getting the actual man on the spot over there. Of course, Sayler's office, if you want to say, was responsible. After all, Henry Sayler had a lot of other responsibilities. Toftoy was actually the guy... [00:50:18] DC: How do you spell Saylor? [00:50:19] GT: S-A-Y-L-O-R, [Sayler is correct] Henry Sayler, he was Major General. [00:50:28] DC: There was another fellow that I want to ask you about. Staver, Bob Staver, did you ever meet him? [00:50:36] GT: Yeah, he was at Caltech, but he was stationed out there. I guess he had been liaison officer with this [part of work?] that was in the [RC?] we’re doing. [00:50:58] DC: He also got involved in the same activity in Europe too, I understand. [00:51:02] GT: Well, I don't know. He was not a part of my group. [00:51:09] DC: I understand that. [00:51:16] GT: See, our dealings were actually with Sayler's office, and Toftoy was, as far as I know, was the guy that was actually in charge of the local [on the spot?] level. I’d say I left the United States before any of this stuff arrived. Now though, in, ‘46 though, we had the war shut off from under me in the Pacific, so I came back in – no, not forty[six] – in ’45, of course. Yeah. When the war ended, my boss, who had been out there the whole four years, General Davis, was immediately returned to the United States. And I became Chief Ordnance Officer in the Western Pacific, and [half-west back?]. The job there was one of tearing down, and a big job of disposing of the ammunition. [00:52:53] DC: Mopping up. [00:52:54] GT: Mopping up. And the new development division back in the War Department now, which was the division of the Special Staff, not the General Staff in the War Department. The Special Staff, was headed by an ordnance officer, a brigadier general, who had known me very well. And he wanted me back there as his deputy. And I didn't want to leave. I had a job that if I stayed on for six months would promote me. And General Styer was… agreeable to keeping me, and when they requested my return, he objected. And then they came back and said that the Secretary of War, which of course probably never heard of me, but anyway that wanted me back to this new development division. And that they would replace me with the list of three officers that they gave, including Davis, who had been Chief Ordnance Officer. In other words, they agreed they would send him back. So Styer said, “I don't want to make Davis come back out, but I've got to let you go.” So, they took Colonel Hoff, who was [inaudible] [officer’s course?], and said he'd got me on the airplanes and sent me back. So, I came back to the War Department Special Staff in December of ‘45. And by that time, because of new developments in this rocket work and so on, in fact all of the [inaudible] staff supervision of it. We had no control over it. Staff job. And then they decided to reorganize the general staff and create the research and development division in the general staff. And my boss decided to retire, so that left me at least temporarily in charge of the – I was the senior officer presently in the new development division. I fell in the job of organizing and getting started for this new development research division of the general staff. And I was the acting head of that for about six months. The general staff division. [00:56:59.] DC: I guess you still kept an eye on guided missiles. [00:57:02] GT: Oh yes, of course. I was very much interested in them, but I had no control over it. I did though, at that point, have considerable to do with keeping guided missiles in the Army. [00:57:24] DC: Oh really? [00:57:25] GT: Yes, because the Air Force, by that time we were trying very hard to get… [00:57:35] DC: That’s the [wing controversy?]. [00:57:38] GT: – the long-range missiles turned over to them. And my old friend Ben Wilson was still there, and General LeMay at that time, the major general, was head of that development group inside that. But anyway, several times I had the order all gotten up to turn it over, because they too were part of the Army at that time, to transfer all this missile work to the Air Corps. But by that time, I was an acting deputy chief of staff, so it required my consent. [00:58:41] DC: So, you moved up into that [?]. [00:58:47] GT: I didn't have any weight, but sitting across the ground force there was Jakey Devers, who had four stars on his shoulder and who did have a lot of weight. So, every time these things came over, I trotted over and stirred up Jakey. [Laughing while speaking] He immediately got on his horse and came over to the Pentagon and got with… [00:59:11] DC: You were the watchdogs there. [00:59:13] GT: That’s about all I did there, of course, exercising influence. But all I had to do was to alert Devers and he was able to get over on Tom Handy's level and say, nonsense, these things are artillery. The action of course is correct, I can say. They bear no resemblance whatsoever to an airplane except they fly through the air is all. [00:59:43] DC: Guided artillery shell. [00:59:52] GT: In the light of the things that have come to pass afterwards, maybe I was wrong. But because the Air Force of course did win the war, but it took them a long time. It was 20 years I guess, pretty near, before they actually got the thing from the Army. [01:00:18] DC: I was somewhat involved in that. I was in the Jupiter program which was turned over to the air force in… [1:00:30] GT: I was up to my ears in 1946. And I say nobody paid much attention to me, but they would pay attention to people like Devers. [01:00:45] DC: That's certainly given me a much better overall feel of how these things come about. It pulled me out a lot of good [chances?]. [01:00:55] [interview ends] [01:01:05] [recording repeats first 30 minutes] [END] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000027_A Title A name given to the resource Trichel, Gervais Description An account of the resource Dr. Trichel's account of post-WW2 V-2 Rocket acquisition, roles of British intelligence, importance of General Electric and Dr. Porter, Askania theodolites, the hiring of Operation Paperclip German scientists, the selection and establishment of White Sands Missile Range, and Ordnance acquisition. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-04-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/25644c9b7e86aaca4602775de31c4558.pdf b8db6910cab1bca25bfda3407b94b8eb Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000026_T Title A name given to the resource Toftoy, Hazel (Transcript) Description An account of the resource Experiences in the early days of Gen. Toftoy's career in Huntsville. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/a515520cf54888093abaa7607f746471.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/746b745e3a4cb981067a082e2b18f062.mp4 ea2fa3de7817bbd12597a998f6830d8a Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Toftoy, Hazel Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 0:33:56 Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:08] David Christensen: Interview with Hazel Toftoy, August 31, 1971. And she's going to tell a few anecdotes about General Toftoy. Hazel, you mentioned on one occasion that the general actually got down on his hands and knees to beg for money for the missile program. Would you tell a little more…? [00:00:27] Hazel Toftoy: I know he got down on his hands and knees to beg for Redstone Arsenal. And when General Ridgway was Chief of Staff, I think, at that time, and he tried to influence the crowd, the executive crowd that was there. And he couldn't seem to get to first base, so he said, we'll put the map on the floor, and they put the big map on the floor. This has to do with Redstone, I think. Then he got down on his hands and knees and showed where Huntsville, Alabama was, you know. And then he said, that's the place we need, General Ridgway. Everybody else was against it. General [Pike?], I think, was the more than said no, irrevocably no, or something. And his decision and they all went no. General Ridgway looked at Toftoy and said, “Alright, that's where it will be.” And so, everybody was, of course after all, the Chief of Staff was the one to decide. So, then he was real happy, and he rolled up the map, and away he went. So that was one of the things that happened. And then on several other occasions, I know he was called up to Congress because they weren't giving enough money. For instance, the Redstone missile, they couldn't get enough money and the contract, I think, was being given to Chrysler. And they needed some other funds, government funds. And he would do everything possible to get funds for that. And then going back to the Germans, you know, when they first came, they were aliens, really, in this country. And he tried to get funds for them, and everybody said no, send them back. We don't want them here because we have our own science. [00:02:59] DC: Was that the military thing, or the industry? [00:03:03] HT: This was the industry, mostly, our own scientists. They thought they were coming in and taking over. And I can remember him on the phone, and two or three phones going, you know, back and forth with people in Congress and up there. And I think that Senator Sparkman and Bob Jones should be given this credit for helping to push this through, you know. [00:03:34] DC: It would be wise to talk to them about this. Do you remember any incidents when the General used to drive to Fort Bliss? I guess you were in Washington then, mostly, weren't you? [00:03:50] HT: Yeah, I was in Washington. [00:03:51] DC: Did you ever go out with him on any trips to Fort Bliss to visit? [00:03:56] HT: No, I didn't get out there. White Sands or Fort Bliss. Never gone out there. [00:04:02] DC: Was he out quite frequently though? [00:04:04] HT: Oh yeah, he was a traveling man. Talk about a salesman. He was a salesman for missiles. That's about what you’d call a missile salesman. But I think that Colonel Hamill would have all the stuff on the housing and all the – you know, because they were in those igloos at first, you know. And then they built little houses for them, better housing, and then they finally took over the hospital at Fort Bliss, you know, and put everybody out of the hospital so that they could take over. And that's the story in itself. And I can't quote that exactly. [00:04:55] DC: Yeah, we have most of the details. [00:04:57] HT: But he can do that much better than I can. [00:05:05] [recording cuts] [00:05:06] DC: A little bit about the salesmanship of this getting industry interested in the missile programs. [00:05:12] HT: Well, first he, I can remember, I don't know whether it was the first one, but he went to Thiokol and talked to them. And then Rohm and Haas, they were in on it at the beginning. And then he went out to Chrysler and had the people come here to see, you know, what was going on and what they were. [00:05:33] DC: Bell Labs. They had to sell them too. [00:05:35] HT: Uh-huh. And then Douglas Aircraft. And he picked out, I think, some of the leading ones in the industry at that time. Then Martin got into it later. And let's see. I think, I'm trying to think of all this and doing dynamics. [00:06:04] DC: You have a hard time investing them to get into this kind of business? They were all aircraft people, primarily. [00:06:10] HT: Yeah, but they didn't see much. You see, nobody in the country saw much missiles in the early days. In fact, half of them didn't know what a missile looked like, you know, or a rocket. And so, they didn't want any part of it. So, you had to have some good salesmanship. He had other men go out with him. [00:06:34] DC: Can you recall any names of some of these other people? We might want to [inaudible]. [00:06:39] HT: Well, you know, I really don't, except Hamill. Of course, he was always a good, because he was a booster. Well, I would say Dr. von Braun was one of our biggest salesmen. [00:06:53] DC: Yeah, carried him along, too. [00:06:57] HT: He wanted to stay here, and of course he wanted to get in on all this, too. And although he was actually working on other things, he went along with that. And in fact, I think Maria will tell you that he kept the seats hot on the plane. That's the way she put it, because he was always traveling from one place to the other. And... [00:07:29] DC: Was there any effort to break up this team and sort of put them out to industry? Do you recall anything there? [00:07:35] HT: Oh yeah, they had fabulous offers from industry once they got started and they knew what they could do. I think every one of them, I don't know, but really, they did. They had a lot of people. [00:07:51] DC: How did Toftoy fight that, to help keep them together as a team? Was this a story for their [?]