11 10 510 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/c050cee4d0016e8b130923224d23aed1.pdf e4da0338d15d099bf318e01e46e5b911 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000027_T Title A name given to the resource Trichel, Gervais (Transcript) Description An account of the resource Role of US Army Ordinance in rocket research in WW Ii. Details of evacuation of V-2s and German engineers after the end of war. Post-war rocket developments USA with German team Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-04-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/ec6923c8fb38fd042cfa2f690ac4095b.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/5263cdac769c9f0da50ddebf6d36988c.mp4 42cb4d81291601c5686b7e8c7f722b67 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000027_A Title A name given to the resource Trichel, Gervais Description An account of the resource Role of US Army Ordinance in rocket research in WW Ii. Details of evacuation of V-2s and German engineers after the end of war. Post-war rocket developments USA with German team Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-04-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/25644c9b7e86aaca4602775de31c4558.pdf b8db6910cab1bca25bfda3407b94b8eb Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000026_T Title A name given to the resource Toftoy, Hazel (Transcript) Description An account of the resource Experiences in the early days of Gen. Toftoy's career in Huntsville. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/a515520cf54888093abaa7607f746471.jpg cc0c4f909af1a8ef79e706ad5968148a https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/746b745e3a4cb981067a082e2b18f062.mp4 ea2fa3de7817bbd12597a998f6830d8a Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christensen, David Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_crst_000026_A Title A name given to the resource Toftoy, Hazel Description An account of the resource Experiences in the early days of Gen. Toftoy's career in Huntsville. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/3d47ba90a2b76b51f3cf37dc4df9ea93.jpg 4598197eb9b09fa4ae86fb6882190ee7 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/21ccd561f7d3a8aed611b1f45ad7f0bd.mp4 6b94b574bac5d13a101ea6cf4915a00b Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Thomson, Jerry Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Bilstein, Roger E. Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 0:56:40 Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:07] Roger Bilstein: I wonder if you could, from your recollection, make some comments about where the porous injector face got started and how it got into Pratt & Whitney and how the transfer occurred from the RL-10 to J-2 and stuff like that. [00:00:21] Jerry Thomson: Oh, good. I might be able to make a few [thousand?] comments about that because I was involved in this area quite a bit back in the early days. The J-2 procurement—I'm sure you've already determined—took place in about 1960. That procurement—the specifications and so forth—were all prepared here in the lab at that time. When we prepared the procurement on the J-2, we visualized it as being somewhat advanced engine relative to the RL-10 because we had already been working with the RL-10. So when we made the solicitation—why, I can't remember now whether it was four or five contractors bid on that J-2 engine—but the winning contractor, who was Rocketdyne, did not offer an injector type like what we ended up with. As a matter of fact, they offered a self-impinging injector or it might have been an unlike pattern—you know?—where fuel was impinging on a LOX stream—I can’t remember exactly—but the man at Rocketdyne that was in charge of that effort then was a very good friend of mine that I’ve known since about 1952 was Bill Mower. Bill Mower… [00:02:23] RB: How do you spell that last name? [00:02:24] JT: W.W. Mower: M-O-W-E-R, and he is still there with the company. After Rocketdyne won the procurement, won the contract, then we began to interface with them to discuss in more detail what we liked and didn't like about their design. My discussions with Bill Mower there at Rocketdyne, we decided that we would go and investigate at Lewis Research Center work which had been done up there by Bill [Tomaszek?]. Bill [Tomaszek?] in the rocket propulsion division up there had for a number of years been experimenting with a coaxial injector pattern about fifteen thousand thrust size. He had investigated this particular injector configuration even prior to the design of the RL-10 engine. [00:03:44] JT: It was dated back a good ways, as I recall. But their design at Lewis was a flat-face injector with coaxial elements, then the LOX through the center with a fuel curtain around it. During the course of that experimental work up there the first basic information was derived that led then to the RL-10 engine design injector. And, you know, when the Pratt & Whitney people saw that data, they took it a few steps further, and they put a convex shape to the injector face and focused it so that the focal point of all of these elements then was right at the throat of the motor. They did that for reasons like that if you have a flat face, the LOX springs when they hit the converging section of the nozzle cause overheating problems in there, so by focusing it so that everything was aimed right at the throat they took a little bit of the load off the converging section of the motor. [00:05:20] RB: I'm glad you explained that because I noticed that on the injector, and I didn't know really what the reason was. Why didn't they use a similar thing then for the H-1 and F-1 injector cases? [00:05:30] JT: Well the H-1 injector preceded the work at Lewis, and the F-1 was based on the H-1. It wasn't really anything back in those days that we could use like experience on it, the RL-10 and so forth. But anyway, by converging those elements at the throat, they took some of the problem off of the—and these are improvements that Pratt & Whitney made to the concept—but the Pratt & Whitney injectors or their thrust chambers start tapering as soon as you leave the face. There's no straight section and then a converging section. They start tapering immediately. So they made some [very?] good improvements over the original work that we done at Lewis Research Center. This was a great deal of interest to us when we started the J-2 program because we said, “Well, gee, that thing has turned out so well.” I kind of pressed Rockedyne into taking a look at it. [00:06:42] JT: So then Bill Mower and I and another guy who worked out there named John Campbell who worked for Bill Mower, all three of us went up to Lewis Research Center to visit Bill [Tomaszek?]. That was about 1960 we went up there. We sat down and reviewed what the Lewis work had been and made some estimates of how this then could be translated into a J-2 injector. But initially the J-2 program started off with an unlike triplet injector or a doublet—I can't remember—but it was flat-faced and no Rigi-Mesh. We entered the test program with that kind of a configuration. Bill Mower was a very practical sort of fellow. He said, “Jerry, we hadn't got people at Rocketdyne that we think can consistently build that high quality piece of equipment”—which is a Rigi-Mesh concentric orifice injector. He says, “We don't think we can build that high quality equipment,” and so he says, “It would be a shame to go into that at Rocketdyne and spend a lot of money and then have two-thirds of them rejected during the course of the manufacturing.” So he still favored the flat-face, no-face cooling, multi-element pattern. Again, I can't remember whether it was like-on-like or whether it was unlike-doublets or something triplets or what, but I believe it was one stream of LOX with two fuel streams impinging on it. I think that was Rocketdyne's initial approach. But when we entered the test program at Rocketdyne, which I don't know, came about 1962 or something along like that, we had a lot of problems. We had face heating problems. [00:08:57] RB: Mower was right then. [00:08:59.] JT: What? [00:09:00] RB: Mower was right. They had a lot of problems, didn't they? [00:09:02] JT: Well, they had problems, but they were design problems or they were development problems. He was forecasting problems in fabrication of a high-quality injector like a coaxial. [00:09:18] RB: Oh, I see. [00:09:20] JT: But when they had these problems, they were both face heating problems, and some of these streams were getting out through the wall, causing wall overheating problems. We had some instability problems with that injector configuration that they initially chose. It was good that there had been a little bit of work started at Rocketdyne on this coaxial approach, that is, the Rigi-Mesh faced coaxial approach. They had sort of taken that along as a backup, hoping that the solid-face injector would have been good enough. Since it didn't turn out that way in the course of the development testing, then they were forced to go back and take a look at the coaxial Rigi-Mesh face, and we gave them a lot of money to give that a real…a lot more emphasis. As a result, then Rocketdyne began to have more success in the course of their injector development. It still had a lot of problems, you know, there were distortion problems—the Rigi-Mesh face would expand and contract, and this caused a little problem as far as the LOX [posts?] are concerned. We'd get straight LOX springs into the wall. But Rocketdyne kept making improvements, and finally, did come out with a real high-class injector. [00:11:07] RB: Was Marshall at this time doing parallel injector studies here in Huntsville? Or was most of the actual hardware dirty hand work going on out at Canoga Park? [00:11:17] JT: It was going on at Canoga Park. We had a little bit of model injector element testing going on here in the center, but it was not on any kind of a scale to give valuable inputs into that Rocketdyne design. That Rocketdyne design was really a result of, first of all, having this Lewis research knowledge. We did make all that available to him. Then we turned over to Rocketdyne all this knowledge that had come out of the RL-10 program. Then Rocketdyne just simply took a couple of