Phone call from Bob Ward to Harry Atkins. Conversation about Wernher von Braun stories and how the space program began in Huntsville. Also discussed is historical revisionism around von Braun and his team.
University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama
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Transcript with notes on a Phone call from Bob Ward to Harry Atkins. Conversation about Wernher von Braun stories and how the space program began in Huntsville. Also discussed is historical revisionism around von Braun and his team.
Axel's spaceflight history begins with his father, Ludwig "Rote" Roth, who worked on the V2 program at Peenemünde. Following several relocations over the course of the war, the family would be split, then reunited in El Paso, Texas. The family would come to Huntsville in 1950, with Ludwig continuing to work under Wernher von Braun until 1956 (at which point he would work at various other companies). Axel began his college studies at the University of Alabama, but would move to Auburn for co-op opportunities, recieving his degree in aeronautical engineering in 1959, and joining Marshall in 1960 (in the Structures and Mechanics Laboratory). Axel recalls his early roles with the Apollo project, including working with the crew safety board, and performing structural analysis. Around 1966, he would transfer to the Technical Systems office, remaining for a few years- then joining the Central Systems engineering laboratory following a major MSFC reorganization (approximately in 1969), then working on engineering and experiments for Skylab. Following Skylab, he hit a "down period" until the Spacelab project, where he served as a structure systems engineer. Axel recounts his unique experiences with the latter in-depth, such as the experience of group collaboration on the projects' many components,and applying to be a payload operations director. He would go on to work on the Space Station project; following Challenger, he would move on to work as the chief engineer of Spacelab. Around 1989, he would be selected as the Space Station deputy chief engineer, and would also work in program development, as well as serving on the flight program directorate. Eventually, Axel would retire in 2004; he reflects that he wouldn't change anything about his career.
Axel Roth (Space History Interviews).mp4
This Bauer oral history interview focuses on the technological evolution of Douglas Aircraft’s S-IV and S-IVB rocket stages, emphasizing how experience from the earlier S-IV program directly informed the simpler, more efficient S-IVB design. Harold Bauer explains that the two stages shared fundamental technologies, including common bulkheads, internal insulation, structural concepts, valve systems, and pressurization methods, while the S-IV used six RL-10 engines and the S-IVB employed a single, more powerful gimbaled J-2 engine. A major technological advance was the introduction of liquid hydrogen, which required new approaches to insulation, structural design, and the storage of very cold helium for efficient tank pressurization. Bauer also describes the stage’s lightweight structural design, including externally mounted stringers protected from aerodynamic heating by a thermal coating called Korotherm, noting that aerodynamic drag was less important during the brief atmospheric portion of a Saturn V flight than structural strength, weight, and ease of manufacturing. The interview highlights how the S-IVB’s design eventually contributed to the Skylab concept: engineers recognized that the large, empty liquid-hydrogen tank could serve as a valuable orbital workspace, initially providing a safe environment for practicing extravehicular activities and eventually inspiring the concept of a pressurized orbital workshop. Logistics also influenced the location of Douglas facilities near Seal Beach and air and sea transportation routes. Bauer discusses the importance of precision welding, particularly because the S-IVB depended on welded joints for both structural strength and leak prevention, unlike conventional aircraft construction, which relied more heavily on riveting and bolting. Elaborate welding fixtures and carefully controlled inert-gas welding processes were developed to ensure consistent, high-quality joints, while the fiberglass-aluminum common bulkhead represented one of the most demanding aspects of the manufacturing process but ultimately became routine. The interview also covers the Sacramento test facilities, including the Beta I and Beta III stands, where S-IV and S-IVB stages underwent acceptance testing. Overall, Bauer portrays the S-IVB as the product of accumulated engineering experience, emphasizing that its success resulted not from radical departure from the S-IV but from refining proven technologies, simplifying the design, improving manufacturing efficiency, and recognizing opportunities to extend the usefulness of the stage beyond its original role as a launch vehicle.
Interview with Harold Bauer and Adrian O'Neal begins at 00:00:26. Interview with Adrian O'Neal alone begins at 00:10:10. Interview with Harold Bauer alone begins at 00:31:28. The interview with Harold Bauer and Adrian O’Neal explores the engineering, manufacturing, quality-control, and management practices behind Douglas Aircraft’s work on the S-IV and S-IVB stages of the Apollo program. Bauer explains the rigorous process for approving vendors, emphasizing technical capability, quality control, and repeatable production, while O’Neal discusses the transition from MIG to TIG welding, the advantages of 2014-T6 aluminum, and how experience from the Thor program informed Apollo development. They describe technical disagreements and gradually developing trust between Douglas and NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, noting that differences often stemmed from contrasting engineering experiences rather than fundamental technical disagreements. The interview also covers major S-IV/S-IVB failures, including an overpressurization incident and a helium-bottle rupture caused by improper welding rod, as well as challenges with cryogenic hydrogen handling and computer-controlled countdowns. Bauer discusses the innovative use of the Guppy aircraft to transport large rocket stages, the precision of S-IVB lunar-impact trajectories, and the stage’s eventual disposal through lunar gravity-assist trajectories. Finally, Bauer compares Air Force and NASA management approaches, praising the Air Force’s structured systems-management methodology and NASA’s exhaustive technical review and flexibility, and concludes that combining the strengths of both approaches could provide an effective model for managing large, complex technical enterprises.
Talk between Leland Belew and Bob Ward about Wernher von Braun. Belew relates a couple of stories relation to von Braun's planning ability, his role in Skylab, and his awareness of his illness.
This interview also contains the end of the Ferrell/Lewis interview. Interview with Leland Belew begins at 00:07:20. The interview centers on the development of the Saturn rocket propulsion systems, with engineers and historians discussing the technical, managerial, and historical decisions that shaped the Apollo program. Early conversation compares liquid- and solid-fueled rockets, emphasizing the higher efficiency of liquid hydrogen engines despite their greater complexity and the safety challenges encountered during early RL-10 development. Lee Belew explains that the RL-10 evolved from earlier Pratt & Whitney engine concepts to meet specific Saturn requirements, while the F-1 engine was developed ahead of a finalized launch vehicle because engine development is the longest-lead element of any rocket program. He describes how clustering engines, adopting the "all-up" testing philosophy, extensive ground testing, and systems engineering enabled NASA to meet the lunar landing deadline. Belew also highlights breakthroughs in solving F-1 combustion instability, advances in hydrogen-oxygen propulsion, and innovations such as Rigi-Mesh injector cooling, arguing that these developments transformed rocket engine design from an uncertain art into a more predictable engineering discipline. The discussion concludes with reflections on payload growth, design conservatism, technology transfer among contractors, and Belew's pride that the Saturn-Apollo program successfully fulfilled the United States' commitment to land humans on the Moon within a decade.
Transcript with notes on a Talk between Leland Belew and Bob Ward about Wernher von Braun. Belew relates a couple of stories relation to von Braun's planning ability, his role in Skylab, and his awareness of his illness.