? [00:07:58] HT: You mean all the German people? Well, he was like the father to them I think. Because he was the one that actually got them together, brought them over here, they felt like – I don't think they felt like they owed him anything – but they felt like he was the father of the brood, you might say, and the group. He just kept them going, you see, and put them to work. And he had charge of putting all these in at Aberdeen, all these charts and things that they picked up from the documents. And then he had charge, ran the White Sands. I don't know how he did some of those things, and still I saw a little bit of him once in a while. And the children, they always say, well how did the children ever get to see their father? I said, well you'd be surprised how he could sandwich a lot of things together. We still made trips and he just seemed to enjoy, that was sort of the other part of his life. [00:09:19] DC: Yeah, did he turn his missiles off when he got home? [00:09:21] HT: Oh yeah, one thing the front door shut and the missiles went off, but the phone was there. And in order not to, I'd often go in the room and take the phone off the hook. And then he'd get so mad because he wanted to call somebody and he'd see it, I'd forget to put it back, and he'd see the receiver off and then I'd catch hell. But yeah, he really did. And I think that's the reason we got along so well. And I went on lots of trips with him. And of course, the Army didn't pay mine, I had to pay my own, but that was all right. We had the time together and that was the only time that actually we enjoyed each other was to be on a trip. [00:10:23] DC: What was the general opinion of the Air Force? I guess there was some controversy all the way [inaudible]. [00:10:29] HT: Oh man, yeah, well he kept quiet. He was a very tactful person. He could have, I think, made a real big noise about everything. If he was that type and I think everything would have blown up and we'd have nothing. [00:10:50] DC: So, he would lean over backwards just to keep the thing going. [00:10:53] HT: Yeah, he'd rather if they wanted something, except that he did not want them to have the missile. He thought that the Army should, because it was his baby and he felt like he started over there with them although the Air Force was in it too. But they should have some of it. But where do you draw the line? But where should they start? Where should they stop and where should the Army? They wanted them to go up 250 miles and they argued over that and he went too. [00:11:32] DC: Some had wings and some couldn't have wings. [00:11:34] HT: And there's a story about him almost being court-martialed on something. But he got out of it. Some congressman got out of it. I can't. Well, I think maybe Colonel Hamill has some data on that. But yeah, Hamill was in on it. [00:11:54] DC: [By the Air Force or something?] [00:11:54] HT: He says, well, goodbye, honey. Goodbye. I may be in jail the next time you see me. I'm going to Washington and I'm going to be court-martialed and this man's after me. And it's almost like a criminal case like you've done something bad. You know, I mean, this is so serious. And now that I'm out of the missile business, I can really smile again. I felt like everything was, I felt like missiles were the thing. So did everybody at that time that were working with us. And I felt like they were coming out of my ears, my eyes, my head all around me were missiles. And at night I'd see one going up in front of me and I'd think, oh, is that the Redstone? Which one is that? Wake up in the morning and grab, you know, I think I was grabbing a missile. [00:12:54] DC: You were really [missiled?]…[laughing] [00:12:54] HT: And I'd be grabbing, yeah, I was really [missiled?]. And I was grabbing my husband instead of the missile. He'd say, ‘What's the matter, honey?’ I'm sorry I didn't have that term right there. I would have said I've been [missiled?]. But anyway, we had a lot of fun over and yet there were real sad moments. And he almost, I don't think anybody else knows this, but he almost resigned from the army because... [00:13:28] DC: Over here at Redstone? [00:13:29] HT: Yeah, over here at Redstone. Maybe you found out about that because he didn't feel that he was getting the support in Congress, the money, or that people didn't understand. To him and to everybody working in the missile field, it was very serious, all this stuff. And of course, we wanted to beat Russia and that was part of it. And yet, that was in the background. But he actually, and he had the phone in his hand to call up the Chief of Staff. He was putting in his resignation. And I took that phone away from him. I'd bet about six times we went through that and almost had a fight. And I think if he was a different temperament, I would have got that phone in my head, on my head. But he was a general type and he put it down. And I said, now come on, let's talk about it. [00:14:34] And he had an offer from [Bulova?] to be president of the [Bulova?] company. And we went out to see Bradley down there. [00:14:46] DC: He was Chairman of the [Bulova?]. [00:14:50] HT: And so that was a fabulous offer in itself for, I don't know, I won't quote the amount of money, but much more than the army could ever give him, even as a general, even if he had been promoted. And he was then a Brigadier General, I think. And like that, somebody got wind of it in Washington because I talked about it so much. Oh, my husband's gonna retire, oh dear, oh dear, he's going out of the army. And we liked the army so much. [inaudible] [00:15:30] DC: So, the word got out. [00:15:32] HT: And word got out and next thing you know, down came the promotion to Major General. So of course, that boosted his ego. And he knew that he was worth something then or they would not promote him as Major General. And so… [00:15:53] DC: About what time, probably, would this be about ‘53 or something like that? [00:15:58] HT: I think, well, we can look up when he was promoted. That was when the offer came in. And of course, we dickered with that for a long time before I almost got the telephone on my head. And I thought, sure, he was going to, you know, throw it out. He was so mad because I was interfering and I didn't think he was thinking this thing through. He was just mad at Congress, mad at missiles, mad at everything. [00:16:30] DC: Frustrated, yeah. [00:16:31] HT: Yeah, frustrated. He just couldn't get to first base with anybody. They said they didn't have the money. You couldn't do this. You can't do that. And he said, you can do it. He was a perfectionist and he wanted everything done right. He thought anybody could do anything that they wanted if they tried. And so that was his, sort of his model. [00:17:00] DC: Of course, he also had kept the team together. I'm sure he didn't want to leave the boat after keeping the group together. That would have been a... [00:17:08] HT: But see, the group at that time were also... [00:17:11] DC: [inaudible] [00:17:12] HT: Well, they were offered, I think, [gentle?], and I won't say [inaudible] dynamics because that may be the wrong one, but it was one of these big industries that kept offering them jobs, you know, at fabulous prices by that time. [00:17:31] DC: We need to find out who and talk to them. That might be interesting for our story. [00:17:36] HT: But I know that they were threatened to get out and I guess maybe he knew about it. Of course, he didn't tell me... [00:17:47] DC: The whole thing was pretty rocky right at that time. [00:17:49] HT: Yeah, he didn't tell me details because he never discussed those kind of things with me, but I knew there was something that was making him feel like... Like... And after all he was doing, and I think we got Colonel Hamill on the spot. I don't know whether I phoned him. I phoned around a lot of people to phone him to tell him how good things were going and everything just to keep his morale up, you know? So, a wife really has an important part in this business too. As I say, you have to go through all these missiles coming at you and out of you, dreaming of them and wondering if you were sitting on one going up when you got up in the morning and all this. And then as soon as he got out of the door, then it left me and I went on with my chores. [00:18:53] DC: Did you ever see a launchers at all? [00:19:00] HT: I saw just the ones that went off at Redstone. You know, they started in with what they call Toftoy’s Folly here in Redstone. That's when they built the little test stands, you know? And they said that was, for instance, this is the way the top crowd looked at it. I won't say general staff because I don't know who it was, but they thought that was much too big. We never had, because it wasn't that high, but you know, whatever height was, we never had anything that would. And then it grew so much that they had to build that great big one, you know? And I don't know whether they call that Toftoy’s Folly or whether that was another story. Did you get in on that one? [00:19:56] DC: I'm generally familiar with the story. The first Redstone test stand and the larger one, you know? [00:20:01] HT: Well, of course, we got to see all those around the arsenal. [00:20:05] DC: You saw some of the first static tests of the engines around it? [00:20:09] HT: Uh-huh. Oh yeah. And the wind tunnel, you go in the wind tunnel at the beginning, you know? When, and [inaudible] you’d think you were going to be blown out of there. The roar. And he said — I said, “Is that a rocket in there roaring?” He says, “oh, that's the way it's going to sound worse than that.” You wait and see. And one incident I remember is White Sands. He came home and told me about it, that a reporter from one of the newspapers, I think Washington or New York, saw this thing for the first time at White Sands. Guess it was a V-2. Anyway, the first one that went up, and they weren't sure. And everybody was saying,oh, that thing is going to go right, and it'll probably go to Mexico. It was not the one that went to Mexico, by the way. But it was an awful roar, and the first time any of these reporters had heard a roar, you know? And so this one got down in the sand, in White Sands, and covered himself all up quickly. And [got down] and never did see the fire. [laughing] [00:21:21] DC: [inaudible] [00:21:22] HT: Because when he heard the roar, you know, that's all he did was dig like, and went right on down and covered himself. And said, so then when they said, it's all over, Jim. I don't know whether it was Jim Lucas or not, but it's all over, Jim. Come on out. And then he uncovered himself and came out all full of sand, and they laughed. They said that was the funniest thing they’d ever seen. And I think the general was nearby there. But he said this poor guy was scared to death. And of course, he still had to be quite far away from it. And he didn't want any part of that. And so, the newspaper never sent him again because he came back with no report, except he buried his head in the sand. [00:22:21] DC: It’s a good story. [chuckling] [00:22:23] [recording cuts] [00:22:25] DC: This is the story of the [steakhouse that’s off-limits?]