approaches and made it even better. [00:12:03] RB: Well, given Pratt & Whitney's experience with Centaurs, with liquid hydrogen technology, and given this injector face work they’d already done, why didn’t they get what became the J-2 engine? Why didn’t they get it, and why did Rocketdyne get it? [00:12:19] JT: Why didn’t Pratt & Whitney get the job? Because that isn’t the only criteria for contractor selection, you know? Injector design is just one of hundreds. The reasons Pratt & Whitney didn’t get the job are all in the evaluation files. [00:12:49] RB: Rocketdyne seems to be pretty successful at getting engine contracts. [00:12:52] JT: Yep. I think in the case of J-2, the biggest thing that drove Rocketdyne in was the fact that they offered a program for about thirty-eight million bucks. Their competition was quite a bit in excess of that. [00:13:10] RB: Did Rocketdyne's association earlier through the H-1 program, did that make it a little bit easier for them, you think, that they knew the people and knew Marshall's philosophy? [00:13:23] JT: No, I think that wasn't very significant there because the evaluation was a NASA thing. It wasn't limited to Marshall. The evaluation was done in Washington. The guy who headed that was Del Tischler. [00:13:42] RB: We tried to get to talk to him, but we couldn't. We talked to John [inaudible]. [00:13:45] JT: Yeah, Del ran the evaluation. I can't think of who the second man was on that. But there were a few of us at Marshall up before that. Of course, a great number from Lewis Research Center and various places. I think even the Air Force people were involved. [14:08] RB: Could you tell me a little bit more about this Rigi-Mesh material? Its origins, where it came from? [00:14:15] JT: Porous Media is one of the companies that… [00:14:24] RB: Aircraft Porous Media Incorporated is the name I've got here. [00:14:27] JT: Yeah. I don't know how they ever came about that darn stuff, whether it was used as a filtering material in some of their other projects—you know?—and they just simply found out that, hey, maybe injectors, or maybe thrust chamber people would be interested in this product or just how it came about. The company did go through a number of development processes and finally coming to a real high quality product. I don't know whether it was just largely their own doings or whether the government sponsored them in this activity under some research contract or whether some other agency was interested in it or just how it came about. But by the time it got utilized in the RL-10, why, it was a pretty good high quality product. There may have been some further improvements in its application to the J-2. But if there were, they were minor because it had already reached the plateau as far as maturity is concerned. [00:16:04] RB: I'm realizing there are lots of parts and subsystems of J-2. I wonder if you could say that Rigi-Mesh was really a significant part of the J-2 success or it didn't have anything to do with it. Just how important was the Rigi-Mesh to the injector face, injector material? [00:16:26] JT: I'd say it was rather important, but it wasn't essential. The job could have been done without that Rigi-Mesh material. You could have gone to a whole lot of drilled holes in the face for it, let the gaseous hydrogen come through it. There's a lot of other principles that could have been employed, but this stuff not only gave you a lot of small weep holes for the fluids to pass through but it provided a pretty good structure. All those tubes that came down to bring the LOX from the top of the injector dome, they were all fastened to the Rigi-Mesh material. [third person talking Jerry Thomson, inaudible] [00:17:40] RB: There was something else that Dave was talking about. He said that he remembered or heard some story about the fact that when Von Braun was out at North American and was watching some of the experiments with J-2 injectors before they were using Rigi-Mesh, and he was also talking about the RL-10, urging them to go into the Rigi-Mesh that had been used by Pratt & Whitney. Do you remember or hear that or do you remember anything about it? [00:18:06] JT: No, I don't. That most likely did happen or something. I'm sure that those of us that were, you know, more intimately involved with that thing were considering the application of Rigi-Mesh to the J-2 all along [laughs]. [00:18:32] RB: That’s what struck me as you were talking, it had to happen long before that. I know you've got to go to this meeting, but there's one other question here, and maybe you can't answer it. But early at one point where they're still talking about a propulsion system for the S-IV stage, they were considering using the LR-119 engines—Pratt & Whitney—and they ran into some kind of trouble, and so they decided to go to the LR-150. This was back in 1961. Do you recall what the difficulty was, and why they went from the LR-115 to the 119? [00:19:17] JT: It escapes me for a minute. [00:19:19] RB: They finally wound up with the RL-10. But I just came across this reference that they had some trouble, and I haven't found out yet what they were. [00:19:28] JT: Well, we had trouble with the development of the RL-10. We had very serious development problems in terms of starting the engine and one problem in terms of igniting the engine. We blew the test stand down a couple of times down in Florida. It was a horizontal light versus a vertical light. You light it horizontal, the oxygen accumulated in the motor and provided a nice, smooth ignition when you brought in hydrogen. When you turn the engine this way, why, all the way in the LOX ripped out. Therefore, when we started, we got no ignition until the diffuser filled with hydrogen, and then she lit. [00:20:20] RB: [laughs] And then she really lit? [00:20:21] JT: Yeah, then she went. Twice! Well, I don't know about that 119 thing, because it don't ring a bell. [00:20:35] RB: I’ll have to go back and find some documentation. We talked to Rod Stewart, and he's forgotten almost all about that. It's been so long ago now, twelve years practically. [00:20:42] Yeah. Well, I remember a little bit about the J-2 injector thing because injectors are what I trained in back when I was in the industry. [00:20:58] RB: Do you have any more comments to make about the J-2 injector development, and some of the problems that Rocketdyne had, and the Marshall inputs to that program? [00:21:12] JT: Nope…make some comments about the F-1 if you ever get interested in that. [00:21:18] RB: Ok, you got time? You want to do it? [00:21:21] JT: Well, if you ever really want to hear a good story, back about 1963 or 4 [sic], we ran into this F-1 combustion instability problem. We had such a terrible thing there on our hands until there was sort of a national ad hoc committee created to do nothing except to concentrate on the solution. [00:21:57] RB: How do you mean a national ad hoc? [Inaudible] people from Lewis and other NASA…? [00:22:02] JT: Yeah, and universities. I hated the thing, and it brought in people from all over the whole country consult and assist us in the solution to that problem. It took us about a year and a half, spent thirty something million bucks solving that problem. [00:22:22] RB: How would you summarize then the problem as it originated and how you worked it out? How would you… [00:22:32] JT: Well, we were going along fine in the F-1 engine testing, we all of a sudden began to destroy engines. We destroyed seven—or at least we blew up seven times—due to combustion instability. It was obvious that the injector system that we were using was not going to do the job. It was a flat face, unlike, doublet with a LOX ring and a fuel ring—copper ring—it was…After about a year and a half or two years of real intensive investigations and trying every kind of a concept you can think of, we finally converged on a solution that was basically the adaptation of baffles to the injector face. [00:23:35] JT: Still that wasn't good enough because the additional baffles caused performance degradation, caused baffle heating problems, local accumulations of fuel and even them themselves caused perturbations and instability. So it was just a laborious step-by-step fix this and fix that and fix something else and go back and refix what you had fixed using a lot of theoretical ideas and a lot of barnyard philosophy and whatever else we could. [00:24:19] JT: We finally got an injector system that was not only did it exceed the requirements that we had started the program with but it set the pace for all the future programs. All the future injector programs both the Air Force and NASA require a dynamically stable system—you know?—where you can bomb artificially and what you see how long it takes for the disturbance to quiet down. The Titan program adopted the procedures and the techniques that we worked out in F-1. [00:25:01] RB: Well, did this bombing begin though with the H-1? There was some instability with the H-1. Did it begin there or did it begin with the F-1? [00:25:10] JT: The experimental bombing and watching the recovery times did start in the H-1. [00:25:22] RB: Did the techniques differ very much from the H-1 to the F-1? [00:25:26] JT: Yeah, they advanced quite a bit from the H-1 to the F-1. [00:25:32] RB: And what were the differences then? [00:25:33] JT: Well, in the H-1 we did use black powder charges as the source of energy, but we didn't understand just what was going on in there when these charges would go off. During the course of the F-1, why, we built these two [inaudible] motors where you could photography see exactly what happened when we set a bomb off near the injector face. We soon learned that the bomb was like a detonator. It was just a…then the real energy came from the reaction of the kerosene that was accumulations in the injector face during the preparation process. [00:26:30] JT: Whereas the H-1 used seventy or hundred grain bombs, black powder bombs. The F-1 we only needed about a nine grain bomb. The location of the bomb we determined during the course of the F-1 was real important. In the H-1 program we set off the bomb at the center of the injector, it would cause the wave that went to the wall and then came back. We found in the course of the F-1 testing that that was the