. Just mention a little bit so I know what that [inaudible]. [00:22:30] HT: Yeah. Well, they went down. They were looking for the quarters for the German crowd at that time. They wanted a hospital, at least. Hamill had in the back of its mind that this hospital was giving up and that they had no money to put into it. So, one night he said, or I don't know whether it was Colonel Toftoy or Hamill, they said, “well, let's go to the steakhouse.” So, they did go to the steakhouse. And then on the way back, instead of turning, go to White Sands or Bliss, wherever it was they were going. He turned the other way and said, “where are you going?” He said, never mind. I'm going down by the hospital. And he had it all fixed with the commanding officer and they stepped in there. And so, he said, now you tell them you want this hospital for these Germans. You're going to have a better place to live. So, they went in there and he showed them all around him and said, well, I don't think I could do that. And Hamill had already, as he made the way for this by telling them that — I don't know whether he got permission from Washington. I don't think he had at that time. But anyway, he had made some kind of preparation beforehand. And they went right in and he said, all right, tomorrow morning, Hamill, you will get this thing. And it was just like that, right overnight. Because they were going to move out of there anyway, they had no money to run the place. And the congressman gave it to them and said, all right, you can have it. And of course, that was another get down on your knees, what I call get down on your knees and plead. Because that was another thing. They had to plead for that because they said, “Oh, we have other plans for that. That's going to the Air Force or the Navy,” or somebody was going to take it over. Not the Army. And they said, “Well, they can't have it.” And they were real upset and mean about it. And so, they thought, well, they better please them. You know, and so sometimes it works the other way where they have to be tough on the congressmen and the ones up at the top instead of the ones at the top being tough on them. So anyway, that's a little bit. I don't remember all the details. He can tell you what even the speed they went and they said, why are you going so fast? Oh, we got to go someplace and all the details can be told by Hamill. Better than me, because I just heard about it when they came back. They just told the story. And that was long ago. [00:25:47] DC: I guess Hamill was in close touch by telephone to Toftoy in Washington. [00:25:52] HT: In Washington. [00:25:53] DC: There were a lot of problems with Bliss they had straightened out in Washington. [00:25:54] HT: Oh, yeah, they got all the orders and [Sagan?], of course, Mr. [Sagan?] was down there again with them. And so, they had quite a time. It was uh… [00:26:12] [glass or cups clinking] [00:26:13] DC: I put a little in there already. Maybe not enough. [00:26:15] HT: You put sugar in it? [00:26:20] HT: But they had a hard time getting real. It was real difficult getting all these things put together. And at the same time, you know, he was trying to run the whole show. And it was hard to convince people that this thing was important. That's why he got so serious, that I couldn't half the time get a smile out of him. Although he did have a beautiful smile. And we'd always say, look at the birdie smile. That was our famous. So that he'd give that time because it was so dead serious about this thing. [00:27:05] DC: Well, I guess one of the biggest problems was the American public wasn't that interested. After the war, they were tired of… [00:27:10] HT: No, they were very [inaudible] and didn't care. And, of course, everybody knows we went into the deep freeze and all these things. We were more interested in household. [00:27:27] DC: [inaudible], homes, automobiles. [00:27:30] HT: Yeah and didn't care about missiles. And that's what I'm afraid of when Vietnam, they give up, you know, Vietnam and that money they'll want for the poor. They've been talking about welfare and all that. And they won't give it to the state program. And that's when unless you have a fighter like him behind that's going to. And I'm afraid the next best fighter is going to be Dr. von Braun himself, because he fought all along with my husband on this whole deal. Whatever he said would go or he would have suggestions. And then then Toftoy would go along with Von Braun and they worked together very beautifully. And I think that Wernher kept the team together a lot, too. [00:28:27] DC: I guess there are a lot of… [00:28:28] HT: Yes, there are a lot of, you know, sidelines to this thing. And actually, I think Von Braun, most of them wanted to work on space. They didn't want to work on these little missiles. That was not their job. They wanted to work on the space. [00:28:48] DC: So, there was no NASA then at all. [00:28:49] HT: So there was no space program. And it took all these years to build up to it. [00:28:57] DC: Did Toftoy mention space very much? Is that sort of in the back of his mind? [00:29:01] HT: Back in ‘46, you know, that was the one thing he said, “In this decade, we’re going to space.” You got a clipping, I’m sure, of that. And he… [00:29:11] DC: There were some raised eyebrows, too, when a military man started speaking about space so much. [00:29:16] HT: I mean, he thought he was a lunatic. In fact, they said, “The white coats are coming to get you any day.” That was really told to him. “Are you cracked?” “I think your husband's cracked.” I get that kind of and all these things thrown at me, you know. “I think your husband's had it. You better take him to the hospital. He's cracked.” And I said, “Well, if he's cracked, Wernher von Braun’s cracked, too.” Oh, well, that's different. He's a scientist. They're all cracked. [00:29:49] DC: [laughing] That was understood! [00:29:50] HT: Yeah, that was understood. But an army man, should stick to his army guns, you know, and things like that. And not bother with all this space. I mean, this space stuff. And of course, it was the same way when they began on the missiles. “He was cracked.” And, “What do you want a missile for?” “How do you know Russia has missiles?” We… you know, and all this stuff. And in the meantime, I'm sure that general staff or intelligence in our army or someone has looked into it and knew they did. But they just didn't want to give money for it. [00:30:39] [recording cuts] [00:30:41] HT: I was at Redstone Arsenal, and I've been in this missile work. And I've gotten as far as space. Now that I've gotten a little further on to heaven. Couldn't I come in? Or do I have to go the other place? And he said, “My dear, here's your orchid. Step right in. Your angels are here. Your mermaids are here. Your missile people are all around you. So just have a good time. [00:31:16] DC: Thank [Peter Lutton?], again. [00:31:17] HT: Yeah, thank [Peter Lutton?]. [inaudible] tell a new story. Of course, every time somebody adds a little bit, something more to it beside the angels, you know, I added the missile men. But they said your whole crowd's here. [00:31:35] DC: You made it. [00:31:35] HT: So we made it. [00:31:38] [recording cuts] [00:31:39] DC: I ask you what were some of his personal feelings when the von Braun team finally switched over to NASA. Since he was an army man, I'm sure he had mixed emotions. Do you recall what some of his feelings were at that time, about 1960? [00:31:54] HT: Well, let's see, that's the year he retired. [00:31:58] DC: But the army, of course, was still trying to keep the von Braun team and do things in space. By the same token, I'm sure he wanted to see them go on. [00:32:08] HT: What hurt him the most, and this was, of course, the feeling, was when they put General Medaris into the job as top. [00:32:18] DC: Oh, the Jupiter project. [00:32:21] HT: And he was the head here at Redstone. And that, he felt, the General felt like he was having a demotion when he ran the whole program. And then they put the man from General Staff in Washington in, who knew, really — well, he knew something about it, of course – but he was not in on the beginning. And he wanted to be at the top. And that, a little while after that, he went to the hospital. And I think in my own mind, this is just my own opinion, that he just, you know, kind of went to pieces. [00:33:06] DC: Hurt him inside, yeah. [00:33:08] And then, let's see, well, I think NASA, he knew it was getting to be a big program and that the army, I mean, as small as it was, and Ordnance couldn't hang on to it. They had to. And they'd rather have NASA, he'd rather have NASA take it over than give it to the Air Force. [laughing] That's about the size of it, even though the Air Force… [00:33:36] DC: Lesser of two evils. [00:33:38] HT: Because there was always that little bickering and I don't believe that. [END] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000026_A Title A name given to the resource Toftoy, Hazel Description An account of the resource Experiences in the early days of Gen. Toftoy's career in Huntsville from his wife. How he fought to keep the Army missile programs, how Toftoy almost resigned, Toftoy's involvement in the creation of Redstone Arsenal, and the transition from Army to NASA. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/0147c7bbd908216522886b86a83b19da.pdf 86ffcea82f7a6b395d7793b2e6a1834f Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000025_T Title A name given to the resource Steihoff, Ernst (Transcript) Description An account of the resource V-2 development in war time Germany. Participation in British Operation Backfire and American Operation Paperclip after WW II. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-19 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/fbabe34f6a2efc60059baf242e4b782e.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/7d0b2604b9e5b85b883cdce4eba0b28e.mp4 3c3a5b7ff2d14ce4d90639fa0771dd95 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Steihoff, Ernst Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Christensen, David Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 1:30:14 Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:05] David Christensen: Interview with Dr. Ernst Steinhoff. The date is August 19, 1971. Dr. Steinhoff, would you tell a little bit how you got into the rocket business when you first heard of Peenemünde? And prior to that, what you were doing? And then the first exposure to the rockets at Peenemünde, and what happened after that? [00:00:36] Ernst Steinhoff: I was one of the scientific staff members of the German Institute for Pilotless Aircraft for Unpowered Aircraft Gliders at Darmstadt. And I had a colleague of mine, Dr. [Sterling?], who was working with me on flight measurements, flight performance measurements, development of telemetry and other endeavors to improve our capabilities in performance measurements. One day he told me he had received an offer to come to a location. He couldn't really tell me very much about it because it was highly secret and he hoped to see me again sometime in the future. I didn't hear anything for several months from him, and then one day he sent me a telegram that he intended to visit me with a gentleman with a name of Dr. von Braun, whose name I had never heard. [00:01:58] DC: This was about what year? [00:01:59] ES: It was in 1939, early in ’39. And so, I was quite impressed by Dr. von Braun and he told me a little bit about what was going on and what we were all involved in but he couldn't tell me too much. He told me that we were developing new propulsion systems, and the operation was actually sponsored by the army. So, we had some test facilities and systems to test it. He would invite me to a personal visit to get a little bit more acquainted. I thought okay I