most favorable place to put the bomb. If you really want to create a disturbance that's difficult to damp, you need to put the bomb near the [engine?] wall. I think that all of our today's criteria and procedures for bomb testing engines really go back to what came out of that F-1 program. It's true that the H-1 had done some, but it wasn't near as significant. [00:27:41] RB: When you finally began to solve the F-1 problem, was it, I think you said, just a convergence of ideas and people? Was there anyone, though, that maybe took the lead, the university or Marshall or Rocketdyne? Was there somebody or someone, you yourself? [00:27:57] JT: I tell you there was about four or five guys that were really involved in that. One was [Dan Klute?], who is dead. [00:28:08] RB: I've seen the name, yeah. [00:28:10.] The other one was—he was at Rocketdyne—the other one was Paul Castenholz at Rocketdyne; and then another guy was Dave Harrje, who's H-A-R-R-J-E; at Princeton University; and Professor Luigi Crocco, at Princeton University. [00:28:33] RB: How do you spell his name? [00:28:34] JT: Luigi? How to spell Luigi? [00:28:41] RB: Yeah, I got Luigi. [00:28:42] JT: Crocco. C-R-O-C-O or C-R-O-C-C-O. And then I was one of the contributors. And the other one was Bob Richmond, here at Marshall. The other one was Dick Crane, at the Lewis Research Center. D-I… [tape cuts out] [00:29:26] JT: [inaudible] interesting…that J-2 Rigi-Mesh injector was a kitten compared to that F-1. That was terrible. [00:29:49] RB: Well, what would you say then was the final fix? These injector baffles? [00:29:53] JT: That was just one step. It took about three or four major steps to solve the problem. First, we put on the baffles. The next step we did was we slowed down the burning rate in the first few inches of the injection process. We had a LOX like-on-like and a fuel like-on-like, and we went to a smaller inclusive angle so that we spread the fuel out. And, you know, if this is the combustion process down here, the fuel was on about, say, 93—I don't know if that's quite what it was, 97—but anyway, our barnyard philosophy told us that if were we to slow down the burning process, we might desensitize the injection process, so that when these [ratings?] came back, we weren't really in the critical process up near the injector face. We decreased that angle, spread out the burning time. That was the second major step. [00:31:28] JT: The third step was that we found that we wanted to change the response time between the LOX and the fuel system. We opened up the diameter of the fuel holes, so that when you, you know, perturbate the system, the LOX system would recover quickly. It was stiff. But the fuel system would recover at a slower rate because it was soft. That's what you want to do. You want to have them recover at different frequencies because if they are recovering at the same frequency, you're putting out a lot of energy. Whereas if they're recovering at different frequencies, you're damping the process. So that was the third step. [00:32:19] RB: So you opened the diameter of the fuel holes in the face of the injector? [00:32:34] That's right. And then the fourth step was that we went in around the edges of the baffles where we knew that there were accumulations of fuel, we modified the injection patterns to try and eliminate these fuel accumulations because if you've got a fuel accumulation there, then it's a source of explosion, you know, and perturbation source—triggering device if you want to call it that. That was the way that the thing went. [00:33:22] JT: I recall one time when Brainerd Holmes was running the Saturn program, he called some of us up to Washington into his office, and he was so concerned about this problem that we weren't able to solve. He told us all that he was ready to go to Congress and tell them that we wanted to have a backup propulsion system for the S-IC. He was prepared to go ask for a solid motor for the backup. He went around the room, and he asked those of us that were there what our own personal feelings were about whether or not we were going to solve this problem. It's pretty dramatic. He was the top man saying that he was ready to go ask Congress for a backup if we told him that we couldn't solve the problem or if we told him we might not solve the problem. He says, “I want you to tell me truthfully how you feel.” So everybody, I guess, expressed ourselves. He says, “Well, I'm going to take your advice and continue the program assuming that we can solve the problem.” Fortunately, we did. It was really something that always sticks in my memory. [00:34:41] RB: Was Von Braun involved in any of this? [00:34:43] JT: Nope, he sure wasn't. It was…Hermann Widener was up there with me. It was Herman Widener, myself, and a man who was the project manager at that time [for the F-1?] Sonny Morea. But I was the chairman of this ad hoc committee to solve this problem, and that was the reason that I was there. The other man was there from Rocketdyne—or two men were from there from Rocketdyne—it was Paul Castenholz and their vice-president Joe McNamara. [00:35:20] RB: Do you have any papers or reports, AIAA things that help summarize this? I've seen some documents we have, but I don't think of any really specific documents at this time that we've got. [00:35:37] JT: The only thing I have ever done is written minutes of all the meetings that were held with a small working group to solve a problem that I had. But I've never published any papers on it, and I don't think any of those that were key in the solution ever published any papers either. But I've seen a whole bunch of papers by people who were not directly involved, but expanded on what I was thinking to solve. Some of them are far from the way it actually was. [00:36:18] RB: Would it be possible to get a look at those minutes? [00:36:25] JT: [Inaudible] I think that they were classified at that time, but I’m sure desensitized [sic] now. Hey, Phil, don't we have the old ad hoc committee file on the F-1? In that red, red…? [00:36:43] RB: I'll tell you what I could do is—if you don't mind—I could take it over to the historical office over here—Akins' office in 4200—and work on them there and leave them there then when I'm done. When I'm finished with them all, I can bring them back to you. Would that be acceptable? [00:37:03] JT: That's the only record that exists as far as what took place. I saved it all these years. But what it is, I figured I’d write how it really was. [laughs] [00:37:14] RB: [laughs] Yeah, I wish you would. You got to do that. Well, I really feel guilty I'm keeping you from this meeting. [00:37:22] JT: I know they're not getting too far on solid motor materials. [both laugh] We don't know what it would look like yet. [00:37:34] RB: Do you have anything else you'd like to throw in here? [00:37:37] JT: Let me ask you, what are your objectives? Is to fish out maybe significant happenings during the course of the Saturn program? Or are you just going to simply cover the whole waterfront? [00:37:53] RB: Well, I'd have to say yes to both of those that way we're trying to, you know, cover as much as we can along the waterfront, and... [00:38:06] JT [speaking to third person, third person is inaudible]:I think it's a whole series of folders, aren't they? Yeah, how many is it? [00:38:16] RB: As time goes along though we find certain things. We've got an opportunity to do it, to dig down, you know, here and there. It just depends kind of on what we stumble across, even the documents in an interview like this one [inaudible] we can maybe go into it in more detail, but… [00:38:34] JT: The reason I was asking that, I do a little writing myself [inaudible] ASI line, the augmented spark igniter. [00:38:46] RB: I talked to Jerry Pease about that. [00:38:48] JT: Who? [00:38:49] RB: Jerry Pease. Or Bob Pease. Bob Pease. What really strikes me is that for all the vacuum tests, etc. that were supposedly done on the J-2 up to that time, why that, you know, still happens. As I understand it, it was because the environment of the vacuum chamber—I'd forgotten what he told me now—was different just enough so that it allowed some of this moisture to collect. When they finally purged the environmental chamber down to a really cold, hard vacuum, they found out what the problem really was. [00:39:26] JT: Yeah, that one was exciting. But you know that ASI line problem had to be not only did we have to understand what failed, we had to understand how it had failed and why it had failed. And then we had a [inaudible] requirement, and that was to reproduce the process here on the ground. In about a four month period, why, we went through all four of those things, and I happened to have been the chairman of that investigation. [00:40:17] RB: I didn't know that either. [00:40:19] JT: When you told me you had talked to Bob Pease, I was kind of wondering a little about that because... [00:40:23] RB: You know, some of this stuff, we're re-writing a lot of this stuff, and I've gotten off engines. Now, I'm into logistics recently. I've kind of forgotten really because I haven't written up that interview yet, what we really got into now. Because I think about it, I think that maybe he did, you know, mention your name in several others. Wasn't Sonny Morea in on that one too? Or was that the F1? Maybe it was... [00:40:46] JT: Sonny was the project manager of the J-2 at that time. [00:40:48] RB: Yeah. Or maybe that's…he just mentioned it in that context then. [00:40:54] JT: But we had about a two hundred man activity going in NASA and the industry combined. We had a test stand going on at Rocketdyne, firing engines trying to re-create the problem, testing components, and so…But Rex Bailey who works over in the propulsion division and I and Karl Heimberg set up a thrust chamber over here in Bill Grafton's test stand, and that's where we recreated the failure was over there. [00:41:28] RB: Okay, so right over here was really the critical discovery point then? Right here on this test stand? [00:41:34] JT: Yeah. Sure was. We recreated the failure. As a matter of fact, I had a thing on the wall, but that thing right there, we simulated the failure right over here. We fired at about eight o'clock one night. [00:42:00] RB: Now did you have a vacuum condition out there? [00:42:03] JT: No, because it wasn't necessary to have a vacuum to recreate the process that, you know, where the engine progressed to the point where it quit running. First of all, you had to create a vacuum here in the outside of this line so that there was no moisture condensation taking place. Then this line would fail due to convolution fatigue. These convolutions there, you know, failed in the [inaudible] due to fatigue, and a crack opened up, and the hydrogen shot out this way instead of going into the ignitor. When the hydrogen didn’t go into the ignitor, then the face of the injector was under-cooled [sic] and it got a hot spot on it. Then like blowtorch it started to consuming itself and the failure worked back until the injector face sort of caved in. Well, it's that part of the recreating of the series of circumstances that we've performed over here. It was Rocketdyne who, during the course of the investigation, stumbled across the fact that the environment was very important in terms of life of this convolution here. [00:43:36] RB: Okay, so let me try and get this straight then. Rocketdyne first discovered the environmental factor. [00:43:41] JT: That's right. [00:43:42] RB: Okay. And then you recreated the environmental factor out here? [00:43:46] JT: Well, we recreated the failure process. You know, to go back first, General Phillips says, “You gotta prove what happened.” So we showed him this happened: that line failed. He says, “How did it fail?” It failed due to fatigue. He says, “Why did it fail?” It failed because of the environment around there. It caused high frequency vibrations in it. Then he says, “Now you recreate the events like that engine saw in flight.” Well, it's that fourth thing that we did over here. Rocketdyne stumbled across the fact that the environment was critical to the fatigued life of those [bellows?]. That two hundred man operation was, like I say, active for about four months, and we got the solution. [00:44:54] RB: That was both Marshall and Rocketdyne, the two hundred man crew? [00:44:57] JT: Yeah, it was Marshall, Rocketdyne, North American, and Douglas—all four combined effort—was 200 men. [00:45:07] RB: Sounds like it was, you know, getting to the stage of another crunch like Brainerd Holmes might have called you back up again for another session. Of course, it was a little late then. [laughs] [00:45:18] JT: Well, we had something nearly like that because during the course of that four months, we had these things called [inaudible] what they do now, but the Boeing building down in the Research Park, they had a room that would go in and sit down, and TV shows all over the country to other groups. We'd have to go down there about once every three weeks or something and give a briefing on where we were in this investigation. That darn thing, I don't know, I mean, it must have been a thousand people on that hookup, because they had people at Boeing Seattle; people at out on the west coast of Los Angeles within that; people down at KSC; people in Houston; people in Washington. It was like a Walter Cronkite news broadcast. [00:46:18] RB: Why did they have such an extensive hookup? Was it just to let other people know in terms of their own scheduling or because of the inputs they could make from a technical standpoint? [00:46:26] JT: No, it was a management review, and all the management should know was, you know, was very concerned, because we were trying to, you know, go manned flight on 504. [00:46:43] RB: Yeah. 503, wasn't it? [00:46:46] JT: 504. [00:46:47] RB: Okay. [00:46:49] We were trying to go manned flight on 504—502 had messed up. They were kind of wondering whether to delay the flight of 503, until we had absolutely proven the solution. And if they delay 503, they delay 504, and then they delay the whole lunar program. So that's why all them people were interested. But it was on that same flight—if you recall— we had the first pogo problem on S-1C. [00:47:20] RB: On 502, yeah. [00:47:22] JT: So we had Erich Goerner, who was in charge of the pogo investigation. He had a whole team, and all over the country and I had this ASI line [inaudible]. [00:47:36] RB: How do you spell…is it G-O-E-R-N-E-R, Goerner? [00:47:41] JT: G-O-E-R-N-E-R. Erich Goerner. [00:47:48] RB: Yeah, I think there was…503 was the first manned flight—that was Apollo 8. [00:47:53] JT: I didn't know it was. [00:47:54] RB: Yeah, 504 was the manned suborbital flight. 505 went back to the moon. 506 [inaudible]. [00:48:00] JT: Well, if it was, then the whole bet was, do we dare put men on the bird that lost three engines and had POGO on 502. That's why they were all sweatin’. [00:48:13] RB: Were you sweating when that man launch finally came then or were you pretty sure that it was going to go? [00:48:19] JT: I sweated every time it flew, hoping nothing happened with propulsion system. [both laugh] [00:48:28] RB: As far as the Saturn V missions, that was the only really big problem that you had that was on 502—as I recall—POGO and the ASI line. They both happened at the same time. [00:48:40] JT: That's right. And of course, those all fell heavily in the propulsion area, so we had plenty of activity. POGO problem, you know, goes back to what the F-1 compliances are the F-1 engine gains, and we had a program going on night and day to run the F-1 turbo pumps and engine [inaudible] factors and all that's going on here looking at the inside line phase parallel for it. It's really exciting. [00:49:18] RB: [laughs] Yeah, yeah. [00:49:20] JT: That's the part that really I think people would enjoy reading more about if I were looking into the Saturn...I mean it's great to read about how you land on the moon and all and the [chariots?] run around all over, but good lord they got miles and miles of film about that. The thing that isn't really documented is all of the daily excitements and things that went on during the course of getting there. [00:49:56] RB: That's what struck me about writing this history: it's that the manned part of the mission is so visible. It's easier to relate to maybe because there are men in it, but the development of the Saturn V and all the testing, static tests, dynamic tests, systems tests and so on, which is such a huge part of the program, is basically unknown. I mean, I take visitors out here to the Space Center and they didn't realize it was the Saturn I and I-B were a bunch of Redstone and Jupiter tanks, you know, hung together. A lot of people just really don't know that much about the Saturn story itself. So I agree with you. [laughs] I hope we can do a fairly good job with it. [00:50:39] JT: Another one that was really interesting too. One time we were concerned about the H-1 engine and its dynamic stability, perturbation, you know? We'd been running tests up at Joplin, Missouri... [00:50:55] RB: Neosho was that? [00:50:56] Neosho. Trying to bomb the H-1 engine and determine if it was truly dynamically stable and everything. And the engine wouldn't really damp in the time that we had laid down for ourselves that it should. So we began to wonder if the test stand up there may have contributed, you know, to lack of desired damp time. So we—Bob Richmond and myself—were working in the area there. We decided that, by golly, the only way you'll ever find out is to put the engine in a stage, then bomb the whole dang stage. We had an AM-11, [inaudible] be blown today—it’s an S-1 stage. We had it over there on the test stand. We had eight engines in it. It was ready for its acceptance test. I made the proposal that we put bombs in there, and then, of course, during the acceptance fire, we'd get data on the stability characteristics of the vehicle as well, and it'd be a real live flight vehicle, and it ought to be surely good. So we put bombs in four engines. We ran the stage one time, and we had said we wanted three tests, you know, three burns, and we'd bomb every time. Fired the first time, we bombed four engines and watched the damp characteristics. That was good. For the second time, we bombed four engines, and we blew one engine flat out of that stage over there, and it was on the day before George Washington's birthday. A year, I don't know, two, three, four years, five years ago. Boy, you're talking about a bunch of sick people. So the next day was George Washington's birthday, the holiday and all. But I was over there crawling around in that burned up back end where that engine had burned out. Dan Driscoll was in there, and Karl Heimberg was in there, and Lucas was in there, too. We were all four crawling around up there trying to see what the damage was, see how much delay, and how much expense and everything it was going to take. And it was that day, George Washington's birthday, that a congressional group was touring here. So naturally, when they hit town, they won't know what had blown up because you don't dare let a congressional group go through here having had an explosion without telling them we had one. So late afternoon, about three o'clock, why, we finally got a story well enough to give and explain to them what had happened and everything that would settle it all. So we began to clean up the mess, of course, we had to put in a new engine, replace all the hardware, and Chrysler was under contract with us. They fixed everything back pretty good. But we still had one more test to make, you know, because I wanted three. Somebody came to me and said, “Jerry, what about it? Are we going to get that third test?” [both laugh] Not on your life. [both laugh] I got all the experience and all the data that I need. [00:54:34] RB: What stage was this you were testing? It was an S-1 stage? [00:54:38] JT: No, it was an S-1. [00:54:40] RB: Oh, an S-1. Yeah, okay. An S-1 then. [00:54:44] JT: Yeah. With H-1 engines. [00:54:47] RB: Okay. [00:54:49] JT: But it was a funny thing, the explosion had not come though anything having to do with stability characteristics. What had happened is when you perturbate the thrust chamber, you know, causing a bomb explosion down there, the flow rates and everything change, and then they have to recover. The LOX pump on one of the engines had a carbon nose ring in it, and when you perturbate the engine, the [inaudible] naturally reacts. And of course it's going at—I think a H-1—around 5,000 or 6,000 RPMs. Carbon being a hard material with these shock loads like that, it cracked. When that cracked, the oxidizer shot through and came in contact with the fuel drain from the other pump. That's where the [explosion?] chain just popped right open. But we've got some good data from the stage from the combustion stability [panel?]