have to fly in a flight contest which will bring me in the general area sometimes in May. [00:03:03] DC: You were competing in gliding contests? [00:03:06] ES: No, it was a powered contest. I had the plane of our institute, which I flew there. [00:03:17] DC: Was that a specially built plane for competition? [00:03:21] ES: No, it was a national contest which actually evaluated pilot skills. [00:03:35] DC: Oh, yeah. Like a – [00:03:41] ES: After I had completed my mission there, I decided that in agreement with our discussion I would visit Dr. von Braun and Dr. [Sterling?] at Peenemünde. So, I asked the local flight service to give me clearance for a flight plan to fly there. They kind of looked at each other and said, “You know, young man, we don't know of anyone yet who ever got permission to fly to that place. We can try it, but don't have too high hopes because we have never gotten clearance yet. We have tried it many times. We were interested too to find out what's going on there.” [00:04:38] DC: What did the aerial map show of that area? Nothing? [00:04:40] ES: Oh, it was a – [00:04:42] DC: Restricted area, maybe? [00:04:48] ES: It was a typical dot of a military German air force – air base, and this was it. To the surprise of the flight operations people who came with word back, said I was expected to come there. [00:05:06] DC: Fly right in! [00:05:08] ES: Then they asked, “Who are you? Can’t just get there on a telephone call.” I just don't know myself. [chuckling] So I flew there and, probably, von Braun had forgotten the day already when I would come there. We had some VIPs coming there. When I came, he said, “You know, it's kind of a coincidence but I have visitors there. We have a big test run going on a new engine and I'd like you to see it. But really everyone who comes here needs a clearance. I have even been able to talk to my boss. I have used my own, so to speak, executive privileges to determine you could be a bona fide guest here. You are working for the government anyhow too. If we want to get you to work here, we might as well show you all of it.” [00:06:11] DC: I see, go all the way! [00:06:13] ES: Then he said, “Unfortunately, I cannot take you up to the block house out there because everyone would see that I have someone there who no one knows.” This probably kind of would set up things before I’ve talked to my commanding officer. This was, of course, Dr. Dornberger. He was a colonel at the time and hoping to be promoted to general, what happened. Apparently while the test was going on, von Braun he kind of hid me behind some bushes. I was probably twice the distance of the people sitting in the block house, but I got all the incidentals to the test. The tremendous roar, the tremendous flames and smoke, as you know. Also, the dust which was kicked up, everything. I was standing there and then after the test, von Braun and Dornberger and their guests they walked around the still steaming and red-hot tail end. This was the first test of a real complete V2 engine. It was the first – it was not the final engine, but it was the one which reached – [00:07:42] DC: Long duration test. [00:07:43] ES: Yes, a long duration test. There was no failure and so on. Everything worked like the book describes. I said, “Okay I will just wait until someone gets me and don't come out behind my bushes. I don't want to embarrass Dr. von Braun.” After they were all through inspecting, they all turned towards that bush and came slowly walking and von Braun took about two steps back. Dr. Dornberger and von Braun called me and said come out here – [00:08:22] DC: Hop up! [chuckling] [00:08:24] ES: And I would like to meet you here my boss, Dr. Dornberger. And so, he said, “How did you like it? It was really something wasn't it?” I said, “I was sure impressed.” He said “How about working here?” I said, “Okay I will accept.” I didn't ask for any amount of salary or anything. He could have told me a day later you work for a dollar a day or something or a dollar a year. That is it. You accepted here. But I have never in my life really rejected. I have never asked for a salary. I have accepted or rejected but I have never told anyone what I think I need to earn. This, of course, led to a pretty, I would say, jokeful experience that von Braun and I had later. A few years which you probably also have read in his book or in Dornberger’s book. [00:09:37] DC: One basic question, before we continue where you went from there. When you were flying into Peenemünde, did you see any of the facilities? [00:09:45] ES: Oh yes. I could see. I flew inside the, I would say, danger area, so the people restricted area, and I could see all kinds of strange types of buildings there which I really had no idea what they were used for, until I knew more about it. Of course, that first test gave me quite some impression. [00:10:14] DC: And then what happened? What was your first responsibility? [00:10:19] ES: I went back and told my boss that I really had decided to leave. I have been there for three years. This is normally the time, if you are an engineer or scientist employed in the German industry or university or research institute. It didn't make any difference. You are expected to change every three to – early three at the latest four years. Unless you have given up to become promoted. [00:10:56] DC: This is normal procedure then. [00:10:58] ES: Yes, normal procedure. If you don't have, I would say, a major promotion not just the salary raises, which I had several, but a major promotion in these three years to move on to broaden your background. Everyone expects you to do, and you can come back again after a number of years. Then they make you, maybe, a much better offer than you had before and so on. From that point of view, the boss couldn't say much. He made me a salary offer and I said “It's too late now. If you would have done it before I would have come. I wouldn't have even suggested to resign and leave.” But I think in retrospect, I wouldn't change my mind. I found that I never regretted this position. I came up there, and I was actually put in charge of the development world – remote control included, and so on. This is something which I had done over the last three years besides flight performance measurements, more as a hobby. I realized that if you wanted to really progress into commercial aviation, then we needed autopilot. Much better than we had at the time. We had, I would say, rudiments of autopilot. That’s the Model T, yeah. I felt that there was considerable gain. When I went to Peenemünde this was my test. There were quite a few departments. I had the boss who had the much larger department who had all the electrical devices and so on. [00:13:01] DC: Who is that now? [00:13:03] ES: I have to try to remember again. He did not stay with the team. He was actually a man who felt that this whole business of rocketry had something which included a lot of lists for conservative engineers or scientists. He did not really feel at home beyond his more narrow confines of education. I had been much broader educated. While I was still working toward my master's degree, I took a lot of electronic courses. I could have at the same time gotten my degree in aeronautical engineering or aeronautics in general, in meteorology or in electronics. [00:14:03] DC: Much more of a systems background. [00:14:05] ES: I felt that flying would never amount to much unless you could really deal with the weather. Secondly, I did not think that it would really amount to much until you had radio communications, and you had autopilot, and you became independent of the weather. You had – [00:14:26] DC: Self-contained. [00:14:27] ES: to know about the weather to become self-contained. This was what I felt I wanted to bring as background into my profession. How I would get into that profession? I had the faintest idea. After I graduated, I went to an airline and I developed a real health problem because I had some chronic eye inflammation. I was told by a doctor that I could not get rid of it. I was living at Königsberg in East Germany. Which is now actually not even Polish. I think it's partly Polish but partly Russian. We were living right at the Baltic Sea. This was an area which was really wind swept all the time. All these little salt particles were in the air and got in my eyes. I had this chronic eye inflammation. There was another thing. I had no relatives, nothing there. The only people I really was together with all the time were these old salty flight captains. When they came there, they had a day away from home. That was when they descended on the town. They at times took me with them. I got very little sleep. I had a lot to work on. I think one of the reasons that I could not fight this infection was the fact that I really didn't get the rest enough either. One day, I saw in a periodical that in one of the political institutes there was the position of an assistant to the professor. So, I didn't think much. I just said, “Okay, maybe it was really the tail end of the depression.” It was in 1933. Unemployment in Germany was sky high so to speak. I decided at least to give it a try. I sent a letter there that I would be interested in being considered for that position. I had a lot of qualifications for it. I was a pilot, and I knew aircraft and so on. I worked for heavy gear in an airline and knew how the airline operations worked. I was the number two technical [mainsail?]. [00:17:32] DC: You did have a certain background in commercial aviation and aviation. You thought Peenemünde offered you an opportunity to advance the state of the art? [00:17:33] ES: I didn't know anything about Peenemünde at that time. [00:17:36] DC: I mean later, when you got into Peenemünde. You saw this as a way to feed back into commercial aviation. [00:17:42] ES: So, what happened on this application, first I heard for at least two months nothing. Then suddenly I got a telegram whether I could not give out a [lecture there?]. I was very successful and I talked about aircraft instrumentation and aircraft instrumentation design. So, I went to my old organization [inaudible] I could get some of the [background material?] told my old professor about it. He told me, “I would like to keep you here but my funds are so low that I really can't hire anyone unless someone resigns.” So, I went there, gave my lecture and did my thing for a while again. And suddenly I got a telegram in which I was offered the position of the lecturer for the aeronautics department. I really had not applied for it. I was kind of scared about it. So, I said, “Okay, I would take that only if so and so would be hired as my assistant.” Because I didn't think I could do this without having an assistant. This was a colleague of mine who had gotten his master's degree about half a year after me and he was also working in some aeronautical enterprise there. It was not very highly paid at the time, because no one really could pay. [00:19:30] DC: What was German aviation, commercial aviation like in the 30s? [00:19:35] ES: It was two times flight from where I was located from Berlin to that location and then on to Moscow in both directions which was considerable. And since [inaudible] I will say German airline also flew there and returned back again and stopped in several places, I would say, which were in the order of magnitude of populations of 100,000 to 300,000 - 500,000 between there and Berlin. [00:20:11] DC: Were people eager to fly or a little reluctant? [00:20:14] Yeah it was not anywhere near [here?]