. We proved without a doubt that the H-1 has required dynamic stability characteristics. But I never did get that third sample. [both laugh] [00:56:23] RB: Well, I still feel guilty about your meeting up here. I'm afraid I'm keeping you.. [00:56:26] [inaudible] what it’s like…this is these porch… [tape ends] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000048_A Title A name given to the resource Thomson, Jerry Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-23 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Description An account of the resource Procurement and specifications of Rocketdyne's J-2 engine https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/08ba46ae7d98993bf1022031a4c08180.jpg 4598197eb9b09fa4ae86fb6882190ee7 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/ed7b9258971206614488068cff3f24ce.mp4 82f42e37e2014501d6f365c4f51d8194 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Oral History A resource containing historical information obtained in interviews with persons having firsthand knowledge. Interviewee The person(s) being interviewed Sweat, Sidney; McKay, Therman; Hayden, Joe; and Powell, Luther Interviewer The person(s) performing the interview Bilstein, Roger E. Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 0:46:16 Transcription Any written text transcribed from a sound [00:00:00] RB: The story concerning the delivery, I'm not exactly sure, of the first instrument unit, flight unit, floating down to Tennessee and all that…would you care to recapitulate that for me? Which unit was it? Which IU was it? [00:00:23] Sidney Sweat: I've been trying to forget that ever since it happened, Roger. [00:00:25] RB: I get this chuckle over here. [laughs] [00:00:27] SS: Lou was very much a part of that too. Let me kind of set the stage for you. We were running behind on the delivery of that instrument unit. One of the reasons that we were behind on it was because we were having to make a significant number of changes in the instrumentation—the instrumentation also which fed into the flight control computer, the LVDA, and the LVDC. We were rapidly approaching the point that we could not accommodate the stack schedule—that's the schedule where they put the IU on the stack at the Cape. Center management called a bunch of us together and said, “How are we going to accommodate this?” The idea was presented to center management that, you know, it takes quite a bit of time in transit to go all the way down the Mississippi to New Orleans and around the Cape. Why don't we look at these modifications and do them in transit? We got quite a bit of reluctance on it. Luther and I and some of the people in the [inaudible] office sat down and developed the details with IBM and found out, yeah, it's feasible. But to make it work, we were going to have to continuously shuttle hardware along the Mississippi to meet the barge at various points as the hardware was literally built and as the drawings were finished. [00:01:55] RB: This is one of the enclosed barges then? [00:01:57] SS: Yes. To make a long story short, we pulled all the data together and worked out a detailed schedule on it. We assigned two people that would, in fact, we'd be in constant radio communication with them, “Hey, fellas, we need these bolts, we need these transistors, diodes, capacitors, and so on. We'll meet you at Biloxi, Mississippi tomorrow afternoon at four o'clock.” Well, we made one of our airplanes available and a bunch of guys in pickup trucks and so on. They kept replenishing our supply of parts, and as the mod kits were built from the drawings, they would deliver them to us. We worked on the barge and successfully completed that darn thing by the time we got to New Orleans. [00:02:43] RB: Okay, but now in all the stuff I read, there's a great detailed explanation about the IBM clean rooms and the global clean rooms and all this quality control. Now, did you guys rig up some special polyethylene rooms inside? How did you do that? [00:02:59] SS: Absolutely. On the enclosed barge, there is a built-in environmental system. [00:03:05] RB: That's right, I'd forgotten that. [00:03:07] SS: We'd built, fabricated, a polyethylene shroud that went around that we could have a positive pressure in the area for the technicians to work in. That way we were able to maintain the cleanliness level. Now, we did set a ground rule when we started out. We did not break into the ST-124 pneumatic system. That's the one that has the most stringent environmental control. But we did open up and go into the environmental—the ECS system as we called it—the environmental control system, the water-methanol. [00:03:44] RB: Right, right, right. [00:03:46] SS: So, in fact, we were anxiously waiting for KSC to run their first test specimen to see if we had maintained the cleanliness level, and we had maintained it right within spec. [00:03:59] RB: But you were also replacing, you say, diodes and capacitors, and everything else in the memory banks? [00:04:04] SS: No, no, no, no, no. These were just in the electrical distributors. [00:04:09] RB: Oh, okay. So, in other words, the flight computer and the launch vehicle digital adapter were never [inverted?]. Okay. That's the other thing that bothered me because the story was vague, and it's outlined. [00:04:22] SS: Yes, well, we had to be very selective on those components, which we could, in fact, open. Of course, we had a very limited capability on board the barge from our ability to put in transistors and diodes and then our ability to test them. [00:04:39] RB: There's one other thing you may not want to comment on. Somewhere, too, in the back of my mind, part of the equipment that was put on board was several cases of beer. Is that correct? [laughs] [00:04:51] SS: No. That's totally erroneous. No way. In fact, they didn't even have beer in the galley on the barge. [00:05:02] RB: Is that right? Dry barge? [laughs] [00:05:04] SS: Dry barge. But the food…I've got to tell you about this. You know, usually when you're working sixteen, eighteen hours a day, you lose a lot of weight, but the chef on board that barge was something else. I literally gained 12 pounds on that trip. [00:05:27] RB: One of the things that I've tried to do, and I've been working on a revised draft of, is go back and treat the development of the unit logic devices and triple modular redundancy and all this kind of stuff. But the one thing that really grabs me and trying to get a hold of the instrument unit story is how much input Marshall made on this thing up to 1964 when I think is when IBM took over the full contract and how much input IBM was making before and after that date. Can any of you help elucidate that problem? [00:06:02] Joe Hayden: I can, I guess, start on it. Marshall was responsible for the design of the IU in the early stages. I believe that IBM took over the maintainability of the design starting with 501 and 205 as I recall. The checkout of 201 to 204 was a Marshall responsibility, and the design was a Marshall responsibility. Marshall in effect turned over a design to IBM then IBM was responsible with continuing with that design and maintaining the design. [00:06:46] RB: Okay. Excuse me, before going further, could you identify yourself for the purposes of my microphone here? [00:06:53] JH: I am Joe Hayden. [00:06:53] RB: OK, thank you. Now, so my question is this, who really came up with the TMR and ULD concepts, stuff like that? [00:07:04] [inaudible due to overlapping speakers] [00:07:26] Luther Powell: ULDs is based on the technology that was used in the 360 line. That’s what it was an early application of what IBM called the SLTs: Standard Logic Technologies. Now, the ULDs [per se?] the circuits in the ULDs were Marshall designed. In other words, they did not take off the [shelf?] SLTs. They had to be designed specifically for the Saturn application. They required the defining a certain number of types. I don’t know how many types we had…fourteen, or something like that, types of ULDs, Unit Logic Devices. The mechanical aspects of it was completely different because the SLTs were pins. They had pins that plugged in sort of like. We went with a new design with what we called C-clips. They go around and clipped them on. [00:08:22] RB: This is interesting then. So in this instance could you say that there was a departure from some original constraints that you only use off the shelf hardware? [00:08:31] LP: Well, at that point in time, there wasn’t technology in off the shelf hardware. It was a question at that time whether you went with integrated circuits or whether you went with the so-called ULDs, the clip chip type of technology. [00:09:00] SS: Roger I don't understand your statement there—the departure from the ground rule to use off the shelf hardware. [00:09:07] RB: Okay, well, these are just kind of general things that on almost every stage including the IU, there were documents that came out, and they all said for a general term “One of the things we want to do is use the existing components, take off the shelf hardware. We don’t want to get involved in using new technology that’s not really tried and tested and get into a hassle.” This is what I was getting at. [00:09:34] JH: [Inaudible] find gold. There were very few components which were off the shelf. In fact, the only ones that come to mind are maybe some TM components. But the majority of the hardware was designed and built for Saturn. [00:09:43] SS: And some plumbing maybe. [00:09:49] RB: TM components? [00:09:50] JH: Telemetry. [00:09:52] RB: Telemetry, okay. [00:09:53] JH: Instrumentation. Like Motorola had some equipment that could be used, but very little off the shelf hardware for Saturn. [00:10:01] RB: Okay because that’s one of the things that struck me about using the magnesium-lithium for the chassis. Apparently that was a fairly unique thing to be doing for the application in the instrument