. I would say the airplanes mostly at that time held somewhere between 8 and 16 passengers and they were not at all time full and the German government had considerable subsidy on it. We had the… coming in in that year, actually last year I would say, the He 57. Which was the first airliner with a retractable landing gear. It was a really big aircraft. It flew at that time around 220 miles an hour or so. So, I sent a telegram back that I would only accept that this former colleague of mine would become my assistant. And I did not think that he ever would accept it. But 2 hours later, I got a telegram that he had accepted and therefore my conditions were met. So, I had to accept it. That really ushered in the time in my life where I worked hardest ever. I probably did get only 4 maybe 3 to 4 hours sleep at night, except maybe on the weekend when we really slept through one night until we kind of felt we’d caught up. Unfortunately... [00:22:01] DC: Well, I've been told you were pretty much that way even in the Peenemünde days. [00:22:06] ES: Oh yeah, I was in the Peenemünde. I sometimes was only 3 or 4 hours at home. I had a bed right in a test stand. If I got tired, I took a nap. And an hour or two later, I was there again. I was there by all the major tests we had. So that was the way I got into Peenemünde. And then this [upper-chair?] decided that or he felt that I probably was much more qualified for the position than I was. And he said, “you never know what happens here at Peenemünde.” So, he’d tell Dr. von Braun, said, “I'm resigning here and appoint you as my successor and have him sign it right away. He may think of someone else and I think you’re the one who should take it.” And that was the man. He was a really solid citizen and he had principles. He was a very cautious operator and most of what he was doing was really outside his domain. He felt that I had really penetrated things really into his area of responsibility. [00:23:25] DC: Did he go back in the industry? [00:23:29] ES: No, he went back to [inaudible]. He became actually a [?] company chief electrical engineer. It was everything he knew; he knew the power plants and so on. There was nothing which was fundamentally dependent on the results of research which had been done. This was really what the issues there was. [00:23:59] DC: This was about what time when you took over then? [00:24:02] ES: That was about half a year after I came. It was around the end of... I think it was about November of 19[39?]. [inaudible] I had in the meantime the responsibilities to organizing things. Von Braun charged me with setting up the ‘day of science’ that you had read [inaudible]. [00:24:30] DC: The wisdom day. [00:24:33] [talking over each other] [00:24:35] ES: We invited all the other people [to come and?] tell us what all of our problems were. This was like an industry briefing of the Air Force or Army. [00:24:45] DC: You were sort of coordinated then to get these people in. You gave them a couple of years to come up with solutions? [00:24:52] ES: No, we told them we like to have [sequences?] done. I had one test which likely led to the inertial guidance system. I told them I wanted to measure the speed of rocket to [110 to 1?] percent. They looked at me, “Is this fellow out of his mind?” Some knew me. “You know Steinhoff, this is an area where we really don't want to [stain?] our reputation.” [00:25:22] DC: You were trying to advance the whole state of the art in the guidance control. [00:25:26] ES: This was something that couldn't be done. They tried to measure the level of the rocket to [110 to 1?] percent. It was so easy for anyone to get lost. They didn't think that something like this would be resolved. Now that gentleman, you had come back in three months and would have told me you really thought it over, and it couldn't be done. Then I would accept your ‘no’ for an answer. But I don't think that what you said here is [inaudible]. So, you go home and do your homework and then we'll talk about it. You find it still impossible. I don't think it is impossible. [00:26:12] DC: What was your term for this? I said wisdom day. [00:26:15] I think we said it. Tag der [Wissenschaft?]. This was more a joke. Tag der [Wissenschaft?]. [00:26:22] DC: Which means? [00:26:24] ES: It means a day of science. [00:26:26] DC: Day of science, I see. [00:26:27] ES: We had all the professors there. We had a very mundane problem all day long and all week long. We wanted to know whether there were people [inaudible] could overcome our problems, let’s say, in the most speedy fashion. [00:26:45] DC: Were these people given the VIP treatment? Shown firings to get them enthused or something? [00:26:47] ES: Oh yes. They were. We were like if you had your Air Force SAB coming in. [00:26:56] DC: So, you were trying to get them enthused about all this. [talking over each other] [00:26:58] ES: [inaudible] We showed them all this. Some got more scared than… [00:27:03] DC: Really scared them when they saw them! [laughing] [00:27:07] ES: Some made good suggestions and some made suggestions that we realized only much later that they were good. We couldn't really at all times properly judge how well visitors understood what we were doing. For instance, the five, I would say, all real outstanding professors – real outstanding people – said it couldn't be done. I didn't accept this. They came back again. They all became my best buds; I can tell you. [00:27:40] DC: Was most of the science day efforts related to guidance control? [00:27:45] ES: No, no. We wanted to know how we could measure temperature, combustion chamber and so on. Instrumentation. We wanted to improve telemetry and so on. [00:27:57] DC: That was always one of the big problems was telemetry, wasn’t it? [00:28:01] ES: We had it already solved but it wasn't good enough. We had a pulse time system and we could not measure two values at the same time because we had only one electrode. We projected the results. We had discriminators. We had, I would say, a delay at the presentation. We saw seven curves. They were all going slowly. But it was all one electrode [beam?] doing self-writing and so on. So, we couldn't make any vibrations. These people wandered off and came back after three months. They had all the fundamental solutions to how I measure velocity on a moving body. Some of these solutions were quite ingenious. [00:29:06] DC: They're still being applied today, I guess. [00:29:08] ES: They're still being applied today. The ones we don't use, the Russians probably use. [suppressed laughter] This is about where it is. Of course, the last 25 years have increased the accuracy of the system by the factor 10 to the 4 to 10 to the 5th. We had put the precision mechanics but I would say none of these systems were optimized in the same way today. We discovered in the last few years all the fundamental control laws which we needed to consider, and how we could optimize them without getting involved in extremely long developments. What could be done short to demonstrate these things? We had only about four years to really demonstrate. The fourth year was there. We had to bring production up of these inertial and fly-by-wire systems to about 1,050 sets a month to supply 900 missiles plus the necessary spare parts. It was all in our responsibility. In my area, I was absolutely responsible for all of it. [00:30:50] DC: R&D, production… [00:30:52] ES: Production yeah, field testing, and so on, everything. [00:30:55] DC: Delivery, logistics– [00:30:56] ES: Really, the data [inaudible] taught me a lot. [00:30:59] DC: I can imagine. [00:31:01] ES: Then I saw that in order to get everything the way we needed it, the theoretical data, which we had the strongest demand for because our work required much more accuracy than any one of the other divisions. I was also charged with doing all the test measurements and ballistic measurements and so on. I asked a colleague of mine, who was an independent division chief, the same level as I was, whether he would not join my organization. I would give him all the support he would need and he would work on our problems. He was very delighted about that. He was not an administrator in the sense that I now had to administer another 50 to 100 people or so that did not make much difference to my organization. [00:32:09] [recording cuts] [00:32:12] DC: Continuation of interview with Dr. Steinhoff concerning his experiences at Peenemünde. [00:32:19] ES: This was the A-7, which was a guided missile, which actually was a test vehicle for the anti-aircraft missile. [00:32:33] DC: [To do what with a –?] [00:32:35] ES: With a pilot, yeah. [00:32:37] DC: With a joystick? [00:32:39] ES: We wanted to get it a lot of flying time and test it and so on. [00:32:44] DC: You were the test pilot? [00:32:46] ES: I was the test pilot and had my crew on it. When we were up ready to release the missile, we got word from below that the [inaudible] were not online yet because they had some problems there. And they were working on it and we should just go to sleep until they were ready. Then I noticed that I wasn't getting enough oxygen. On the other hand, I was not busy or in immediate danger of an accident. So, I did… my crew chief, immediately offered me his mask and I said no. We would, I would say, interrupt the flight, return, abort it if things get critical. So, we continued to fly at 18,000 feet and I stayed at 18,000 feet about 20 minutes with no oxygen. Then we dropped and immediately I dove down. [00:34:04] DC: You were following the vehicle? [00:34:06] ES: We tried to follow it but we couldn't see it. Something must have happened that very probably a parachute or something came loose and it was decelerating. [00:34:16] DC: In one of those tests, didn't the stray frequency interfere with your test? [00:34:22] ES: This was probably another one. Something happened. It was never really cleared up. It was decelerating so much., the [other lights?] were error control, displacement control. So, I followed them and suddenly the thing that we just saw for a short while was out of the field of view and they couldn't recover it. Also, the operator followed the aircraft which was flying over it until he realized he had lost it and so on. So, we didn't get the result and I landed the aircraft. At that time, I really had a severe case of [hypoxia?]. I brought it down and I laid down when I came to flight operations for a while. It took me about three or four days to really recover it again. [00:35:22] DC: This was the first attempt – [00:35:25] ES: The first attempt of a [power-controlled pilot?] – [00:35:29] DC: Remote controlled. [00:35:31] DC: Could you talk a little bit about some of your experiences again on keeping the production going, the A4 parts? I think your pilot experience came in quite handy. [00:35:43] ES: Oh yeah. Now we also, if necessary, went to planes and picked up parts which would have taken too long to get and buy a railroad or a truck or so. We also, whenever we were on the test area which was in southern Russia in the Ukraine area, if something was missing, we couldn't really... [00:36:13] DC: Oh, you had a test area besides Blizna then? [00:36:15] ES: Yeah. [00:36:18] DC: What was that located? [00:36:20] ES: That was in southwestern Russia. [00:36:26] DC: I don't know much about that. Could you talk a little bit about what the purpose and activity… R&D? [00:36:31] ES: We had two test areas. One was along the Baltic Sea coastline, the instrumentation stage. It was very similar now down along Florida coast, along the islands. [00:36:50] DC: There's one in the Ukraine you're saying? [00:36:52] ES: Yeah, that was one in the Ukraine. [00:36:55] ES: That was, let's say, set up about in... must have been in ‘43, late in ‘43, in which we made our troop testing and our production – product testing at the same time. We had some real serious problems. We had missiles breaking up during the entry. [00:37:26] DC: Oh, was this the Blizna test? [00:37:29] ES: Yeah, full on. [00:37:31] DC: Oh, it’s the same. Yeah, okay. [00:37:33] ES: Yeah, it's actually… now I think how you call it, it was... it actually was already to Ukraine, not Poland. [00:37:50] DC: I see. [00:37:51] ES: It had to go through Poland. It was piled into an area which