unit. Now again who made the decision to go to that? Was that an IBM decision or was that Marshall decision? [00:10:17] JH: All of the decisions were made by Marshall. Again, there were contractors involved. You and I know when it came time or maybe there were recommendations proposed by the contractors, but the decisions were all Marshall before the final decision. Even when IBM had the responsibility for maintaining the design, Marshall still had the final authority. [00:10:42] LP: It was a bigger question in that mag-lith [inaudible] cooling [inaudible] [00:10:51] Therman McKay: One of the [inaudible] on mag-lith, [JB?] had mentioned to me earlier that Herman Gilmore and Marshall had done a lot of work in the area of mag-lith, and it had sort of become an accepted alloy to be used. Using mag-lith, [inaudible] they were able to shave some sixty-five pounds from the weight from the DA/DC. Plus it didn’t have toxicity problems. Beryllium, which was used by the way in the platform system, remained a part of its strength and its stability for use in gimbals. But I think… [00:11:33] LP: You said weight on the cold plate too. If you’re going to cool the thing, you gotta move weight from the cold plate. So all that… [00:11:41] JH: But again the thing you said that IBM has been the contractor that recommended that approach. I don’t know. I don’t go back that far. [00:11:50] RB: Let me ask, let me explain why I’m on this because as I said I started out on this covering somebody else’s tracks, and there is a lack of documentation. The only thing I had to go with was a bunch of stuff from Aviation Week and Space Technology, and they’re kind of vague. Of course, I got the impression that the reporter had gone to IBM, and the feedback that comes back was this was a great thing that IBM did. This is what I’m trying to find out: where did IBM make inputs, and where did the Marshall design input? [00:12:19] SS: To really answer that, Roger, you’re going to have an understanding about a change control system. As Joe pointed out, IBM assumed design responsibilities for the instrument unit for 501 and 205. All the instrument units prior to that time, Marshall had designed and developed and turned over to IBM under prime contractor’s award is what was referred to as a technical baseline. [00:12:48] RB: Okay. [00:12:49] JH: Excuse me, Sid, I don’t mean to interrupt, but I guess we need to make the point here though that even prior to that time, LVDA/DC were [GSE?] but still made by IBM at Owego under a contract that we had with Owego. IBM was a corporation still building the DA/DC for the government even prior to the contract. [00:13:14] SS: The change control system that I’m going to allude to was applicable even back during that period of time. The contractor is limited in the type of change he can make a decision on and implement. We had various classifications of changes. Now any change that involved a material change of this significance—we’re talking about the mag-lith—or any other change that would have affected some compatibility of a component’s ability to integrate with another one, all of those decisions were passed on to Marshall who made the ultimate decision. Some of them were recommended by the contractor. He’d come through with what we referred to as an ECP—Engineering Change Proposal—but that’s all it was. He proposed the change, but the government made the decision as to whether or not that change would be implemented. [00:14:13] JH: I think that what he’s getting at is even prior to that time, we had to have a unit. Who came up with all the original ideas of just how the unit could be built? [Inaudible] these fellas [inaudible] specific case was done, the government would propose to a contractor for a proposal to build a black box to the government’s requirements and specifications for that black box. The contractor would build that black box. Most of the details of how it be built would be left up to the contractor, again, with the government’s approval. I would expect IBM had a major role in recommending or determining just how the DA/DC would be built. [00:15:04] RB: Including the mag-lith. [00:15:05] JH: I don’t know about the details of that. [00:15:09] LP: I don’t know the details either, but as I recall there was a major input from [inaudible] materials. [00:15:18] RB: IBM? [00:15:21] TM: No, Marshall. [00:15:22] JH: I guess we’re all kind of guessing that far back. It’s really before our time. [Inaudible] I thought we were going to talk about the normal process that we go through. [00:15:36] LP: Talk about the technology, and we kinda drop back on some of the research IBM had done previously. As far as owning the ULDs, the government paid for setting up lines up in Fishkill to do those things. [00:15:55] TM: It’s a hybrid system. [00:15:58] JH: I think his thing though is “Who thought it up? Who decided this is the way we ought to go?” [Inaudible] with the government, but did IBM come up and say, “Hey, this is a good idea. This is the way to go”? I don’t know what kind of recommendations. [00:16:14] LP: We talked about this yesterday. One good example—I don’t know whether you were in the program or not—was the debate about how many memory modules we have. We had the monthly design—Luther, you might have been there—they designed the back panels with a maximum of six memory modules. This was on one of the engineering models. We sat there and told them, “We wanted eight memory modules in that machine.” They said, “Well, you don’t need eight.” [Inaudible] requirement, we told them we want eight. We went up there a month later, that back panel was laid out for six memory modules in there. It hit the fan, we had to get that. We accepted that machine because of schedule problems. Later on, we had to send that back and retrofit it. But the design changed, right there. So that’s the type of thing that you get into. [00:17:12] RB: You wanted the extra two on there for test purposes and testability and mission [inaudible]? [00:17:18] TM: It turned out that Saturn IB could use six memory modules, but the Saturn V had to have eight. [00:17:29] LP: Seven, seven and a half. Whatever it is. [00:17:30] TM: All boxes were designed to have eight, but only used six in the IB. [00:17:38] JH: [Inaudible] program information [inaudible] [00:17:46] RB: As long as we’re on that too, in the instrument unit for the IB and Saturn V were both identical? [00:17:53] JH: The IUs were identical with small differences, one being the number of memories. [00:18:05] [LP?]: Do you want to stick with the DC? [00:18:07] TM: I think that’s what he’s talking about at the computer data adapter interface [inaudible due to overlapping speakers] [00:18:14] RB: There were variations in terms of the overall IU for the 1B and the Saturn V, but not that much as I understand. Basically, a kind of similar thing. Maybe I’m going back too far, but the other thing that gets me, I’m very, very [on query?] as to when the change was made in the early Saturn Is from the kind of tubular cruciform guidance system they had to the [slice?]? [00:18:45] JH: Well, vehicle-wise 201 and 501 were the first ones of the present configuration. [00:18:53] RB: Yeah, but I thought there was also Saturn I instead of having that… [00:18:57] SS: SA-10 was the last crucible we had. SA…. [00:19:01] TM: SA-1, 2, 3, and 4 had an instrument compartment for the IU equipment. Then in SA-5 we flew the first tubular canister type, which had…The reason I remember because that was the ST-90S platform flying in control, then the ST-124-1 being a passenger, and that fed into a guidance signal processor at that time rather than a DA/DC. For the last five Saturn Is, you had that. They were at ninety degrees. It had its own…It was pressurized because at that time it was felt the environment was needed. [00:19:54] [LP?]: First flight was 201. [00:20:04] JH: First IU in the present configuration was 201. [00:20:10] RB: Another question, very simple. What does the ST stand for? [00:20:18] TM: Platform? Stable table. That’s the old terminology. That’s just uh… [00:20:25] SS: [Inaudible] very sophisticated. [00:20:30] [LP?]: They coined the name stable table, and they just tried to give [inaudible] started calling it ST-80. [00:20:36] RB: I ran across it, and all of a sudden, I was doing all this writing, and it occurred to me that I didn’t know what ST stood for. I made calls around Houston, and this guy said, “I’ve been working on it for twenty years and never gave it thought. I don't know what it stands for.” [00:20:50] TM: It’s a stable reference or a stable platform. The early term they used was table. It means a reference point. [00:21:01] RB: Now there’s another question here, somewhere apparently early in the definition of the instrument unit, there was a decision to go to digital as opposed to analog, and that’s about as much as I know about it. [00:21:14] JH: Again, that’s only with the guidance computer. The control computer is still analog. [00:21:20] RB: The guidance computer, okay. [00:21:22] JH: The guidance computer [inaudible]. [00:21:24] RB: Can you explain to me the logic and the trade offs involved? [00:21:38] [LP?]: As opposed to some of the earlier flights like Jupiter? Basically, because they went to a different guidance scheme. They went from a delta minimum to [inaudible]. The thing was [inaudible] polynomial expansion was about thirty terms in there somewhere. It was [inaudible]. [00:22:05] RB: So was that not really a big decision or was it a very large decision? [00:22:11] : [LP?]: I think to have adaptive mode was a big decision but then [inaudible] hardware in a number of areas. The computing system or the guidance [inaudible]. [00:22:23] TM: It was a necessary decision to do what they wanted to do. [00:22:27] [LP?]: The decision was a direct derivative the mission requirements. [00:22:31]: RB: Can you expand on that a little bit for me? [00:22:33]: [LP?]: Take the LOR concept. The big discussion with all of the agencies, “How will you get [inaudible]?” [Inaudible] or whether you go to...I think it was about three concepts that had been discussed. [00:22:47]: RB: [Inaudible] mode and so on. [00:22:48] LP: [Inaudible] LOR because of the size of the vehicle, the capacity, fuel, [inaudible] so forth, they [inaudible] have adaptive mode. [Inaudible] calculations and speed of that in order to economize on fuel [inaudible] primary [inaudible] fuel economy. [Inaudible] We’ve been looking at that thing for a year or two years until we really thought it was going to [inaudible]. We were looking at the time of developing the Pershing. [Inaudible] Pershing [inaudible]. [00:23:39] JH: There was the other thing though [inaudible]. [00:23:44] RB: Okay, another question now. After going through all this stuff of getting the computers and everything and so on, they weren’t even used in the boost phase. Can you explain to me why then? As I understand anyway, there was no active guidance system used in the first stage boost phase for either the Saturn IB or the Saturn V. [00:24:07] JH: Let me tell you what I recall. Somebody correct me if I’m wrong. The main concern, of course, you’re going to Max Q [inaudible] boost phase. I think they wanted to be sure they didn’t have any attitude [inaudible] Max Q. In other words, you’re trying to correct, pick the best path, and you may have an undesirable attitude as the way I recall it. I’m sure that’s one reason. [00:24:33] RB: An undesirable attitude would create sloshing problems or bending moments? [00:24:38] JH: If you have too large angle of attack going to Max Q, you’ll have vehicle break up. Does anybody else… [00:24:49] RB: So in other words, that thing was set just to bore straight up? [00:24:52] [LP?]: That’s right. [00:24:53] RB: Was there any gimbaling at all? [00:24:54] JH: It goes up straight and then it rolls to the proper attitude, then it pitches over and flies on a preset trajectory through the boost phase. [00:25:07]: RB: After the roll and tilt then there was no gimbaling of the engines? It just bored straight on up? [00:25:13]: JH: It was gimbaled to keep it on course. [00:25:17] TM: Keep attitude. [00:25:22] RB: As I understand it then, if there were any perturbations or deviations or something occurred that the computer sensed those and stored them up and the changes and corrections were made then during the S-2 and S-4B boost phase. [00:25:37] JH: The vehicle stored up the information to know what its position was and knowing its position and knowing after that its attitude and its velocity and acceleration because they [inaudible]. [00:25:51] TM: The guidance mode. It would enter the guidance mode, and it was shooting for one spot out there. [00:25:58] RB: This brings me to another…I don’t know, maybe you guys didn’t get a copy of this, but I’ve got a list of questions here. One of them, and I’ll be very humble about it, an explanation of inertial guidance that I can understand. [laughs] I really need that I’m afraid. I’ve tried to write some stuff. I’ve got some general ideas, but I’m really not sure. When I talk about inertial guidance… [00:26:19] SS: I think Luther has the book there that… [00:26:22] RB: Is it a star reference guidance system or an internal reference guidance system? Can somebody help me on this? [00:26:32] TM: Inertial guidance is not a star reference. It’s a reference that you establish on the ground prior to lift off where you have the platform oriented to the local vertical in two axes, yaw and pitch, and you have it aligned an azimuth to a theodolite reference, which is a first order geodetic survey, which is shot into the platform system to align in it in roll or azimuth. The other two axes are aligned to a plumb line through the center of the earth by pendulums mounted on the platform system, air bearing pendulum. Now that’s your reference. That’s where you’re starting from. You know exactly where you are when you start. Once you lift off, you drop the alignment system, and the platform goes inertial or space-fixed. It just maintains the reference. It has three stabilizing gyros that gives you this stable table or stable reference that you operate from. Throwing out any errors due to drift and what not, theoretically the platform system is always exactly in the same position from the time you start to the time you end the mission. Now that’s attitude. Those signals are fed from resolvers. You have resolvers on the gimbals of the platform that’s [keyed?] out through the computer and detects errors between the platform system and the vehicle. Then those signals are fed back to the control system to make corrections to keep the vehicle on the proper attitude. It’s an instantaneous thing though, and you’re constantly maintaining the vehicle and the attitude relative to the platform system with these pre-programmed tilt programs and everything factored in too. But the whole purpose of the stable reference there is it didn’t allow you a way to navigate, so then mounted on the platform, you have accelerometers, integrating accelerometers that produce the acceleration and velocity data that eventually becomes position data to tell you the point that you want to hit out there. [00:28:59] RB: But these are being constantly compared are they not with a program stored in the guidance computer? [00:29:06] TM: Yeah, you’re looking at where you are versus where you ought to be. So inertial when you limit your question to just “What is inertial guidance?” is your talking about platform. The platform is a pretty straight forward part of it. It’s just a reference you set up using gyros that you can operate from. Then you use accelerometers to [cinch?] your accelerations in all three axes. [00:29:36] JH: It helps you to navigate, but then your computer has to come up with guidance calculations and send signals to the control system now that has to send signals to the actuators on the stages to direct the thrust so that the vehicle is going in the right direction. By the way, I’ve just taken some pages out of one of our technical manuals that’s on navigation guidance and control system, and I think this will give you the information that you need. I do want to come back to your other question though that you had. It does say here that “During the first stage flight of either the S-1B or S-1C,” which of course is the first stage of either one of [inaudible], “the vehicle transverses the dense portion of the atmosphere where the high aerodynamic pressure occurs to avoid excessive structural loads caused by guidance maneuvers, no guidance constraints are applied during the flight phase. Open loop guidance in the form of a timed tilt program is used. Path adaptive guidance begins with ignition of the second stage, either the S-2 for the…” [tape cuts out] [00:30:46] RB: …Consider the instrument unit as a stage? What is the… [00:30:51] JH: A non-propulsive stage. [00:30:52] RB: A non-propulsive stage. [00:30:54] JH: That’s my own opinion of it. [00:30:55] [LP?]: Von Braun coined a good phrase [inaudible] it’s the brain inside. That’s the way he referred to it quite often. [00:31:07] JH: You can always get that debate. There’s a project office for the IU just like there’s a stage project office. You look at [inaudible] no propulsion system. [00:31:22] TM: We didn’t have any de-tanking problems that we had to scrub. [00:31:31] RB: [laughs] There’s another question I’ve got now. Again, I’m getting into the same murky waters as the origin of the mag-lith chassis, and this is the ST-124 itself. Was it a Marshall concept? Did Marshall give the plans to Bendix and say, “Here, build me an ST-124”? How did that come about? [00:31:48] TM: They didn’t give them the plans. Bendix people are packaging experts and platform design. They built the ST-120 that’s still flying in the Pershing. ST-124 evolved from that to some extent, but Marshall in the form of ABMA was involved in the development of the Pershing platform ST-120. I’d have to say that Marshall was very actively involved in the design of the 124. When I say design, I’m talking about basic concepts for what it will do, that it will have dual prism alignment to allow you to maintain a reference and drive your platform to any firing azimuth as opposed to the way ballistic missiles had to be aligned and shoot right over [the San Juan?]. Those were all things that were concepts that were worked together with Bendix but Marshall had a very heavy hand in designing the 124. When they went into production, and Bendix got the contract, then Bendix had the job of actually packaging that concept into the hardware, which is what they did. But if you look at the ST-124 platform and go down to the museum and look at an SG-66 platform that flew in the V-2, you will be amazed. The SG-66 wasn’t designed by Bendix, but some of the people that worked on the SG-66 also worked on the ST-124. I'd have to say that… [00:33:40] LP: [Inaudible] designed it. Look back at the old ST-80 and ST-90 and [LVDC?]. [All the way back?] [00:33:46] RB: I was going to say [inaudible]. [00:33:50] TM: The point I’m trying to make is when you talk design, I’m talking about basic concepts. When you get into packaging, Bendix may have come up with a good idea on how the servo end should operate. [00:34:03] JH: The packaging is very similar to the V-2. [00:34:08] TM: I’m saying if you go look at that old SG-66, then look at a ST-124, it really strikes you as strange to see the two sitting there, one of them 1930 something and one of 1960. [00:34:27] RB: What’s the difference between the ST-124 and the ST-124-M? [00:34:32] TM: Well, the ST-124-1 and -2 were the first 124 platforms built, and they flew in the Saturn I vehicle. It was a predecessor to the dash M, and the M only means modified. The platform that flew in Saturn I had a redundant pitch gimbal built in. The yaw and roll were 360 degrees of freedom, and pitch was limited to [twenty-three?], but it had a redundant gimbal that had its own servo loop that would then program as you had to pitch over. They changed this in the dash M to make yaw the axis that was limited to plus or minus forty-five degrees. The other two axes had 360. That gave you full freedom in pitch, which is helpful when you’re in orbit, you know, and you’re maintaining attitude of the vehicle, you just rotate around the platform. But with a platform like the dash 1 and dash 2, [inaudible] you’re constantly having to program [inaudible]. So there was a difference, it was just updated and modified to the present configuration. Those flew in 201, 501, and… [00:36:06] RB: Again, I’m