was in southern Poland. But actually, [Landscheid?] was in Russian territory. So, what we found was that some of the vehicles did impact alright with the payload nose cone, so to speak, still attached. And some others came and we found that they had lost parts of their skin. After a while, after looking all the parts, we concluded that those which actually reentered intact actually would have broken up too if they would not have reached the surface. And we found on meteorological measurements that the reason for this was, I would say, a different degree of turbulence which changed the transition from laminar flow, as it comes in height to turbulent flow at different altitudes, and it was a fatigue problem. You had oscillations and this caused, of course, flutter. If you had an angle attack on one side, the flow was actually still attached on one side, but separate on the other. Since the vehicle was oscillating somewhere between 3 and 12 cycles per second, there were enough fatigue cycles on the spot welds to break them loose. So, when the spot welds started breaking loose, then there was no hold anymore. Suddenly a whole section of the skin came off. In the first, I think it was about 10 vehicles in that order of magnitude. We had everything riveted, but the vehicle was too heavy. [00:39:57] DC: Did you ever try to fly in the reentry area to get up high enough to see – [00:40:01] ES: We did that, and we had also Dr. Dornberger and Dr. von Braun in the reentry area, which was about – [00:40:12] DC: On the ground, though? [00:40:13] ES: On the ground, 200 miles further north. They decided that the safest point was right to be at the endpoint. Unfortunately, or fortunately, however you call it, that one came in within 1500 feet, which is still for, I would say, today's ballistic missiles. Nothing too uh... [chuckle] [00:40:46] DC: Did you actually observe any from aircraft as they broke up? [00:40:50] ES: No, I have not done that. You can't really see those unless you are either in the rear or in the front. Of course, they were sitting there with they knew what and what elevation angle it would come in. Sure enough, there was a point beating right to the endpoint. Then just shortly before, because of the increase of the drag, increasing density, it kind of bent over and landed 1500 feet. I still remember that they were looking for a [mound?], they couldn't climb on quickly. [laughs] Then of course it came in with much above Mach 1. The highest speed was about Mach 5, but then it slowed down coming in. The nose cone alone would have come in slower, but the whole project still had quite a ballistic coefficient. As impacts, the ones which had no explosives in the warhead had much more terrific impacts than those with warheads. The reason for that is that the explosion blew most of the missile off and destroyed it. [00:42:24] DC: It took away the kinetic energy. [00:42:27] ES: It took the kinetic energy and so to speak increased the density tremendously. While the one without an explosion just bored in. Then the power plant in the rear, going at still in the order of Mach 2 and a half or Mach 3, impacted, compressed the tanks. [00:42:58] DC: It's like a shaped charge coming in. [00:43:00] ES: It compressed the tanks and then the tanks blew up. But at the time when the projectile still had penetrated somewhere between 15 and 30 feet. That means all that compressed air flew large amounts of dirt around and so on. The craters with which the warhead hit were only about 10 feet deep and maybe 15 feet in diameter. We had craters here 30 feet deep up to about 50-60 feet in diameter. But then they dropped [hell?] in again and filled it partly up like we see in the lunar craters today. Then of course after it was all through, we still had the crater somewhere between 20 and 25 feet deep. [00:43:55] DC: Was there any consideration to dropping the warhead and just letting the things go without it? [00:44:00] ES: Yes, it was so really when they broke up, they had already so much speed, it wouldn't really change the course of the warhead in any way. The warhead kind of oscillated and wobbled along. Probably they came a little bit more short, maybe another 1000 feet or something like that. But this was about, all wind was much more critical. Displace of warhead was more than I would say just a breaking up. And then there's another thing that at the reentry they start to spin. And then of course if the spin rate is relatively high, then there's no oscillation anymore. Then they came right, so to speak, they even didn't bend over. They were spinning enough and they just went straight in. So, there was no more dispersion. We had few which had zero or very small spin rates, but most of them had. These were just caused by manufacturing instabilities, differences and so on. And those which actually spun, they impacted much less dispersion than the others. They were really going on maybe 50-60 revolutions per minute or so, 1.8 per second… actually over 100. [00:45:32] DC: Well towards the end of the war, when you started moving south and so forth, you still tried to keep production going at all these different universities and production points. Could you talk a little bit about some of the experiences there? I guess it was quite difficult. [00:45:51] We relocated quite a number of production sites. The amazing thing was that actually... [00:45:57] DC: Were you the coordinator for all these things? [00:45:59] ES: For all the electrical things, I was. [00:46:01] DC: What was your system to keep up with all these things? [00:46:04] ES: I had the responsibility that technically the production was going. And then we had people of ours who were attached to the plan. [00:46:16] DC: Right, liaison man. [00:46:18] ES: Yeah, it was one of my men in charge who then did all the coordinating for the plan. So, the plan told all people how many they had to bring in so to speak to have enough. [00:46:33] DC: You had your feedback right there from each other. [00:46:35] ES: Yeah, right there. Oh, I still have in my stored records at Holloman. I would say quite a bit of our test results. We had one man who later got to the Russians, who maintained all the statistics on it. This was quite interesting. We kept the statistics of each individual plant. We had no [power to?] build in only one plant. Because an air raid could destroy the production right there. So, we built, I would say, in the order of about 300 to 450 pieces each. Of each individual part we needed on three different plants. [00:47:18] DC: You went redundant then so you always had a choice of supply. [00:47:22] ES: And then we also in the quality control checked which one was the best. Which had the least amount of rejects. And we checked then whether the quality tests were really proper. We did not buy 40 tests to produce more useful parts than was really justified. So, we found that where good quality control was and where the production numbers were dependable and so on. [00:48:04] DC: I read there was one plant in Denmark making precision parts. Did you have even plants – [00:48:10] ES: Yeah, we had – [ 00:48:13] DC: – from other countries too? These were all over the map. And you had to personally visit these, occasionally? [00:48:20] ES: Mostly I went around with von Braun, one of the general officers. And then of course I was with members of my staff. We had two bailed aircraft all the time available. [00:48:37] DC: And even in field operations when the troops had a problem you still had to go oversee? So, you were moving around a heck of a lot. [00:48:45] ES: Much more than I do today. People think I'm traveling a lot, but uh… [00:48:49] DC: Back then that was [very?] moving. [00:48:51] ES: I had a big operation going. In 1944, I had in my directorate 550 engineers with masters [inaudible], doctors, and scientists. Out of 1144, there were more than 1000 actual engineers and technical personnel. And I was a high-grade technician. And actually, that was less than 100 good people. And then the other was clerical and administrative staff. We had actually, if you look at today, we had various, I would say, administrative staff. But we were all highly motivated and worked hard and so on. We relocated the whole organization and the secretaries, everything stayed with us. When we evacuated before the Russians came, we could not take our secretaries with us and so on. They still partly followed us or even warned us that the Russians were about to kidnap us and so on. So, this was quite some experience. Then again, we had to leave our families and everything in an area which was supposed to be occupied by the Russians. All our technical people went to South Bavaria. And when the war was over, we learned about that the Russians were coming to occupy that particular area. So, we asked the Americans to not forget our families and so we were promised this would be done. So, Dr. Schilling and I, we were in charge to relocate all the families. So, I had to relocate all of Peenemünde. And then I had to relocate the families. And Dr. Schilling and I, we were on the first large shipment of the Paperclip people here to the United States. So, we kept our people together. [00:51:24] DC: Who was the first American you recall having contact with and where were you then? [00:51:28] ES: Oh, let's see. [00:51:31] DC: Were you there with Magnus von Braun when he bicycled down to meet the Americans? [00:51:38] ES: We were actually in a place in Bavaria. And we had some real problems here. The German troops were retreating and released all the prisoners of war. And we had a number of prisoners of war who apparently went after the train. We had our instruments and everything in our lab equipment. So, what we did is we, in spite of the fact that this area was not occupied yet, we went to a place which was occupied by the Americans and told them that we had a train there with irreplaceable equipment. We were asking for guards. So, they sent guards there, occupied that area with the guards. [00:52:34] DC: I see. Did you recall a Major Staver? [00:52:40] ES: Oh yes, I know him very well. [00:52:42] DC: Could you tell a little bit about what his role was in this whole thing? I think he was involved before even Hamill and Toftoy got involved. [00:52:51] ES: Yes, he was with a certain intelligence team. I think probably you might be interested to talk to him. [00:53:02] DC: Yes, I plan to in California. [00:53:03] ES: I know where he is living and so on. Los Altos. I met him when we came up to [inaudible]. When Dr. Schilling and I came up to evacuate the families, we met him. We left a group of people there to stay with the family. These were mainly administrators. We had nothing to do with the technical part of it except one of my people, who was actually the head of our quality control and one of our experimental stations. We left him there to have someone of our technical people there. When we came there, this was just on the birthday of my wife, and I came home and saw her again. She didn't think that we were [anywhere probably?], because the radios reported that this area where the German scientists had retrieved from Peenemünde had been bombed and all the leading people had been killed. [00:54:21] DC: Who announced that? The German radio? [00:54:23] ES: It was in the radio. I don't know whether it was German radio, but this was what came through the radio. It was really dangerous that this could have happened, but we were so much experienced in what precautions we had to do during the war. We convinced immediately the military organization that we should not actually have all our people in one location. They wanted us to go into one of these big mines and work underground. There was one big mine which actually Messerschmitt had part of its fighter production. [00:55:10] DC: Really? Do you know where that is… [00:55:11] The other one was near, let's say, what's the name again? Kloster Ettal. E-T-T-A-L, Kloster Monastery. K-L-O-S-T-E-R. I convinced them that this was the biggest nonsense that people do here, make here, because any aircraft company, even any aircraft production is currently [inaudible]. Even if they just can't get into the mountains, there are some big mountains in the Alps, but just if they destroy the gates going in, they will destroy the villages around, because the people are living there. This is nonsense. What I did, I arranged that all our people will [disperse?], some 500 people over about 50 different villages. [00:56:20] DC: Dispersed. [00:56:21] ES: Yeah, really dispersed. This way we didn't lose anyone. We had only one case where two people were injured during a fighter attack, and the reason for it was the two people had left two briefcases with important valuables, like gross certificates and all kinds of things, bank account statements and so on. They ran back to the train because the train was under fire, and so they were afraid that if the train would burn up, they would lose their most important documents. One was shot in the foot, the other in the leg, and so it was the only injuries we had. It was absolutely unnecessary. They were lying in a trench, and if you fly you know it's extremely difficult to see someone unless you move. You see a moving target, but if someone is leaning against the tree, you can't notice him because you move so fast. [00:57:51] DC: You're moving. [00:57:52] ES: Yeah, and you also scan the whole area because there may be someone shooting at you. So, you can see a moving train, you can even see a standing train. In many cases, I would say, on a standing train, if it was not smoking, the pilot would assume that the engine had already been shot up and he didn't need to go after it anymore. [00:58:21] DC: Speaking of air power, of course, the Allies had Germany pretty well pinned down from the air. When was your last flights? Did you ever run into any fighter planes moving around? [00:58:36] ES: Oh, I flew a JU-52. We said I landed on the day when the big attack was against Schweinfurt, against the ball bearings. I landed at the airport of [?]. There were about four or five fighter planes refueling and going after the American bombers again. [00:59:09] DC: You were flying around at the same time? [00:59:12] ES: I was called to immediately land on the cause of the air battle going on. I decided this was the wrong thing to do. I would go to where the fighters were. So, I flew right over the treetops to avoid that the fighter would come underneath me. So, I flew and landed there and then took off again. I did most of the time, I just did head-dropping and so on and listened to what was going on the radio. [00:59:51] DC: You never got attacked while you were flying? [00:59:54] ES: No. I got bombed in a hotel several times, and things like that. And my house. We lost our house, we were living in Peenemünde. [01:00:06] DC: What finally became of your plane that you were using? You left it at Peenemünde when you finally went south? [01:00:12] ES: We turned it over to the German air force when we evacuated. They flew the planes away to locations where they were needed. [01:00:29] DC: I guess gasoline was getting to be a critical problem. [01:00:33] ES: Yes, in some place there was gasoline stored, which couldn't be taken unless a special order was. Much of this gas actually was lost. There was one interesting area. We had to go to the area where we had the people, I would say these [girls?], we could not get a single [inaudible] to stay without the people having 180 days food with them. Because they had to have food to harvest to be taken up by this community. So, we got some order to get food out of depots. Most of these depots were already evacuated. The enemy forces had not arrived yet but our forces had already retreated. [1:01:38] DC: They were vacant? [1:01:40] ES: We had trucks there and we loaded them up during the night and brought them to the various villages where the people were to satisfy the mayors of the cities and villages that we had food for the people. This was a real problem. We had some young people. You probably met one of them, Lindner, who was at Huntsville. He died a number of years ago. [01:02:08] DC: I think I missed knowing him. [01:02:10] ES: He was in charge of the [inaudible] from [Cape?]. These two and another number of young first and second lieutenants with their drivers, overnight they got all these trucks loaded and came back home again. The next night they went out again. [01:02:32] DC: Midnight requisitions. [01:02:35] ES: This is a way that we could really, I would say, win over the situation. [1:02:46] [recording muffles and cuts] [01:02:51] ES: – at that time. We had asked for skyscreens to be, but there was never money really to provide skyscreens. [01:02:59 DC:] We're talking about White Sands, right? [01:03:01] ES: White Sands, yeah. [01:03:05] We had several cases where we had runaway missiles and so on. There was one. We had a lot of spectators all around the block houses and so on because there were only a limited number of people in the block houses. One just took off and headed for the block house. My policy in these cases was I was not cutting off as long as the engine was running and there was no immediate danger. One impacted, I would say, in sufficient distance from the block house and there were no people in the immediate area. [1:03:50] [recording cuts] [01:03:52] DC: Continuation of interview with Dr. Steinhoff and some of his experiences at Fort Bliss. So, you arrived with the first group? [01:04:01] ES: I was with... No, I did not arrive with the first group at Fort Bliss. I was supposed to go first together with von Braun to the United States, five or six of us, to prepare things and send... [01:04:17] DC: Documentation and so forth. [01:04:19] ES: Yeah, I think Mr. Rees was there and Dr. Schwidetzky was there, I think. And so, this group was split up. Then Dr. von Braun and Mr. Rees came to Fort Bliss and then Mr. Neubert and others came to... [01:04:36] DC: William Schulze, I guess. [01:04:38] ES: Schulze, we came to Aberdeen Proving Grounds. So, we stayed from our arrival date, about 15th of November to Christmas at Fort Strong in Massachusetts, and then about five of us were brought to Aberdeen, Maryland to sort captured documents. [01:04:58] DC: Oh, you were involved in that. [01:04:59] ES: Yeah, and secondly... [01:05:01] DC: Poppel was there. [01:05:02] ES: Then Walter Riedel and I, it was Riedel III, we were asked to give lectures, so to speak, to the first U.S. Guided Missile School. [01:05:17] DC: Oh, really? [01:05:18] ES: We started out there. So, we... [01:05:20] DC: At Aberdeen. [01:05:21] At Aberdeen. We gave lectures there, which were put in report form and were for first, I would say, teaching material and textbooks used in Fort Bliss. Of course, again, people put a lot of effort in as time went on and we got some very, very good textbooks. But the first ones, we just wrote down from our memory and we could write them mathematically quickly and presented them at debates with Dr. Kent at Aberdeen, Maryland, and how we did this and how we did that and so on. It was a very enjoyable time. We had one of the officers who was a captain who gave us, I would say, American colloquial lessons and so on, because we had all, I would say, either had seven or nine years of English in school, but we didn't have, I would say, so we did the routine which comes from using it or we could read it and so on. There's one thing which helped us quite a bit was reading the Readers' Digest. This was, I think, presented in a way, everything, and edited in a way that we had no problems to read or understand it. But every now and then we got newspapers and particularly the southern part of the country which generally contains more French, a lot of French roots, like the difference between storm and tempest. The French word is tempest, French is tempête, and English is – the German is storm or Sturm. So, these types of things were newspapers, we'd say, coming from Louisiana and New Orleans, we hardly could read, yeah? That's why we could read the New York Times and so newspapers had no problems. Of course, the longer you are here, you get also acquainted with the other words more and more so it doesn't make any difference, but in the beginning, it was a problem. And then we had difficulty to follow [this?] [inaudible] told us something, we understood the English, but then we had to think, what did he say, what did he mean? In the meantime, the individual started talking on and then we didn't get the next sentence or so. But these things, after a quarter of a year, are mostly overcome, so we had no more problems. So, in March, and I arrived in Fort Bliss on the 21st of March, and we rode in the train from Aberdeen, Maryland to Chicago. And then we went on another train from Chicago to Kansas City, and then I saw the first time Kansas City – Kansas into Oklahoma – [01:08:30] DC: Wide and flat? [01:08:31] ES: – the flat areas and so on. We rode the train all day long, and we saw a few houses on the way [inaudible]. [01:08:41] DC: You wondered where you were going, I guess. [01:08:45] ES: Then we came to Dallas, Texas from Oklahoma. And then on the train from Texas to – no, it was, it was another trip later. It was from Kansas to Oklahoma City and then also the Panhandle down to Alamogordo. The Alamogordo was the first place I saw the first green trees on the 21st of March. You could see really on the day the springs break out. Then we came of course to Fort Bliss, and we were in a former station hospital annex. And the whole area was fenced in, and we were told the fence was not for us but to keep people who were undesired out. The army was very much afraid if the population would find out that we were Germans up there that they would lynch us after the war. But we haven't really found any hostility or so. [01:10:04] DC: That was all just conjecture. [01:10:06] ES: So, we needed a few things which we couldn't get in the PX. So, there was a lot of times we had the group divided. We had about 120 people in groups of five, just in six days. [inaudible] About, let’s say, four groups of people every day other way, [inaudible]. So, there was no concentration and the guards were told or the accompanying GIs they should never lose one of us. So, whenever we were somewhere they told us, “Okay, stick together,” [inaudible]. – the GI then said “Okay, now go in here buy whatever you want and be down here again in, let's say, half an hour and now I'll meet you here again.” Oh, he probably had a date there somewhere. So, we did our shopping and some of us got out to a restaurant and had a beer or something. Then most of the time people said, “Okay, why don't you buy us lunch here in the [path of the north?] hotel and then you go and do your shopping and then you meet at five o'clock here again and so on. So, the people in [our path?] they saw all the time these, I would say, barely English-speaking strangers there accompanied by one GI. [01:11:51] DC: They didn't know what was going on. [laughing] [01:11:54] ES: So, we went and bought all kinds of things also for our wives because they couldn't get anything in Europe or [inaudible]. So, we said and actually we were on a Per Diem our salary was paid in Germany to our families. We had a Per Diem, so half of our Per Diem we spent on packages we sent home. So, it was from this then we were called to White Sands when the first V2s came in. [01:12:28] DC: Were you involved in getting those set up for launch? [01:12:31] ES: Yeah, yeah. [01:12:32] DC: What kind of shape were they in? [01:12:34] ES: Some were really beaten up they were put on a truck and then brought from Nordhausen to Le Havre in France. These people who drove and never had driven a missile and so on. I think we could of out a hundred of them – I think we could out of the hundred we disassembled and repaired and we could get about 40. And the rest was, I would say, damaged beyond repair. We even ordered in Germany from the plant for duty and [inaudible]. [01:13:13] DC: So, you went back to some of the old – [inaudible] [01:13:17] ES: The American occupation forces arranged all this. [01:13:21] DC: Did you go back yourself to coordinate any of this? [01:13:23] ES: No, I was not. There were a few others going. [01:13:25] DC: Who did go back on that? [01:13:29] ES: I think Rees was one. [01:13:31] DC: Rees? [01:13:33] ES: Rees knows much better who was with him. There were actually people at our assembly plant, foremen and so on. One got all these professors who needed to get the oxygen plants going and so on. So, this all worked out really well. [01:13:53] DC: So, you were physically at White Sands at that same group? [01:13:57] ES: We had normally lived at Fort Bliss but there were some barracks where we could sleep in. We had our rooms there so we could come anytime. Of course, I got the charge for the range safety and we had one case where a missile was heading right towards where we had our observation post for the range safety. They had given a Navy man – an enlisted man, sailor – who was supposed to push a button. He had to push a button only at my direction. When this missile came, he said, “Shall I push?” I said, “Keep your hands off.” “Shall I push?” And so on. We had the VIP standing around and the thing was really looking like it was heading right for, I would say some of it 100-150 feet. I knew it was spinning wildly and that keeps it in the same direction because whatever the control system does it's neutralized and that one spins right, it doesn't get concerned at all. So, when I looked around there was only that sailor standing there who wanted to push a button and I said, “For heaven's sake keep your hands off.” And it impacted on the end of the airfield. Didn't do any damage and so on but then all my people who were with me on the stand they came back again there was one, I think it was a Navy commander, he said, you know I've never seen such a cold-blooded [inaudible]. I knew what was going to happen if it would fall down and if it would blow, we couldn't get away fast enough anyway. [01:15:58] DC: Hang in there! [01:16:02] ES: So, I think it was a good thing that the man I could tell him don't push it and so on. This is the same was when this was going to Fort Bliss. There the control system did fail maybe after it was flying for maybe 15 to 20 seconds. It was already through sonic speed and we had tilted the trajectory such that it hit, I would say the flight path angle had burned out of about 5 degrees which brought it about 40 miles far and was impacting again the at White Sands range I would say in the near field. These things looked like they go really straight up and there is no point which is the azimuth here. So, if you have stood there for a while, you really don't know if it's really in the scene so then I suddenly felt it was moving really towards the other direction up here towards here [inaudible]. Then I decided if you can see this already it's moving that way it's really building up speed. So, my conclusion was you can let that thing burn out and nothing can really happen anymore. It produces a big hole but it does not I would say put the whole city blocks on fire. [01:17:40] DC: You wanted to get rid of the propellants. [01:17:42] ES: I figured out by the time I really evaluated the trajectory. At the time when I really thought I was going to have seen it, yeah, and I would have pushed the button the nearest point that the missile would have fallen [inaudible] with all these wooden barracks and so on. You would have seen a fireworks there you couldn't really – [01:18:08] DC: You made the right… [01:18:12] ES: Then if I would have pushed it a little bit later it would have been it was still going very steep. So, the impact point was moving at probably some maybe during the burning period maybe five miles a second, south. [01:18:36] DC: You were doing some quick calculating. [01:18:38] ES: So, I decided I’ll let it burn out. And of course, I realized that it would just possibly go into Mexico. I hoped if it ever gets into Fort Bliss there is no – no more fuel in there. I could not have saved the house but I could have saved the city block that way and it just went over Juarez. And Juarez it is half wood and I would say that would have burned like timber [01:19:17] DC: It actually went beyond Juarez. [01:19:21] ES: Beyond Juarez and impacted on the corner of the cemetery. And we got into cars and so on and got down and by the time everyone was notified an American… people from Fort Bliss got there what did they find? The Mexicans were all collecting pieces of tin around, skin and so on and had a hamburger stand there and were selling, I would say, souvenirs and hamburgers there. [chuckling] I said one day to some reporter you know that was the first commercial use of space. [Laughter] I think they sold – the whole empty weight of the vehicle was about 4 tons – 10,000 pounds. But I think they sold maybe 10 to 15 tons of relics of it. [01:20:23] DC: Did you bring the engine back across the border? [01:20:27] ES: No, the engine was impacted… it was only small pieces. [01:20:31] DC: So, you didn't bring anything back? Just let ‘em have it? [01:20:33] ES: No, no, they sold everything. Everything that was metal was sold as pieces of it. [01:20:41] DC: I wonder if any of that still exists. I guess someone must have… [01:20:45] ES: Probably the engine is still in the hole and you can't see it because it really has penetrated and goes right in the dirt [hole?] later on it, unless you dig it out. And it will be completely flat the whole engine compressed to about 4 inches thickness [01:21:08] DC: The rocket that landed in Sweden still had a pretty good chunk of engine didn't it? [01:21:14] ES: Yes, but that was where the warhead came off and it fell down by itself and the missile came in a flat spin and it comes down like a parachute so large parts are undamaged, really slightly damaged. [01:21:30] DC: What was your reaction to that particular flight? [01:21:34] ES: Oh, this was quite interesting too I noticed right away, this was actually a V2 missile but with a Wasserfall control, a prototype control in it. And we in order to test it we had worked out a program and we told the man who had the stick control to memorize it so we had to go we computed this all so and so many seconds to the right and so and so many seconds to the left. We had all figured out that, so to speak, it would then fall down again in the line of fire after maneuvering. And this man was so excited that he applied all the corrections the wrong way. This way it did not come there, and there is earth rotation involved it is displaced by so and so much by earth rotation it goes the other way it is heading the other way and so on. So, I told the man, “You know what you did! You just did all the signs with all the commands with the wrong sign!” There is some real, let's say, suspect first that the man probably did this with intention, but I noticed he was so excited that it couldn’t have been done. So, I said, “Okay it can’t have fallen into Sweden.” We set our target so close to the Swedish coast because we could then determine the impact against landmarks and so on. [inaudible] We said now it has gone too far we could also not aim it, let's say, the normal rocket in any, I would say… anyway but we had to go let's say with certain points on our launching table. And we did not actually on that day change the azimuth. We only rotated it by 90 degrees to go over in that direction instead of falling along the Baltic seashore because it would have strayed the changes that fell on land with this, let's say, test was much larger than do it the other way and just fire past these islands here. And so we decided to do that and so I told my people you make an immediate evaluation of all the data it fell and let me know so I said I can report if something happened here. So, when I got the data people said it looks like it has fallen into that canal between Karlskrona and these islands just in between there was about 10 mile wide… [01:24:52] DC: Hoped you hit the water? [01:24:52] ES: No, we hoped… the water was the main… our uncertainty is about 6-7 miles so it can’t have fallen on land, it hit right on the coastline just about 2 or 3 miles inside [01:25:12] DC: Did you immediately know from Sweden that this had happened? [01:25:16] ES: – there was immediate feedback to the German let's say foreign ministry they called immediately and I was… while I had asked my people to check [more accurate?]. Because I felt I could not really get anyone excited and we had not really hit something and if we wouldn’t get anyone excited no one would have noticed and no one would ever know about it. We, of course, would tell our bosses and tell them where it is we would have submarines and divers going there to try to get it. But for heaven's sake, don't say anything. So, I was flying in one of these [ – we stole?] aircrafts. We had these [inaudible] over to that little island which we had to go over to that little island which we had also some pilots there and when I was there the commanding general said, “Steinhoff, did you fire into Sweden?” I said, “Sir it might have been. I had all the analysis done and it looked like that the impact was in that water area but of course the uncertainty is so much if we don't get more data, it's there and there.” He said immediately, “No it can't really be,” then he went back to the telephone and said “Yes, we had had that case. It is possible that it has come down.” In the meantime they had learned that it had actually landed near Karlskrona. [01:26:57] DC: Someone heard the impact, I guess [01:27:00] ES: They probably had the case when it broke up it's quite a sonic boom. Then of course the impact more, you get like an earthquake you can't say the sonic boom, if it's near it's so sharp, I really don't know what happened. [01:27:22] DC: Were you aware that the Swedes turned the parts over to the British? [01:27:28] ES: Yes, we were aware of that. [01:27:30] DC: Did you try to make any attempt to get them yourself? Before the – [01:27:36] ES: I know it's actually they brought them past Bornholm. [01:27:48] DC: Was there some plan to maybe try and grab them or recover them? [01:27:52] ES: No, actually there's a problem with this there was a 50% chance that the vehicle impacted as a whole and then you couldn't say anything of the parts then if it broke apart. Then there were several parts that couldn’t be flown or anything we didn't think we should interfere with Sweden's neutrality in a sense. [01:28:22] DC: Of course, that was a key link for the British bombing of Peenemünde later, I guess. [01:28:29] ES: We counted after this was known, if the British got any word of it, we really were expecting it. [01:28:47] [recording distorts] [01:28:52] ES: – of course we knew for the actual vehicle Wiesman was in charge of the documentation and people working for him [01:29:00] DC: Walt Wiesman? He just retired [01:29:04] ES: Oh, he's much too young to retire [01:29:06] DC: Only 50 years? [01:29:08] [inaudible] should not retire. But I want to finish a number of books, if I don't – [01:29:15] [recording cuts and distorts] [END] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000025_A Title A name given to the resource Steihoff, Ernst Description An account of the resource V-2 development in war time Germany, German aviation in 1930-1940s, Operation Paperclip after WWII, and adjustment to life in America as German immigrant. White Sands V-2 launches. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-19 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. 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