thinking about the structure of the ST-124 and the computer chassis. They’re both integrally cooled, right? [00:36:19] TM: Yes, in a little different form. The DA/DC actually had drilled passages within the mag-lith to allow the coolant to flow through the body of the system. In the 124, the way they adapted it was to form the covers such that on the covers the ball had coolant passages through them. The actual frame in the platform has no coolant through it. The covers—see you can see the lines there—it was formed by taking two layers and putting graphite in, and you press these together and then blew it up—actually inflated it. That’s the way the coolant passages were made, one on each side. [00:36:41] RB: Oh okay, I never understood that. [00:37:10] TM: The frame of the platform system, which is beryllium, did not have coolant passages in it. It would have been real difficult to do that like it was done in the DA/DC because it’s not a symmetrical box. [00:37:27] RB: Beryllium is lighter than the mag-lith, correct? [00:37:31] TM: It’s strong too. It’s very stable. It has high strength. It has that toxicity problem, which was considered when they built the platform system, but they elected to go with it. I think… [00:37:49] RB: That’s why I’m trying to find out why they decided to go with beryllium in one case and not in the other one. [00:37:56] TM2: One reason is you had two different groups of people working. I don’t know how that fits, but I think that has a lot to do with it. [00:38:10] RB: The beryllium decision you think maybe came out of the Bendix shop as opposed to the Marshall shop? [00:38:15] TM: A lot of the beryllium on the platform was going to be buried into the platform where you made the casting of the DA/DC, both of them. You [wouldn’t?] have had all the beryllium showing. The covers on the platform are not beryllium. [00:38:32] RB: The whole thing is just a big ball as I recall seeing it… [00:38:34] TM: The covers—the main part of it that shows—is not beryllium. There’s a lot of beryllium inside the platform, see? All of your gimbals are beryllium. [00:38:47] RB: Is this necessity for the rigidity and accuracy then that made beryllium much more attractive for the ST-124 as opposed to mag-lith? [00:38:55] TM: It’s a very good material to use for gimbals. It’s very light weight. It’s very strong, and they wanted accuracy. They’re able to machine it and mount it and know that later it’s right where you put it. It worked out real good. I don’t believe the toxicity problem turned out to be as bad as... [00:39:20] RB: But it’s a fairly small thing. It didn’t weigh all that much. What was it, 196 pounds? That doesn’t sound right, but… [00:39:25] TM: The platform? 117. Well, that’s for the inertial assembly. [00:39:31] RB: Why not use steel? Does steel weigh that much more? [00:39:35] TM: Let me give you a good example of why. If everybody thought that way, the weight would go up in a way you wouldn’t have a payload. There was a statement that was made that if every solder joint in the Saturn V was over-soldered to the point that it had as much solder as you’d do in your shop at home—instead of dressing it down to the point where it’s a neat and lightweight joint—if every solder joint in the Saturn built up too big, it would take away the entire payload capability of Saturn V, which was 37,000 pounds. [00:40:20] RB: And the other thing too, in the upper stages, it’s a one-to-one trade-off, as I understand too. So you save thirty pounds, that’s exactly thirty pounds that you put on the payload. [00:40:28] TM: It's 117 pounds for the inertial assembly. If you asked the question, “Why go with 117 when you could’ve gone with 140 or 50?” Well, it’s just a… [00:40:39] JH: Also, back when all that was designed, I’m not so sure how good a handle Marshall had on the [capability?] of the vehicle and what the other parts were going to weigh too, see? Like the structure. We went all out on the honeycomb structure to make it lighter and all of this for [inaudible] necessary [inaudible] payload capability. [00:41:04] RB: Okay, well, I’ve kept some of you gentlemen beyond your time. I’ve also got to go off now myself, go back to an interview that was interrupted. Is there anything you could add to help the poor historian here, you think? Any comments you’d like drop in here before I turn this thing off? [00:41:23] LP: I got a document here. [Inaudible] I think it’s a pretty good document on the guidance, navigation, and control that goes in the platform. Got pictures in here. Computers… [00:41:35] JH: What’s the date on it? [00:41:36] LP: 1964. [00:41:38] SS: That’s also an antique. [00:41:40] JH: I was just thinking I had pulled some pages out of I think it’s a more current [inaudible] out of the astrionics handbook [inaudible]. [00:41:52] RB: Anything will help. [00:42:05] JH: Here’s some pages that came out [inaudible]. I don’t know your specific question. [00:42:09] RB: This was just kind of pulled out of a hat. I had a very limited group of documents to work with. This is just one of the things I came across. That particular event occurred while 501 was in the checkout, so there was a momentary flap about it, whether the flap was really large and created horrendous problems or just one of the many things that happens during checkout. I didn’t know, so I stuck it in there, maybe it would jog somebody’s memory. [00:42:42] JH: It was a pretty large flap that the problem was revealed during the checkout of 503 at IBM. There was a failure of the flight control computer, which was traced through a cracked solder joint in the FCC. Because of the nature of the problem, there was a concern about all of the critical hardware, not just the FCC. There was a requirement to recycle the FCC for 501. In fact, they disassembled it, inspected it for cracked solder joints, and reworked it by actually providing what’s called [inaudible] to strengthen the joints. There was also a requirement to inspect other critical hardware [inaudible] details on those. The problem, of course, there’s been a lot said about cracked solder joints before and after that. What happens is that because of the design—the way the components are mounted on the board, the [inaudible] fuse, and the differences in the thermal coefficients—you build up stresses on the joint. Because the joints are stressed, that causes the crack. Even though you’ve got a good solder joint, it cracks within the solder. That was a rather expensive exercise. In fact, I have just three documents associated with that activity. There was a lot of [scurrying?] around, a lot of rework activity that was necessary before 501 got off. You also mentioned questions about testing. I’m not sure what you’re after there. [00:44:25] RB: That was just a general question because I wasn’t able to find out a whole lot about testing. I wasn’t really sure what all was involved in that. I didn’t have any information about it. I know the propulsive stages went through all kinds of testing and checkout at MTF and everywhere else. [00:44:43] JH: That’s the thing that bothers me a little bit. If you look at that document, there’s just volumes and volumes of the other stages in there, and the IU is almost nothing. As far as the test program, well, of course, I didn’t bring the book…Here it is. Here is the test plan for the IU. This is a very high level, but there were many tests at the IU level, not to speak of all the qualification of the hardware etc. We have quite a bit of detail on that. This goes back to ‘65. Now what I’ve done—again not being sure just what you were looking for—I have taken some pages out of the general test plan that list the various IU level tests that were performed. I’ve also identified on a separate sheet some additional IUs that were scheduled and tested after this plan was written, and I’ve given you the reason why. I haven’t counted them up, but there must have been ten or twelve IU level tests. [00:45:50] RB: That sounds like it will give a base to start on some of this thing again.. [00:45:55] JH: I would like to see it if the history of Saturn comes out, I would like the IU to get some recognition, you know? Like [inaudible], it’s the brains of the vehicle, and without it, you’re not going to go very far. [tape ends] Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000047_A Title A name given to the resource Sweat, Sidney; McKay, Therman; Hayden, Joe; and Powell, Luther Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Description An account of the resource Instrumentation Unit: IBM as contractor, LVDA/DC, and ST-124-M https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/be4aac252087ea7122f9eda5240dfa17.pdf 0c454e265ad842e65ce9219f5f90570a Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000046_T Title A name given to the resource Stuhlinger, Ernst (Transcript) Description An account of the resource General Saturn topics, Projects Highwater and Pegasus. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-23 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/41818bb74e5d75e7d9ea39309acec5ee.jpg 4598197eb9b09fa4ae86fb6882190ee7 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/19688b42c65bf8ba9d283dcdef9ca7ff.mp4 e40d3d26a257735ba8ef55d604197bc6 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000046_A Title A name given to the resource Stuhlinger, Ernst Description An account of the resource General Saturn topics, Projects Highwater and Pegasus. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971-08-23 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/9817aff418bab19cd6b6e9ad577f5a54.pdf d52f9cf691f7294565f7add85d9e62cc Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000045_T Title A name given to the resource Stewart, Rod (Transcript) Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/e52795f3bddb4b7494f96b28bdb029f4.jpg 4598197eb9b09fa4ae86fb6882190ee7 https://oralhistory.uah.edu/files/original/28cf2deb5bb972fd09e63f005654293b.mp4 543c685002c998995d9c139cdf4df040 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context ohc_stnv_000045_A Title A name given to the resource Stewart, Rod Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource .MP4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Audio Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections.